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 This study examines the textual dialogues that emerge from the translation and 
publication of texts by U.S. authors in the Cuban literary magazine Orígenes: Revista de 
Arte y Literatura.  The magazine, published in Havana from 1944 to 1956, is considered 
one of the most important in the history of Latin American literature.  This dissertation 
analyzes the aesthetic, philosophical, political and religious foundations of texts by 
Wallace Stevens, T. S. Eliot, and Allen Tate in this new context, rather than from within 
the framework of the U.S. literary canon.  It is thus possible to illuminate the explicit and 
implicit cultural dialogues that emerge from the interactions between texts of distinct 
cultural origins.  This methodology is aimed at offering insights into the nature of cultural 
production in an international context and at expanding our understanding of the 
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connections between two national cultures that have been kept artificially separate by an 
embargo for the past four decades. 
 The text begins with the description of a methodology for studying literary 
journals and the function of translation within them.  Then, Orígenes is placed in its 
historical, cultural and political context, and the thinking of each Cuban participant is 
described, illustrating how each writer contributes in a unique way to the overarching 
cultural projects of the magazine.   
 The study then examines the textual interactions between each U. S. author and 
Orígenes, illustrating how each interaction contributes to a dialogue on themes of 
realism, history, imperialism, temporality, mysticism, technology, and exoticism.  In 
narrating each textual dialogue, the study is attentive not only to the conceptual 
consonances and dissonances that emerge, but also to the crucial mechanics of textual 
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 Orígenes: Revista de arte y literatura (1944-56) is one of the most significant and 
influential literary magazines in the history of Latin American literature.  Participants, 
rivals, and subsequent generations of critics have all concurred that the journal sustained 
an unusually high level of artistic quality through the twelve years of its publication.  Not 
only did it publish work by some of the most important Latin American authors of the 
moment, but also presented, in translation, the texts of some of the most significant 
European and North American writers.  Among the Europeans represented were Paul 
Claudel, Rainer Maria Rilke, Paul Valéry, Stephen Spender and Juan Ramón Jiménez.  
The North American writers included were Elizabeth Bishop, T. S. Eliot, Wallace 
Fowlie, Caroline Gordon, Henry James, Harry Levin, Francis Otto Matthiessen, 
Katherine Anne Porter, George Santayana, Wallace Stevens, Allen Tate, and William 
Carlos Williams.  Though it might be argued that the inclusion of such texts was meant 
simply to boost the publication’s prestige, the editors and other participants in the 
magazine, as well as subsequent groups of critics all assert that the international character 
of the magazine is central to its substance.  This study is based on this assertion, seeking 
to suggest a detailed explanation of its implications.   
 This study deals with the Cuba-United States axis of collaboration at work in 
Orígenes.  I examine the texts that Wallace Stevens, T. S. Eliot and Allen Tate 
contributed to the magazine, considering those texts in a transnational context.  The 
aesthetic, philosophical, political and religious values embedded in those texts will be 
considered in relation to the stated and unstated cultural agendas of the Orígenes group, 
in a critical perspective that treats the texts as evidence of contentious encounters 
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between differing or parallel notions of the character and importance of literary 
expression.   
 I choose these three authors from among the U.S.-born authors represented 
because the publication of their work in Orígenes creates dialogues of the greatest 
conceptual breadth and depth.  Focusing on these authors allows this study to illustrate 
three very different transnational textual encounters and explore their significant 
implications within the limited scope of this study.  Further, each encounter is 
characterized by a predominant mode of interaction, each of which is central to an 
understanding of the Orígenes project.  The Stevens nexus is primarily aesthetic, the Tate 
nexus is political, and the Eliot nexus deals primarily with issues of religion.  Thus, using 
these three authors as case studies allows for a focused exploration of each of these three 
textual dynamics.    
 The way in which I have structured the terms of the comparisons I will make in 
this study already suggests a significant methodological problem: how can one 
characterize in a coherent way what the cultural agendas of a magazine like Orígenes 
were?  The origenistas, the group of regular contributors to the magazine and participants 
in its legendary dinners and discussion circles, consist of authors of varying aesthetic, 
philosophical and religious orientations.  Thus the implications of the publication of a 
certain U.S. author’s text and the particular nature of its translation into Spanish cannot 
be said to arise from a simple one-to-one interaction between foreign text and a 
monolithic Cuban culture or aesthetics.  Each foreign text finds itself situated in a 
heterogeneous cultural terrain that Orígenes maps out, one that can present both 
similarities and contrasts to the techniques and intentions of the U.S. authors.     
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 The most prolific and imposing figure of the group is José Lezama Lima (1910-
1976), whose poetics informs the central theoretical current of origenismo.  His 
programmatic essays claim the largest discursive territory in the magazine, and his 
numerous poems and fiction pieces constitute an imposing body of creative practice that 
manifests the theory of his essays.  It is nonetheless a mistake to reduce Orígenes to 
Lezama, examining how multiple authors offer their individual takes on his central poetic 
doctrine.  As we will see, Cintio Vitier, Virgilio Piñera and José Rodríguez Feo, each in 
his own way, represents a unique stream of thought within Orígenes.  Piñera stands out as 
a radical foil to Lezama’s poetics, with his assertion of the categories of the absurd and 
the grotesque, in his atheism, and his profoundly pessimistic vision of human existence. 
Cintio Vitier is less obviously opposed to Lezama, though the religious foundations of his 
poetics are quite different.  Finally, Rodríguez Feo, the one who coordinates and mediates 
most of the transnational textual encounters in the magazine, is a complex thinker, who 
both bolsters and challenges Lezama’s ideas about art in his translations and essays.  He 
figures prominently in this study. 
 Rodríguez Feo’s editing, translations, and critical work show him to be a liminal 
and protean figure.  At times he sings in unison with Lezama (as in the essays signed by 
both editors) and in other instances introduces methodologies and philosophical 
assertions that inflect the agenda expressed in those essays in new ways.  The best way of 
describing Rodríguez Feo’s role in Orígenes is to call it translational.   His labors 
embody two opposing theoretical implications of the activity of translation.  His efforts as 
editor, translator and literary critic open a space of fusion, where the foreign text and its 
receiving context are reconciled with one another and the transfer of meanings is 
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facilitated, while at the same time illustrating moments of incompatibility or blockage in 
the transfer between original and target languages and cultures.   
 The unity of Orígenes as a cultural project survived for ten years and forty issues, 
until the split in 1954 between Lezama and Rodríguez Feo.  Along with Virgilio Piñera 
and others, Rodríguez Feo founded Ciclón (1955-59), a magazine that returned to some 
of the fundamental concerns and techniques of the European-influenced vanguardistas.  
This often-discussed event does not represent a sudden divergence between the two 
editors of the magazine, but rather represents the culmination of the gradual development 
of a distinct poetics within Orígenes.  Ciclón represents a later consolidation of an 
internal aesthetic counterpoint to the stylistic and thematic concerns that many readers 
associate with Orígenes.1  Thus the definition of the Orígenes project will need to specify 
the dissonances that inflect its harmonic voicings in order to stay true to the essential 
heterogeneity operating within the magazine’s broader consensus.   
 The core impulse of the journal, beneath the variegated texture of conflict within 
the group, is to propose a variety of artistic responses to the deterioration of public 
institutions in the face of corruption and the imperialism that fosters it.  These responses 
delve into the spiritual and philosophical foundations of artistic creation itself, rather than 
engage political corruption on its own discursive level, which would diminish their power 
to present a coherent and effective alternative.  If the means of organizing human effort in 
political and commercial spheres in Cuba in the 1940s and 1950s impoverish and degrade 
the many for the benefit of the few, then in response, the origenistas propose a wholly 
different model that channels discrete creative energies into a collective expression that 
works to validate and uplift each participating individual.  The belief in the inherent 
 5
potential for spiritual regeneration in artistic activity unites much of the group, though we 
will see that the theologies undergirding that belief are multiple.  Differences of approach 
and technique within the group do not threaten this model of unity, but rather uphold it, 
by manifesting the value of counterpoint within the creative chorality of origenismo.  
 Thus, variations in philosophical interest and formal tendency within the group do 
not necessarily undermine the Orígenes project because that project advocates a kind of 
creative democracy in its programmatic statements.  This democracy situates itself in 
firm opposition to the corruption of democracy in the public sphere, through the concrete 
degradations of the representative process and through the hegemonic ideological unities 
thrust upon the many by a corrupt Cuban plutocracy.  At the highly significant moment of 
the magazine’s split into two manifestations in 1954, Lezama asserts that the very 
“origins” of the magazine depended on “…the mysterious unity of its poetic form, the … 
forced concurrence…”2 of its multiple creative channels (“…misteriosa unidad de su 
forma poética, la … esforzada concurrencia…”) (Diez Años 65).3  The entire notion of 
the magazine’s cultural agenda thus must be characterized by the productive tension 
between harmony and dissonance.  What the history of Orígenes illustrates is that it is 
extremely difficult to maintain such a conflicted state of affairs before a natural 
splintering occurs.   
 As Lezama asserts, within the space opened by a permissive heterogeneity, a 
certain degree of consistency of mission must be operative for the particularities of each 
writer’s work to stand out.  A set of common concerns, and even approaches, is necessary 
for the individuality of each work to enter into dialogue with its counterparts.  Thus, I 
will attempt at each stage of my analysis to take into account both the underlying unity 
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and the significant discrepancies within the Orígenes project, marking multiple points of 
contact and interaction between the U.S. and Cuban literary productions, rather than 
encounters between monolithic cultural phenomena.  In doing so, I hope to illustrate the 
democratic notion of creative activity that informs the magazine’s agendas and that 
propels its mission of constructing a cultural microcosm of a just society to oppose a 
corrupt one. 
 The politics of resistance and renewal implicit in the aesthetics of Orígenes makes 
for a particularly contentious zone of encounter between the journal and its North 
American contributors.   In the context of the interactions between Cuban and North 
American texts, we must recognize that the corruption that Orígenes explicitly opposes is 
fostered by Cuba’s neocolonial relationship to the United States.  The problem arises of 
how to treat the moments of interaction between Cuban and U.S. cultural actors within 
the overarching context of neocolonial political, economic and political relationships.  It 
is indeed important to recognize the unique political implications of textual discussions of 
issues like imperialism and the proper role of literature in a society when they take place 
across a boundary defined by a relationship of economic exploitation.  Nonetheless, an 
awareness of the importance of the unequal geopolitical terms on which such cultural 
encounters take place should not lead inevitably to a schematization of textual 
interactions according to those terms.   
 Instead, this study treats the participants from both countries as equals.  
Differences of agenda or theoretical orientation between these North Americans and the 
origenistas cannot always be described in terms of geopolitical power relations.  Rather 
than enabling cultural exploitation, the kind of cultural space opened by the collaboration 
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of U.S. and Cuban authors facilitates implicit and explicit dialogues on the nature of 
literary art and its importance to the development of culture.  This space is one in which 
geopolitical power is only one kind of advantage, whereas the power to define the crucial 
terms of the exchange is more equally shared, and at times shifts to the side of the Cuban 
authors who set the terms of debate within the pages of their magazine.  Just as the nature 
of the origenistas’ collective goals cannot be schematized into a distorting unity, the 
political implications of each textual encounter between U.S. and Cuban cultural 
productions cannot be simplified according to a reductive geopolitical dynamic.   
 
Translation in Orígenes: A Statement of Methodology   
 Any analysis of the mechanisms and effects of translation must begin with the 
assumptions Maria Tymoczko outlines in her essay on translation and postcolonial 
writing: “It is abundantly clear from the theory and practice of translation that no text can 
ever be fully translated in all its aspects: perfect homology is impossible between 
translation and source.  Choices must be made by the translator; there are additions and 
omissions in the process, no matter how skilled the translator” (23).  When we discuss 
translations of English texts for publication in Orígenes, we must assume that each one 
will include these additions and omissions.  Furthermore, the rendering of certain crucial 
words and phrases will enact refractions of the original sense, generating aesthetic, 
political, religious and philosophical implications not present in the original.   
 As Lawrence Venuti explains in his introduction to The Translation Studies 
Reader, translation theories revolve around two conceptual poles: equivalence and 
function.  Equivalence is understood as the translation’s accuracy or faithfulness to the 
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original, a concept used to evaluate how closely the two texts correspond on a linguistic 
level.  As Tymoczko asserts, we might encounter broad zones of equivalence between 
original and translation, but they will never be complete in scope.   
Function, on the other hand, is “…the potentiality of the translated text to release 
diverse effects…” (5).  When we evaluate the function of a translation, we are interested 
in its interactions with the target cultural context rather than in the clarity of its reflection 
of the linguistic character of the original.  We ask what the original does in (or to) its 
language system and the culture in which that system operates and then ask the same 
question about the translation.  To understand a text’s function, we must first gain a 
general understanding of the political, aesthetic, religious and commercial contexts of the 
text’s production and then move to an analysis of how the text is designed to interact with 
those contexts.  The nature of this interaction can be alternately cooperative or 
combative.  Works can seek to strengthen, enrich, inflect or defend certain features of 
their dominant context while works characterized as subversive, avant-garde, 
blasphemous or anticommercial are clearly posed in a conflictive relation to certain 
contextual structures.  A single text usually is engaged in both functions at the same time, 
employing techniques considered standard within one contextual frame while deploying 
subversive effects within another.  
 Moving beyond the level of semantic or syntactic equivalence, the concept of 
function operates on a broader level of cultural meaning, though it never escapes its 
grounding in the semantic and grammatical features of a text.  It does not negate 
equivalence as a valid criterion of analysis, either, but rather interacts with and revises 
our understanding of the nature of equivalence.  Equivalence and function, in fact, must 
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be understood as working in conjunction with one another in any instance of translation 
theory or practice.  Any analysis of a translation must employ both concepts.  Function 
should be understood not as a concept that breaks away from equivalence, but rather as 
that aspect of a translation that negotiates different levels of significance, engaging some 
and marginalizing others.   
 In examining the translations that enable the textual transfers between Cuban and 
U.S. literatures, we will see these kinds of adjustments and negotiations at work.  For the 
purposes of this study, though, we must be attentive to instances where a translation 
possesses functions that do not harmonize into the kind of metatextual equivalence 
Venuti describes.  Rather than try to recreate a text’s original effect upon its own 
language, literary canon, or culture, a translation can process the original in a way that 
produces an effect that it never possessed in its original context.  In this kind of operation, 
equivalence is often preserved at semantic and syntactic levels, but the translation that 
emerges from that equivalence has a function that is completely new because the 
receiving context is so different from the original context.   
At other times, we see a translation breaking away from linguistic equivalence to 
release an effect that does not contribute to an equivalence of function either.  This kind 
of translational move treats the text quite differently than those that sacrifice linguistic 
equivalence in order to offer the reader a more broadly cognate experience of the text.  In 
this case, the translation is a more thoroughgoing manipulation of the text; it is mobilized 
to contribute to certain cultural projects in the target culture in a way that has no 
equivalent in the operations of the text in its original context.  When the translator 
operates in this way, she does not strive to simply offer readers who are not conversant 
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with the language of the original an experience of the original text’s effects, but rather 
prepares the original for a wholly new function in the target context.  If what Venuti 
describes is what I would call an analytical approach to translation, where the goal is to 
present an understanding of a crucial function of the original to a new audience, this other 
mode of translation is an activist one.  This kind of translator is more interested in how a 
foreign text can be used than in how one should replicate its function in the target 
language.    
To understand this mode of translation, we must view translation as “…one of the 
processes of literary manipulation, whereby texts are rewritten across linguistic 
boundaries and that rewriting takes place in a very clearly inscribed cultural and 
historical context,” as Susan Bassnett-McGuire explains (xvii).  There are two crucial 
assertions in this statement.  The first is that translation is a manipulation, rather than a 
passive mirroring, of the original.  All translators make interventions into texts.  This fact 
illustrates what Bassnett-McGuire calls the “independence” of the translator from the 
discursive constraints involved in the production of the original (82). 
The second assertion helps us know how to make sense of these interventions—
they are part of an intercultural encounter at a given moment in cultural history.  
Accepting this second assertion, it becomes clear that to criticize or lament alterations 
made to the original, without asking the question of what purpose and what meaning 
those alterations have in the dynamic of cultural transfer, is inadequate to the task of 
describing the full implications of what occurs in a translation.  Whether we believe they 
are intentional or not, violations of our basic notions of equivalence between source text 
and translation participate integrally in processing the source text so that specific 
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aesthetic, political, religious or philosophical functions can be deployed in the target 
cultural context.  Presenting a text to a foreign audience in a clear, unmediated way, so 
that the audience’s experience of the text is a re-enactment of the experience of the 
readers of the original, is impossible.  Every translation is a rewriting, where the 
translator tackles the same essential question that the original author does: how to make a 
text speak to a certain cultural context. 
André Lefevere provides a useful way of understanding the cultural context to 
which both the original and the translation respond by breaking it down into two 
fundamental and interrelated systems—poetics and ideology.  The first is a set of beliefs 
about the proper aesthetic and formal traits of a work.  The second is a set of normative 
statements about how a society should function (14).  This second group of assertions 
tackles questions such as the proper means of political organization, economic 
stratification, and the relevance of religious meanings in the definition of a society.  
Contained within the poetics is the totality of images, devices and generic definitions 
available to a writer working within the system (26).   But there is also a mode of poetics 
that centers on the relation of that of these aesthetic elements to ideology.   This mode 
coordinates literary and cultural-political concerns, deploying a set of operative assertions 
about the relevance of literature within the broader system of shared social meanings 
(26).   
Lefevere states that two groups regulate which statements about the role of 
literature in society are true and which are false.  The first is the professionals within the 
literary system: the editors, critics, teachers and translators (14).  This group not only 
judges the value of a literary work, but also decides what works will be disseminated 
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throughout the culture.  Editors accept and reject manuscripts for publication, and 
publishing houses control how many copies and editions to disseminate.  Critics 
influence this process through their judgments, and teachers also influence this process, 
as the required readings on their syllabi collectively affect the demand for certain texts.  
Translators contribute to the determination of a work’s value and relevance by the choice 
of a text for translation, and control how a new audience will perceive that value and 
relevance by the mechanisms of their translation.   
The second group is the “patrons,” who affect the operations of literary meaning 
in relation to broader cultural meaning when they “further or hinder the reading, writing, 
and rewriting of literature” (15).  The most obvious patrons—publishing companies, 
universities, political parties or movements, the media—manipulate the demand for 
literary works from outside the literary system.  They do so through various apparatuses 
of broad-scale communication and influence, with clear political, social and economic 
ends always in mind.  Though there are actors who bridge the definitions of professionals 
and patrons, Lefevere’s distinction of these two roles is useful.   
For our study of the acts of rewriting that incorporate U.S. texts into Orígenes, the 
“professionals” will receive more focus than the “patrons,” for various reasons.  First, the 
magazine is funded almost entirely by the personal funds of coeditor José Rodríguez Feo, 
removing economic pressures from consideration.  Second, the magazine assumes, as an 
explicit project, the rejection of any kind of “coordination” (to use Lefevere’s concept) 
between its literary agenda and the agenda of any political party, a project made feasible 
by the luxury of being funded by one of its editors.  Finally, the magazine is wholly 
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uninterested in reaching any kind of mass appeal, and thus feels no obligation to follow 
the rules of the marketplace (again, a function of its financial independence). 
Orígenes is for these reasons a project shaped and produced by actors within 
Cuban literary culture, with the aim of reaching and influencing other literary 
professionals in addition to a very small contingent of elite, highly-educated non-
professional readers.  Thus, the means by which the rewriting of literary texts is carried 
out and the meanings that subsequently emerge and interact with their Cuban context are 
predominantly controlled by the editors, translators, and central authors of the Orígenes 
group.  The journal sets its own cultural agenda and carries out all processes of 
production, including translation, with that self-determined agenda as the primary 
operative principle.   
This is not to assert that the origenista project, because of its independence from 
political and commercial forces of influence, insulates itself from political issues.  
Orígenes expresses its own political and cultural ideologies, in response to prevailing 
ideologies advanced through institutional structures of power in Cuba.  The journal 
struggles, in its own eccentric way, to instantiate its vision of the proper structure of 
Cuban society.  It is not, by virtue of its independence, isolated from the ideologies by 
which systems of patronage operate.  Instead, the journal is constantly in dialogue with 
ideologies external to its self-regulated literary and ideological system, even though it is 
able to carry out that dialogue in whatever ways it chooses because of its financial self-
sufficiency. 
For these reasons, the analyses in this study will always consider the 
“professional” context of the explicit Orígenes agendas as the most immediate context in 
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which to make sense of the operations of rewriting in the journal.  To do so is to respect 
the reality of the elite and independent nature of the journal’s position in Cuban society.  
The dialogue of the journal with national cultural formations will be considered second, 
and only after making the primary contextual relevance clear.  Thus, one of the goals of 
this study will be to avoid treacherous leaps from textual to generalized cultural 
“realities.”  The manipulation of a concept or technique employed by a translation will 
not be said to “represent” some aspect of a historical Cuban “experience,” without first 
ascertaining how that act of manipulation responds to the specific poetic and ideological 
mechanisms of the magazine and its producers.    
 
Chapter Introductions 
 In the first chapter, I will offer a summary of the essential cultural agendas of 
Orígenes, in order to establish an understanding of the conceptual context into which 
North American texts are incorporated.  The central issues around which Orígenes 
organizes itself are: its relation to the previous generation of Cuban and Latin American 
writers, its assertion of the regenerative power of literary art, the role of religion in the 
definition of the journal’s aesthetics and ethos, and the role of translation as a method of 
inflecting and enriching the cultural force of the journal. 
 In the second chapter, I will consider the most documented point of contact 
between U.S. authors and Orígenes: the publication of poems by Wallace Stevens in the 
magazine.  Taking into account these texts, their translations, and the extensive 
correspondence between the North American and José Rodríguez Feo, I will attempt to 
adjust the terms of discussion about Stevens’s role in Orígenes.  I will try to show that 
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Stevens’s stance toward the magazine was not a colonialist one, and that his interest in 
the authenticity of Cuban cultural production is not an instance of the exoticist gaze.   
 Rodríguez Feo’s translation of Stevens’s poem “Attempt to Discover Life” lies at 
the center of this argument, as it illustrates a unique instance of textual dialogue in which 
the North American poet submits more of a template than a finished work, so that the 
Cuban translator might create a new poem.  This instance shows Stevens’s reluctance to 
force the imprint of his own literary fame upon the magazine and his interest in cross-
cultural interactions that fostered the creativity of both participants.  In the dialogue that 
Rodríguez Feo and Stevens sustain, we will encounter debates on the question of the 
realist and the imaginative impulses in art, on the proper sources for literary production, 
and on the task of sustaining a rigorous personal methodology for creation. 
 In the third chapter, I will consider two of Eliot’s Four Quartets, “Burnt Norton” 
and “East Coker,” focusing especially on the concepts of time, memory and history they 
express and elucidating the resonances and dissonances with the different religious and 
philosophical perspectives on these topics expressed in Orígenes.  I will show how 
Eliot’s poems interact in a different way with Lezama’s and with Vitier’s work, 
respectively, and subsequently analyze the refractions that Rodríguez Feo’s translations 
impose on the poems.  We will see that these refractions are motivated by a particular 
conception of the Catholic character of Orígenes that contrasts with perceived Protestant 
cultural traits in Eliot’s work.  The mysticism of St. John of the Cross will be a 
fundamental intertext in this encounter.    
 In the fourth chapter, I will consider the surprising presence of Allen Tate’s essay 
“The New Provincialism” in Orígenes.  I will show how his essay is a peculiar instance 
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of anti-imperialist rhetoric that incorporates a prescient critique of the cultural 
implications of globalism.  I will then consider how Tate’s critique of the colonialism of 
the American North clashes with the dominant methodology of cultural discourse in 
Orígenes.  Establishing the terms of this conflict, I will go on to show that Tate’s essay 
supplies a perspective on imperialism that supplements Orígenes’ cultural anti-
imperialism.  Rodolfo Tro’s translation of the text stays true to the essential anti-
imperialist program of the original, though it de-emphasizes much of the text’s cultural 
specificity and emphasizes the notion of religion’s importance in resisting the 
degradations of modernity.   
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    Notes to Introduction 
 
1 As Abel Prieto notes, “...coexiste, dentro del propio seno de este movimiento, un 
Orígenes y un anti-Orígenes, o lo que también se ha denominado, un poco esquema y 
metafísicamente, como dos tradiciones: la del sí y la del no” (9) (“...there coexists, at the 
core of the movement, an Orígenes and an anti-Orígenes, or what has been called, 
somewhat schematically and metaphysically, something like two traditions: one of the 
“yes” and one of the “no”).  Whereas the mainstream of the Orígenes agenda is 
essentially optimistic and affirmative in philosophy, there was, from the start, a darker 
and more pessimistic strain of thought that fully manifested itself in Ciclón.  The later 
magazine can be read as a reaction against Orígenes’ rejection of the vanguardist revista 
de avance, though Rodríguez-Feo was not interested in rehashing old literary fads.  The 
philosophical interest in the absurd  that characterized Ciclón resonates with the 
pervasive influence that surrealism held over Cuban  literature specifically, and Latin 
American literature generally, from the 1920s through the 1940s.    
2 All translations from the Spanish in this study are my own.  Excellent 
translations of crucial texts from both Orígenes and Ciclón can be found in the special 
issue of New Centennial Review edited by Salah Hassan.  
3 It is of course ironic that Lezama asserts the necessity of this unity at the 
moment of its failure.  The split between Lezama and Rodríguez Feo was a rancorous 
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one.  In this context, the accent in his phrase falls on the modifier “forced,” suggesting a 
cohesion that could not be maintained forever, despite its temporary success. 
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Chapter One 
Orígenes: Contributors and Development 
 Orígenes: Revista de Arte y Literatura was published in Havana from 1944 to 
1956.1  The group of regular contributors consisted of authors whose principal occupation 
was poetry: José Lezama Lima (1910-76), Ángel Gaztelu (1914-2003), Gastón Baquero 
(1914-1997), Eliseo Diego (1920-1994), Octavio Smith (1921-1987), Cintio Vitier 
(1921), Fina García Marruz (1923), and Lorenzo García Vega (1926).  Virgilio Piñera 
(1912-79), a writer of immense talent and unorthodox methods, emerged as a poet, 
though later came to be better known for his plays.  The artist Mariano Rodríguez (1912-
1990) contributed significantly to Orígenes, which engaged in sympathetic dialogue with 
the visual arts throughout its existence.  Finally, coeditor, translator and critic José 
Rodríguez Feo (1920- 1993), a central figure in this study, played a large role in shaping 
the journal’s international connections.  
 Different combinations of members of this group produced a number of 
publications leading up to the appearance of Orígenes, which represented a culmination 
of earlier efforts, in terms of quality, consistency, duration.  The first of these early 
journals was Verbum, which produced three numbers in 1937 under the unusual 
sponsorship of the National Association of Law Students at the University of Havana.  
The magazine was run by José Lezama Lima and René Villanorvo, and showed 
characteristics that anticipate Orígenes: a preference for a refined poetic language—
almost old-fashioned for its time—that was influenced by Spanish poet Juan Ramón 
Jiménez (1881-1959), an interest in the visual arts, and a Catholic aesthetic and 
philosophical orientation.   
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 The six issues of Espuela de plata (1939-41) represented the continuation of these 
influences, with the addition of a broader and more international range of contributions, 
including the work of Bachelard, Valéry, Shelly, Joyce, Whitman, and Eliot.  Lezama 
again was in a central role, accompanied by coeditors Guy Pérez Cisneros and the painter 
Mariano Rodríguez.  José Prats Sariol notes that many aspects of the Orígenes aesthetic 
begin to take distinct shape in Espuela de plata: an emphasis on symbolism, a search for 
the origins of creative inspiration, and an orientation of literary production toward the 
value of universality rather than cultural specificity (40).   
 From 1942-44, Lezama and Gaztelu produced ten issues of Nadie parecía, whose 
title comes from a poem by the Spanish mystic poet St. John of the Cross.  St. John and 
the Juan Ramón Jiménez continued to be fundamental presences in the journal’s 
aesthetics.  The five issues of Clavileño (1942-43), edited by Baquero, Diego and Vitier, 
also continued an engagement with the poetry and theology of the Spanish mystic. 
  Finally, it is important to mention the journal Poeta, which Piñera edited from 
1942-43, producing only two issues.  Alongside works by Baquero, Vitier and the 
Spanish philosopher María Zambrano, Piñera published his most important poem, “La 
isla en peso,” and his translations of Aimé Cesaire and Paul Valéry.  The division 
between Piñera and Lezama, the architect of the dominant aesthetics of Orígenes, is 
already clear in Piñera’s editorials.2   
 Orígenes emerged in 1944 as a collaboration between Lezama and Rodríguez 
Feo.  The journal reunited the contributors to the magazines discussed above in what 
would turn out to be a lasting, if problematic, affiliation that produced one of Latin 
America’s best literary journals.   Rodríguez Feo’s significant family wealth, derived 
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largely from sugarcane production, subsidized the magazine.  In addition to the Cuban 
contributors mentioned so far, the journal published work by many other Cuban poets and 
critics, such Samuel Feijoo, Roberto Fernández Retamar, Eugenio Florit, Ramón Guirao, 
and Dulce María Loynaz.  There was also a significant Mexican presence, marked by the 
collaborations of Carlos Fuentes, José Revueltas and Alfonso Reyes; the spring, 1947 
issue of Orígenes was dedicated to Mexican literature and art.  Spanish poets of the 
Generation of 1927—Vicente Aleixandre, Manuel Altolaguirre, Luis Cernuda, Jorge 
Guillén and Pedro Salinas—played a prominent role in the journal.  In addition to his role 
in introducing North American writers to the pages of Orígenes, Rodríguez Feo 
translated the work of the French writers Louis Aragon, Albert Camus, René Char, 
Patrice de La Tour du Pin, and André Masson.  Vitier translated Roger Caillois, Paul 
Claudel, Stéphane Mallarmé, Arthur Rimbaud, Paul Valéry and Simone Weil. 
 In 1954, a personal conflict led the editors of Orígenes to sever ties.  The 
journal’s thirty-fifth number included a brief statement, announcing Rodríguez Feo’s 
departure, and the continued loyalty of most origenistas to Lezama.  Nonetheless, 
Rodríguez Feo produced two of his own issues of Orígenes, until Lezama, who had been 
trained as a lawyer, decided to register the magazine in his name and thus prevent his ex-
colleague from continuing with his parallel versions.3  Lacking the funds that Rodríguez 
Feo brought to the production of the journal, Lezama was forced to cease publication 
after the fortieth issue, in 1956. 
 
The Basic Operations of Literary Magazines 
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 In order to discuss the significance of Orígenes, it is important to begin with some 
general considerations about the cultural functions of literary magazines, and consider 
those functions within a Latin American context.  Literary magazines in most cultural 
contexts play a number of fundamental roles.  They facilitate and express collective 
creative pursuits, and in their pages, those pursuits are publicized and defended against 
detractors.  The manifesto and the polemic generally are given a privileged space, 
especially in twentieth-century European and Latin American literary magazines.  
Literary magazines almost always define for themselves, with varying levels of clarity 
and consistency, a cultural project that responds to the work of predecessors and 
advocates a new path for the development of art.  Though it can never be uniform in its 
expression of a shared agenda, a literary magazine always works to define and embody a 
specific set of aesthetic, political, philosophical, and even religious values.   These values 
are never a repetition of precedent; they mark either a radical detour from a previous 
project or a middle way, a compromise with a preceding model.  A literary magazine 
asserts its own relevance and importance by posing itself as a rupture.  The literary 
magazine’s early statements of agenda tend toward bold promises to correct the errors of 
predecessors and set artistic endeavor on the right path. 
 Not only does the literary magazine tend to locate itself temporally in a 
generational progression, but it also consciously situates itself in relation to the cultural 
spaces of region, nation or internation.  No literary magazine, in the effort to define its 
project and to assert its relevance, ignores the question of what cultural space it reflects, 
analyzes, reforms or reimagines.  In the United States, a number of literary magazines 
have explicitly framed themselves as regional phenomena, responding to local cultural, 
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political and literary developments and eschewing projects of national cultural dialogue.  
In the United States, the Southern literary magazines Sewanee Review (1892-present) and 
Virginia Quarterly Review (1925-present) are examples of this kind of project.  But in 
Latin America, the regional journal is not as prominent; literary magazines tend toward 
the polemical construction of a national identity.  This nationalist agenda derives from the 
tendency of the Latin American intellectual, since the wars of independence in the 
nineteenth century, to forcefully assert the primacy of his role in the construction of a 
workable definition of national culture.4   
 Nonetheless, this tendency frequently works in dynamic tension with the effort to 
situate the national culture at the various nexuses of international cultural exchange.  
Latin American intellectuals, throughout the twentieth century, are rarely able to posit 
their work as strictly national, intersected as Latin America is by exertions of political, 
economic and cultural influence from Europe and the United States.  Thus, the Latin 
American literary magazine inevitably responds to its international context; whether it 
resists or embraces links with foreign cultural activity, it is always required to pose a 
response.   
 An example of this inevitable process of negotiation is the Argentine magazine 
Sur (1931-92), which occupies the same level of cultural importance and impact as 
Orígenes.  The internationalism of Sur is evident from its origin in the interactions of its 
creator, Victoria Ocampo, with U.S. philosopher Waldo Frank.  The journal emerged as a 
hybrid of Frank’s belief in the importance of pan-American cultural reconciliation and 
Ocampo’s profound connection to French language and culture.5  Yet the journal 
expressed as its goal the analytical-creative elucidation of a total vision of Argentine 
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cultural identity (Sitman 75-6).  This focus only seems on the surface to be bifurcated, as 
the aforementioned geopolitical intersections that define Latin American nationality 
assure that attempts to divulge the national essence will participate in internationalist 
discourses. 
 The translation of foreign texts often plays an important role in Latin American 
magazines’ constructions of cultural projects, pointing up a recognition of, and 
engagement in, the processes of transnational cultural transfer discussed here.  The 
significance of the publication of texts by important European and North American 
authors cannot be reduced to that of educating a readership about foreign cultural 
developments, nor to the goal of garnering prestige for the publication, though both of 
these processes might be at work in the activities of a given journal.   
 Instead, the incorporation of foreign texts into the local context of the literary 
journal is inevitably dialogic.  The carefully constructed coherence of agenda expressed 
and evidenced in a literary journal makes it impossible to see a foreign text merely as an 
appendage.  If the foreign text is brought into the discursive space established by the 
programmatic statements and editorial selections of the journal, it inevitably becomes 
part of the publication’s cultural project, whether it concurs or conflicts with the 
dominant ideologies of its new context.  This process of transnational dialogue and 
interaction is particularly significant for the Latin American literary magazine, for a 
reason we have already established here: transnational cultural transfer is essential to the 
construction of a national cultural project.  
 These general precepts for understanding literary magazines in a Latin American 
context are all useful for an examination of Orígenes.  As we will see, the Cuban journal, 
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in its own ways, confronts each of the central issues we have sketched out here.  In a 
letter to his coeditor, Lezama remarks about the journal: “Variado y rápido va hacia su 
centro de nuevas integraciones” (“Varied and quick, it moves toward its center of new 
integrations”) (Correspondencia 128).  This statement illustrates the editor’s emphasis on 
the importance of a journal’s integrity, dynamic as that integrity might be.  If the journal 
is in a process of constant evolution, it should be evolving toward newer and more 
challenging “integrations” of disparate material.  Jesús Barquet emphasizes this 
interrelation between evolution and coherence, when he asserts that each of the origenista 
journals is “… a continuus (or process) animated by a univocal impulse that made each 
magazine and each number, not a mere compilation of disparate texts and illustrations, 
but rather the organic material configuration of a utopian project”  (“…un continuus (o 
proceso) animado por un impulso unívoco que hacía de cada revista y de cada número, no 
una mera compilación de textos e ilustraciones dispares, sino la orgánica configuración 
material de un proyecto utópico” (Consagración 55-6).  
 In order to explicitly establish a framework in which this process of integration 
might take place, the journal deploys programmatic statements to frame the cultural 
agenda to which each of its texts contributes.  These programmatic statements are 
responses rather than evocations of creation ex nihilo; Orígenes situates itself in 
conflictive response to its vanguardista predecessors in Cuba, and posits a subtler 
relationship between the Cuban intellectual and his national and transnational contexts 
than do its predecessors.  Finally, in what will be the central issue of this study, Orígenes 
positions and promotes itself as a site of transnational cultural dialogue in two ways.  It 
does so explicitly by stating the importance of that very dialogue, and implicitly, through 
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the aesthetically and politically nuanced processes of soliciting, translating, and 
publishing foreign texts.   
  
The Reaction against the Vanguardia 
 To understand the generational and national positioning of Orígenes, it is useful 
to consider the work of the majority of the origenistas as a reaction against the Cuban 
vanguardia.6  The most significant mouthpiece for the Cuban vanguardistas was the 
revista de avance, which was published from 1927 to 1930.  Marked by the presence of 
such figures as Nicolás Guillén, Alejo Carpentier, Juan Marinello and Jorge Mañach, the 
magazine possessed two important traits.  First was a tendency toward explicit political 
protest, and second, an openly avant-garde stance on questions of literary form and 
content.  The framers of Orígenes reacted against both of these qualities. 
 As Jesús Barquet asserts, revista de avance represented the height of 
vanguardismo (Consagración 15) in its abiding interest in formal innovations, and 
conscious as the group was of comparisons between its own literary production and that 
of other vanguard movements around the globe.  It took its cue from the European avant-
garde politically as well, participating in the Protesta de los Trece in 1923, the first 
collective expression of Cuban intellectuals’ strong opposition to government corruption 
in the young history of the republic (Barquet, Consagración 14).  In the Declaración del 
Grupo Minorista, in 1927, the year of the magazine’s first number, they put forth a clear 
political platform upon which their literary production would be built.  They explicitly 
advocated economic independence for Cuba and denounced the deleterious effects of 
U.S. imperialism on Cuban society.  Further, they sought to expose the illusions of 
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democracy that were the projections of a corrupt plutocracy and advocated the direct 
participation of the people in their government (Barquet, Consagración 15).  They were 
thus advocates of a renovation, not only of accepted literary forms, but also of the 
damaged institutions of the public sphere. 
 The origenistas chose to situate themselves quite differently in their literary and 
political contexts.  In the first text of the first issue of Orígenes, José Lezama Lima and 
José Rodríguez Feo state their opposition to chameleon-like changes in artistic vision, in 
an implied reaction to the avance group: “Como no cambiamos con la [sic] estaciones, no 
tenemos que justificar en extensos alegatos una piel de camaleón.  No nos interesan 
superficiales mutaciones, sino ir subrayando la toma de posesión del ser” (“As we do not 
change with the seasons, we do not have to justify, in extensive declarations, a 
chameleon’s skin.  We are not interested in superficial mutations, but rather in 
emphasizing the act of taking possession of being”) (Lezama and Rodríguez-Feo 7).  
With incisive rhetoric, the editors of the new journal assert their disdain for a literary 
agenda that “changes with the seasons” of literary fashion and political exigency, 
adapting and reacting always to what is going on elsewhere, and never formulating a 
consistent and coherent cultural project.  The editors criticize formal techniques, 
philosophical stances or political poses that betray their own superficiality, and in their 
place, they propose a project grounded in philosophical concerns that resist useless 
“mutations.” 
 Their concerns are grounded in what they call the humanist tradition, and their 
work thus is directed inward, toward the contemplation of human experience in a more 
universal or classical sense.  Human experience, despite its ontological complexity, is 
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assumed to be more constant and universal than constantly evolving “-isms.”  
Universality is an important value within this humanist program, posed in opposition to 
art that limits itself to documenting evanescent cultural realities and thus faces the danger 
of falling into irrelevance.  In a 1952 essay in Orígenes, Lezama asserts, “…every work 
should tend to be a universal product, and not displayed with faked localisms of humility 
and daubs of makeup…” (“…toda obra nuestra debería tender a ser un producto 
universal, y no mostrada con fingidos localismos de humildad y pintarrajeos…”) 
(Alrededores 65).  
 Though the Orígenes group values the same political projects as the avance 
group—economic independence and the extirpation of public corruption—they ascribe 
different means by which the artist should participate in those projects’ advancement.  As 
Barquet asserts, the origenistas question the model of the Latin American public 
intellectual formed by the legacy of such figures as José Martí, Andrés Bello and 
Domingo Sarmiento (Consagración 44).  The origenistas counter the open and public 
political stance adopted by the generation of the revista de avance with a different 
conception of the cultural worker’s role in society.  Their vision assigns to the artist the 
labor of reconstructing Cuban society, not by advocating the reorganization of public 
institutions, but rather by an ethical and artistic renewal of the individual.   
 As Barquet asserts, the origenistas hoped to construct a more “solid and lasting” 
(“sólido y perdurable”) republic of letters, in the face of the corruption of the Cuban state 
(Consagración 62).  This process occurred exclusively through creative activity; thus we 
see in the magazine’s first programmatic statement an evocation of values like “liberty” 
and “justice” in both political and creative terms (Lezama and Rodríguez Feo 1944, 5).  
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In contrast to their predecessors, the origenistas did not encourage the pursuit of these 
values in the political sphere, but rather in a different space—one marked by both 
individual and collective creative action.7  Thus, it would be wrong to assert that 
Orígenes marks a moment of complete disengagement from political concerns.  Its 
contributors simply worked toward a shift in the arena of art’s function in society from 
the public toward the private.  It was through private pursuits that the public sphere might 
be renewed. 
 As they shift the arena of art’s proper functioning from the public to the private, 
the origenistas envision the root of political and cultural “disintegration” as a lack of 
imagination, rather than a question of societal structure.  The description of the problem 
is couched in a poetic rhetoric that suggests poetic solutions: 
Cerca del índice crítico que señala la falta de imaginación estatal, que no es en 
definitiva sino la ausencia de una proyección o impulsión por zonas más 
espléndidas, es necesario ir ya entregando las formas superadoras de esa 
desintegración.  Si ese señalamiento es esencialmente crítico, su remedio tendrá 
que brotar de creación y de imagen. (Desintegración, 60) 
 
Near the critical index that points out the State’s lack of imagination, which is 
clearly nothing less than the absence of a projection of impulsion through more 
splendid zones, it is necessary to begin to provide the forms that will overcome 
that disintegration.  If that assertion is essentially critical, its remedy will have to 
emerge from creation and from the image. 
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Though the editors acknowledge the importance of the “critical index” that lays out the 
dilemmas facing Cuban culture, their analysis tends to veer from historiographical and 
political modes of analysis in order to reformulate cultural problems in poetic terms.  
This formulation, designating a lack of “imagination” and “projection,” determines the 
nature of the proper response: the artistic creation of new images with which to construct 
a sense of national identity.  
 This way of imagining the national space is a response to the perceived failure of 
politically committed writers to work effectively in the traditional spaces of public 
discourse in Cuba and elsewhere.  Because the origenistas believe that public discourse 
has been so profoundly contaminated by corruption in its various forms, they revise the 
role of the politically engaged writer that is such an important element of their national 
tradition.  They opt to avoid the failures of political engagement by redefining the nation 
in terms that allow them, as artists, a more direct role in the process of reform.  Thus, the 
nation, as imagined in Orígenes, is a created and creative phenomenon, a spiritual mode 
of existence that art is especially well-equipped to recuperate and sustain.  In her 1948 
essay “La Cuba Secreta,” the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano provides a 
particularly useful distillation of this concept, summarizing a perspective that shaped the 
magazine’s projects from its inception four years earlier.  Zambrano asserts: “...la patria 
pre-natal es la poesía viviente, el fundamento poético de la vida, el secreto de nuestro ser 
terrenal … Cuba: substancia poética visible ya.  Cuba: mi secreto” (4) (“…the prenatal 
homeland is living poetry, the poetic foundation of life, the secret of our earthly being … 
Cuba: visible poetic substance.  Cuba: my secret”).  Defining the nation in poetic and 
religious terms, and positing it in a way that gives the individual imagination a role in 
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reshaping it, clears the ground for a direct and fundamental intervention in the national 
process by the kind of literature Orígenes promotes. This move helps the origenistas 
define their project in such a way that they can avoid a basic dilemma facing politically 
engaged writers: how to reconcile the individual and creative nature of their work with 
the collective and purportedly objective nature of the political discourse they are trying to 
transform. 
 Working in concert with Zambrano’s spiritual definition of nationality, Cintio 
Vitier’s image of rebirth through creative activity revises the model of politically 
commited literature by focusing intensely on the effects of political corruption on the 
idenity of the individual: 
…siendo como hijos abortivos de una gestación interrumpida, sentíamos la 
necesidad imposible, casi desesperada, de volver a nacer, de re-nacer, y para ello 
sentíamos oscuramente la necesidad de des-nacer, de borrar un nacimiento 
fraudulento y culpable … des-nacer y volver a nacer, o nacer no realmente de la 
nada, como ingenuamente fuera supuesto por la pasión juvenil, sino de sí misma, 
como lo pidiera Martí para toda la América nuestra.  (Para llegar 86) 
 
…being like abortive children of an interrupted gestation, we felt the impossible, 
almost desperate, need to go back and be born, to be reborn, and towards that 
purpose, we felt in an obscure way the need to be unborn, to erase a fraudelent 
and guilty birth … to be unborn and be born again, or be born not really from 
nothing, as was ingenuously supposed by juvenile passion, but rather from 
oneself, as Martí had asked of all of our America. 
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Vitier compares the forestalled progress of the young republic to a premature birth that 
produces children who are unready for even the most basic forms of survival.  The near-
hyperbolic reach of his rhetoric consciously extends beyond the assessment of Cuban 
society that undergirds the avance project.  Vitier, like other origenistas, acknowledges 
the effect of U.S. imperialism upon Cuban culture, though he is also typical of his group 
in locating the most devastating effects of this and other corrosive forces within the 
individual identity, rather than limiting them to extrinsic institutional manifestations.  At 
the historical moment of Vitier’s statement, the operative Cuban notion of individual 
identity and agency in society has become the product of an illegitimate union of corrupt 
political forces. In order to undo the effects of that union, each individual must strive, 
through creative acts, to be unborn and reborn.  Vitier’s metaphor acknowledges the role 
of political forces in constituting the individual while at the same time rejecting the 
possibility of revising the work of those forces through political engagement.   
 The statements by the editors as well as by Zambrano and Vitier, all betray an 
emphasis on the moral renewal of the polis.  Rather than engage the pragmatics of the 
political issues of their moment, the group proposed a creative investigation into the 
ethical issues at the heart of social conduct.  By renovating conduct through creative 
activity, broader values like justice and equality could be set on a firmer foundation.  
Respect for creative and philosophical differences, for example, is not only an important 
mode of conduct, but was also a means toward the goal of freedom: “La libertad consiste 
para nosotros en el respeto absoluto que merece el trabajo por la creación…”  (“For us, 
liberty consists of the absolute respect that work for the sake of creation deserves…”) 
(Lezama and Rodríguez Feo, 1944, 5).  Art’s role was not to voice slogans or cry out in 
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protest, but rather to start with the individual, with an exploration of the connections of 
the Self to the Other that are illuminated specifically through artistic creation.  Only in 
this way could the pathologies afflicting the public sphere be cured. 
 Vitier’s work provides one of the clearest manifestations of concern for the 
origenista ethics and the interrogation of the philosophical foundations of those ethics.  
The first stage of the examination is one of questioning.  As Enrique Saínz points out, 
Vitier’s early poetry evidences existential concerns, and betrays an attitude of profound 
self-questioning that leads to a stage of great confusion, especially of the individual’s 
relationships with the natural and social worlds surrounding him (51-52).   This stage can 
be seen as a clearing of the ground for a new awareness of the importance of the Other 
that develops in Vitier’s poetry of the Orígenes period.  In his poem “El desposeído” 
(“The dispossessed”), published in the journal in 1954, the existential struggle feeds a 
longing for contact with an Other that remains fantasmatic without the realization of an 
essential, longed-for communion: “Estoy solo escuchando esos fantasmas/ que en el 
crepúsculo vienen a mirarme/ con ansia de que yo los incorpore” (“I am alone listening to 
the ghosts/ who, in the dawn, come to gaze at me/ anxious for me to incorporate them”) 
(16-18).  This Other is ubiquitous in Vitier’s poetry, and its nature is always a subtle and 
challenging interpenetration of philosophical, social and political, and religious 
significances.  
 Vitier, like the Orígenes group as a whole, privileges poetry’s epistemological 
status, and sees his writing as a means for the acquisition of knowledge.  Poetry’s role is 
to work toward a clearer understanding of the ethical foundations of social life, an 
activity that is prerequisite to the possibility of lasting political reform.  This 
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understanding, for Vitier, consists of a hard-won rediscovery of three central truths: “la 
caridad, la comunión, el prójimo” (Obras 204) (“charity, communion, one’s fellow 
man”).  These verities are of course in no way new, but have been arrived at through 
great creative and spiritual labor and thus are apprehended more completely.  It is 
important to note the textual and conceptual centrality of communion in Vitier’s trinity of 
values.  It of course illustrates the Catholic theology undergirding his ethical system, but 
further, it suggests a form of connection with the Other, whether godly or human, that is 
infused with mystery.  His use of the term evokes a connectedness that cannot be reduced 
to a social or political relationship, but rather emerges from a miraculous transformation.  
Thus we see how Vitier grounds the political potential of art in its ability to apprehend 
spiritual, rather than sociological, features of the individual and the society. 
 
Lezama’s Theory of the Poetic Image 
 A crucial poetic foundation for the origenista aesthetics is Lezama’s concept of 
the image.  The image is for him a dynamic force, moving fluidly through time, evolving 
and undergoing constant permutations.  Throughout history, artists participate in these 
processes, shaping images into forms never seen before, forms that will be taken up and 
reshaped by future creators.  In this context, we can better understand the universality 
toward which Orígenes strives: great art must call forth and manipulate images that have 
participated in history and that will gain new relevance in the future through the artist’s 
creative intervention in the present.  Thus, radical innovation is not the goal of art; 
instead, the participation in fluid, multiple and universal traditions of creation marks the 
great artist. 
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 This notion of the history of art facilitates surprisingly fluid connections among 
creative artifacts from different epochs and cultures.  In the opening paragraphs of his 
essay “Mitos y cansancio clásico,” Lezama admits that images can only be understood in 
a historical context, yet the kind of historical analysis he exemplifies is quite 
idiosyncratic.  It is clearly not a history of influence, a kind of narrative that relies on 
limited and concrete relations of cause and effect.  Later in the same essay, Lezama 
extols the freedom of the creative genius to supercede simplistic causalities in the 
offering of his or her imaginative vision (15).8  Lezama’s historical narrativization is 
marked by fluid homologies, held in flux by the constant activity of what he calls “el 
sujeto metafórico,” a subjectivity that intervenes in history, drawing connections among 
disparate images, preventing images patterns from becoming static (11).  This 
subjectivity is at work in every creative act that takes up a pattern and suggests a way of 
redrawing it, notably in the analysis of historiographical image structures found in 
Lezama’s essays.  Thus, as Abel Prieto asserts, causality is not abandoned altogether in 
Lezama’s historiography; instead, a different concept of cause and effect is at work in the 
connections drawn among images (vi).   
 This new principle privileges the activity of a critical subjectivity that has been 
shaped by a poetic sense of images and their relations to one another.  This subjectivity 
allows a freer play of signification and approaches images as entities in a state of constant 
metamorphosis rather than as static markers of a determined set of historical relations.  
Thus, a poetic causality is at work in Lezama’s system.  This implies that the connective 
and ordering force may originate in the subjectivity, but does not confine itself to the 
subjective realm.  In “Introducción a un Sistema Poético,” Lezama describes the 
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movement of poetic discourse as “…the march from the unreal to the real” (“…la marcha 
de lo irreal hacia lo real”) (37).   Poetic discourse facilitates processes of coming-into-
being.  The reshaped image moves from the imagination of the artist into the realm of 
shared meaning, reconfiguring the image systems that structure what are thought of as 
non-subjective systems of knowledge, such as history. 
 It is important to note that Lezama applies the flexible principle of causality seen 
in his writing on the history of visual or literary art to all kinds of historical narrative.  All 
history is for Lezama the history of images.  Poetic discourse takes primacy, becoming 
the source of history, rather than a system of elaborations on historical fact.  In “Las 
imágenes posibles,” Lezama asserts that poetry manifests “…a conception of the world as 
image.  The image as an absolute, the image that knows that it is an image, the image as 
the last of all possible histories” (“…una concepción del mundo como imagen.  La 
imagen como un absoluto, la imagen que se sabe imagen, la imagen como la última de las 
historias posibles”) (3).     
 Thus, all history is constantly shaped and reshaped by the creative work of the 
“sujeto metafórico.”9   This subject works in a temporal plane whose boundaries shift 
abruptly, making possible the surprising imagistic homologies Lezama describes in his 
essays.  In privileging the fluid nature of the image’s existence in time over what 
historians might attempt to assert as unquestionable fact, Lezama brings to the fore a 
creative subjectivity that demands a profound measure of freedom not only in the face of 
chronology, but also in relation to other intellectual disciplines.   
 As described in his essays, this subjectivity tends to leave behind the world of 
concrete experience in order to dwell in a more fictive realm where “experience” means 
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the experience of art.  The dynamic counterpoints that illustrate the image’s essential 
relationality take precedence over dialectics of the real and the ideal, of the imaginative 
and the empirical.  Lezama and Rodríguez Feo’s questioning of the art-life duality is 
grounded in a poetics that stretches the category of the empirical to include the 
contemplation of fictive realities.  
 
The Catholicity and Catholicism of Orígenes 
 An association with Catholicism was clearly central to the origenista identity.  
Nonetheless, the journal did not function like a cultural appendage of the Church.  Its 
framers dealt with thematics associated with Catholicism and held a particular interest in 
Catholic writers, especially French Catholic poets like Paul Claudel.  Yet the journal did 
not concern itself much with questions of doctrine.  Faith and religious contemplation are 
driving energies behind much of the creative production of origenistas, though the 
manifestations of those energies are rarely dogmatic in nature. 
 Instead, the Catholicism of Orígenes manifests itself as a constellation of ideas 
and social practices rooted in Catholic culture rather than in a strictly defined Catholic 
creed.  The programmatic statements of Lezama, Rodríguez Feo, Vitier, and others, along 
with what we know of the social interactions of the origenistas, tell us that the group 
subscribed to a communitarian ethos and aesthetics.  Alfredo Chacón describes the 
origenistas as a “congregation” (27).   They saw themselves as a creative group whose 
cohesiveness and collaborative spirit operated under the aegis of their shared 
Catholicism.  The banquets, readings, and celebrations, held at the priest and poet Ángel 
Gaztelu’s church in Havana, were the clearest expressions of this association of 
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communitas and creativity.  The interactions of the origenistas embody a concept of 
communion and an emphasis on ceremony.  These social characteristics are not 
peripheral to their literary production, but rather are asserted as a force driving that 
production.10  
 Orígenes is also Catholic, not just in its positive assertions, but also in contrast to 
a certain notion of what it means to be Protestant.  This oppositional definition is more 
cultural than it is theological; it derives from differing social attitudes and philosophical 
understandings of human experience.  The distinction between Catholic and Protestant 
cultures is of great significance for this study in particular.  The textual encounters 
between U.S. and Cuban literary traditions are, viewed broadly, a Protestant-Catholic 
encounter.  José Rodríguez Feo, the principal orchestrator of the cultural counterpoints 
examined in this study, plays a crucial role in expounding the distinction between the two 
cultural orientations, avowing an allegiance to a Catholic cultural identity in his essays, 
correspondence and translations.  As intermediary figure, he takes it upon himself to 
maintain this cultural distinction as an operative discursive structure in the textual 
encounters he coordinates.  He sees this task as an important function in defining and 
defending origenismo. 
 Again, the Catholicism we speak of here is cultural, rather than dogmatic.  Thus, 
despite the profound social strictures of the Church, origenistas like Lezama and 
Rodríguez Feo betray permissive attitudes toward sexuality, and a belief in the 
importance of fully enjoying sensual pleasures of all kinds without concern about 
questions of sin or damnation.  They believe in being catholic—broad minded and 
accepting of disparate kinds of faith.11   They identify their Catholicism with the personal 
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traits of expressiveness and candor.  One who is culturally Protestant is quite different, 
according to this way of thinking: narrow-minded, judgmental, dogmatic, repressed and 
laconic.   
 In his essay on Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, Rodríguez Feo, through his role as 
literary scholar, mediates a textual encounter between Protestant and Catholic ideologies.  
He makes it his purpose to explain, to a culturally Catholic readership, the influence of a 
Protestant worldview on Captain Ahab’s actions.  He emphasizes the cultural dissonance 
between Melville’s text and a Cuban cultural context when he comments: “Con un 
concepto de la persona como el que anima a los novelistas católicos no se podría jamás 
crear un héroe protestante comparable a Ahab.  Esto es lo que en gran parte impide una 
comprensión adecuada de la novelística americana” (18). (“With a concept of the person 
like the one that animates Catholic novelists, one could never create a Protestant hero 
comparable to Ahab.  This is what, in large part, impedes an adequate comprehension of 
the U.S. novel.”)  In his explication, Rodríguez Feo uses Ahab as an illustration of the 
dangerous extremes to which the ideologies of Protestantism tend. 
 In his explanation of the philosophical bases of Ahab’s mania, Rodríguez Feo lays 
out a system of Protestant thought and action that serves as an implicit foil to the 
Catholicism of Orígenes.  Because of what he calls the “spiritual decadence” of U.S. 
Protestantism, caused by its association with Calvinism and Puritanism, the very story of 
Christ’s life is perverted into a saga of supreme individualism: “…la interpretación de la 
muerte y resurrección de Cristo sufre el influjo de las doctrinas nuevas.  En esta 
decadencia espiritual, Cristo no se nos aparece como Dios convertido en Hombre para 
redimir a la humanidad; es el rebelde sacrificado por una sociedad innoble…” (17) 
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(“…the interpretation of the death and resurrection of Christ suffers from the influence of 
new doctrines.  In this spiritual decadence, Christ does not appear to us as God become 
Man to redeem humanity; he is the rebel sacrificed by an ignoble society…”).  Where the 
Catholic viewpoint would emphasize redemption as the essence of the Christ story, 
Rodríguez Feo asserts that U.S. Protestantism uses the story to elevate a concept of 
individualism “in extremis” (17).   
 The extremity of this individualism results in the pathological tendency toward 
spiritual and intellectual self-isolation exemplified by Ahab.  Further, it leads to fanatical 
and reckless extremes of hubris that lead the captain to consider himself a god (19).  
Rodríguez Feo’s insistence on Ahab’s dangerous individualism implies a central value of 
Catholicism.  Whereas Ahab laments his inability to find comfort in other human beings, 
Rodríguez Feo asserts the Catholic values of communion, communitas, and agapé.  
Indeed, at the closing of the essay, the author strays from his methodology of implicit 
argumentation into a moralization: “La salvación de Ahab, la de todos los hombres, 
depende de su habilidad y su capacidad de amar a sus semejantes.  Esta es la lección 
suprema de Moby Dick” (21) (“The salvation of Ahab, and of all men, depends on the 
ability and capacity to love one’s fellow man.  This is the supreme lesson of Moby 
Dick”).   
 In his insistence on the impossibility of redemption for Ahab, Rodríguez Feo 
points up a crucial difference of perspective between the Protestant and the Catholic.  
Whereas the Protestant who believes in the Calvinist doctrine of predestination would see 
a sinful man as doomed (16), the Catholic is confident in the abiding potential for 
salvation.  Rodríguez Feo’s underscoring of this issue resonates with the essential 
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optimism of the dominant origenista poetics.  Lezama and Vitier are especially 
representative of this optimism, subscribing to the essential assertion that redemption, 
regeneration and illumination are perpetually available to the individual through the 
supernatural alchemy of the poetic act.  Rodríguez Feo’s vision of U.S. culture and 
literature implies a binary relationship to this Catholic optimism; the Cuban critic betrays 
the belief that North American cultural production is fundamentally shaped by a 
pessimism about the situation of human beings in the physical and the spiritual worlds.   
 Rodríguez Feo’s essay on André Gide, published in Orígenes in 1951, continues 
this project of cultural self-identification in opposition to Protestantism, introducing the 
issue of self-repression.  Gide represents, for Rodríguez Feo, many of the prototypical 
Protestant or “puritan” traits.  Gide suffers an interior tension that would never trouble a 
true Catholic; he longs for a full, sensual existence in the world, yet is prevented by his 
own prudish morality and self-absorption:  “En vano se movió entre esos los dos dilemas 
del existir y del pensar; del mirar y no compartir en la vida que lo rodeaba, tan llena de 
tentaciones y de delicias” (58)  (“In vain he moved between those two dilemmas of 
existing and thinking, of watching and not sharing in the life, so full of temptations and 
delights, that surrounded him”).  A definition of the Catholic character is implicit in 
Rodríguez Feo’s critique: it is marked by an open attitude to pleasure and to “shar[ing]” 
that pleasure with others.  Where the Catholic values communion in its sacred and 
interpersonal senses, the Protestant Gide is intensely introverted and secretive: “…sus 
tribulaciones lo conducía [sic] a la confesión íntima, al secreteo, a la escritura de diarios o 
de cartas personalísimas” (56) (“…his tribulations led him to the intimate confession, to 
secretiveness, to the writing of diaries or of extremely personal letters”).  According to 
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the Catholic ethic, these inner struggles are what should be exteriorized and shared.  The 
assertion, in the opening editorial statement in Orígenes, that literature should “show” 
individuals in their moments of greatest “tension” and “fever” illustrates the fact that 
Lezama and Rodríguez Feo feel this “Catholic” trait is essential to the journal’s aesthetics 
(5).   
 It is clear that Rodríguez Feo identifies the “Catholic” with the Cuban, a crucial 
connection in his thinking and in the thinking of origenismo in general.  He illustrates the 
link between religion and culture when he writes to Wallace Stevens that “an Antillean” 
gives himself up to sensuality without the puritan’s crippling propensity to self-
punishment: “To my tropical senses all of Gide’s struggles seem a bore.  Why didn’t he 
make up his mind and go to bed with the grocer boy and stop all that nonsense about God 
and the mortal sin?  An Antillean goes to bed and that’s that” (Secretaries 194).  In what 
seems like a casual comment, it is nonetheless clear that an operative cultural self-
definition is at work.  This self-definition—marked by an emphasis on the erotic, on 
freedom and on experience—is not incidental to the literary mission of Orígenes; it is 
deployed, through Rodríguez Feo’s essay on Gide, as an element in the definition of a 
particular Cuban literary project. 
 Thus, it is not surprising that Rodríguez Feo makes a connection between 
Protestant cultural traits and U.S. literature.  If Orígenes, as a Cuban cultural production, 
must necessarily evidence Catholic cultural traits, then U.S. literature must inevitably 
illustrate the Protestantism that is so pervasive in its national culture.  In his essay on 
Moby Dick, Rodríguez Feo asserts that a Protestant cultural background will shape the 
work of an individual U.S. author (18), though he does not go so far as to define 
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Protestantism or “puritanism” as a basis for all of U.S. literature.  In his essay on Gide, he 
does just that:  “…André Gide es un precursor, suprema ironía, de la literatura 
norteamericana contemporánea, que por otro lado él fué uno de los primeros en descubrir 
y elogiar desmesuradamente” (57)  (“André Gide is a precursor, supreme irony, of 
contemporary North American literature, which on the other hand he was one of the first 
to discover and praise inordinately”).   
 This assertion is crucial; it offers an important insight into Rodríguez Feo’s 
attitude toward the literature of the U.S., of which he is such an avid student.  A notion of 
Protestantism or “puritanism” is central to his critical image of the cultural foundations of 
U.S. literature.  Thus, the traits Gide possesses are typical of North American writers, in 
Rodríguez Feo’s estimation.  This opinion is active in all of his thinking as a critic and in 
his operations as a translator as well, given the grounding of acts of translation in 
operative interpretive constructs.  We will see this notion of a Protestant cultural and 
literary personality emerge as a minor thematics in Rodríguez Feo’s exchanges with 
Stevens.  More significantly, it will fundamentally inform Rodríguez Feo’s processing of 
T. S. Eliot’s poems for incorporation into Orígenes.   
 
Modes of Religiosity in Orígenes: Mysticism, Genesis, Revelation   
 Having established the magazine’s cultural, philosophical, and social 
identification with Catholicism, it is necessary to delve further into the central currents of 
religious thinking in Orígenes.  The journal’s identification with certain Catholic cultural 
traits is not the limit of the journal’s engagement with religious concerns; an exploration 
of the content of operative religious convictions is necessary.  The theological 
 44
foundations of the journal’s aesthetics are a complex issue.  Because these foundations 
are marked by internal counterpoints and dissonances, it is difficult to propose a unitary 
model for discussing each author’s individual orientation.  What I propose is a limited, 
but illustrative starting point for discussing the varied religiosities of the origenistas.  I 
will place them in relation to a cultural precedent of significant religious and literary 
importance—the mysticism of the Spanish monk and poet St. John of the Cross (San Juan 
de la Cruz) (1542 – 1591).  Examining the distinct ways in which origenistas respond to 
this tradition will illuminate the dialogue between their poetics and their theologies. 
 Mysticism is generally understood as a mode of religiosity which can be active 
within the broader space of any religion.  It orients itself toward the reconciliation and 
union of the created with the Creator.  Margaret Smith describes it as “…an attitude of 
mind; an innate tendency of the human soul, which seeks to transcend reason and to 
attain to a direct experience of God, and which believes that it is possible for the human 
soul to be united with Ultimate Reality, when ‘God ceases to be an object and becomes 
an experience’” (3).12  The “transcendence” of reason, which also implies a 
transcendence of what can be expressed in language, is the means.  The end is the 
unmediated experience of the Divine, usually described as a union. 
 Any form of mysticism presupposes that the general state of human existence is 
one of separation from God.  Traces of God’s grace can be found in Creation, but those 
traces only create a sense of longing for a lost presence.  The idea of Deus absconditus is 
the impulse behind mystic disciplines.  Michel de Certeau points out that in the Christian 
mysticisms of the sixteenth century—the time of St. John of the Cross—the feeling of 
God’s absence came to be expressed as an erotic longing.  Certeau attributes this 
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eroticization to the increasing influence of courtly love poetry on religious discourse 
since the 12th century (Fable 4).  In this evolution, there is a “…slow transformation of 
the religious setting into an amorous one, or of faith into eroticism.  It tells how a body 
‘touched’ by desire and engraved, wounded, written by the other, replaced the revelatory, 
didactic word” (5).  This fusion of erotic and devotional feeling is, initially, a heterodox 
development that invites accusations of blasphemy, as the case of St. John of the Cross’s 
imprisonment illustrates.13  Yet, the pronounced aesthetic element of Catholicism also 
provides fertile ground for the establishment of mysticism as a central current of Catholic 
religiosity, as it is largely recognized to be today.    
 Certeau emphasizes that the discourses of mysticism permeate much of Western 
cultural expression since the sixteenth century.  He argues that the harnessing of the 
energy of an erotic longing mobilizes a peculiarly “‘Western’ productivity” in theology, 
art, and literature (4).  Yet, when it develops into a methodology for achieving a union 
with the object of longing, this productivity is marked by a peculiar paradox.  Mysticism 
is largely a verbal (or visual) system that seeks to describe the means for achieving a 
union with God.  Yet it runs into the impossibility of describing, in any semiotic system, 
what that union consists of; the language of mysticism reaches toward the inexpressible. 
 Certeau identifies the central rhetorical feature of mysticism as the oxymoron, and 
mentions St. John’s phrases “sweet burning” and “silent music” as examples (143).   If 
mysticism involves the transcendence of reason, as Smith asserts, then the oxymoron is 
the device that points the way to that transcendence.  As Certeau explains:  
…the oxymoron belongs to the category of the metasememe, which, like the 
demonstrative, refers to something beyond language.  It is deictic: it shows what it 
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does not say.  The combination of the two terms is substituted for the existence of 
a third, which is posited as absent.  It makes a hole in language.  It roughs out a 
space for the unsayable.  It is language directed toward non-language. (143) 
Mysticism thus is marked not only by a particular thematics—the eroticized longing and 
pursuit of the divine beloved—but also by a clear set of discursive operations that posit 
the absence of their referent both in the world and in discourse.  This discourse is 
structured by vectors that point in the direction of something beyond what is locatable.  
 The other paradox that is fundamental in Christian mysticism generally, and in St. 
John’s work specifically, is the coexistence of a disciplinary element of abnegation, 
whereby bodily desires are suppressed, and a poetic language that describes the union 
with God in erotic terms.  As we will see, Lezama and Rodríguez Feo’s thinking plays on 
this tension, and resolves it by identifying more closely with the poetics of mysticism 
than with the spiritual discipline of renunciation.  The fusion of the erotic and the 
spiritual is a legacy that origenistas embrace as part of their Catholic inheritance.  The 
disciplining of the body, which is such a crucial element in Christian mysticisms, is 
something they associate with the repressions of Protestantism.  This slippage of 
association is central to the coordination of poetics with theology in Orígenes.  
 In St. John’s Subida al Monte Carmelo (Ascent of Mount Carmel), the discipline 
of abnegation is taught as a means toward a union with God that is metaphorically 
evoked in the universally-known poem “La noche oscura del alma” (“The Dark Night of 
the Soul”).  This poem can be found in the preface to the chapters on the disciplinary 
process in Subida, evoking the goal of the mystic quest in ravishingly beautiful language.  
Then, in the prose that follows, St. John lays out in clear terms the demands of the 
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discipline through which this union can be achieved.  In St. John’s mysticism, the erotics 
of the poetry and the renunciation prescribed in the prose are linked with no sense of 
tension.  The description of the amorous encounter between believer and God is the 
closest metaphorical approximation to an experience that is beyond the bodily and, as we 
have established, beyond language.  The physical erotic drive is completely supplanted 
by a total surrender to God that is like a sexual act, but is not in itself physical. 
 In Subida al Monte Carmelo, St. John describes the progressive stages of the 
mystic discipline.  First, the practitioner must enter into a “night of the senses,” in which 
all bodily “appetites” are abandoned.  Next, the individual must enter a deeper darkness, 
in which reason no longer functions; an “emptying” of memory and thought occurs in 
order to make room for the reception of spiritual Truth.  Subsequently, the will is 
dissolved, and the practitioner renounces his ability to achieve a state of union with God 
through righteous actions.  As Rowan Williams explains, this renunciation “…reduce[es] 
human spiritual activity to the one act of faith and longing” (179).  At this stage, a state of 
profound suffering is experienced; subjectively, the practitioner feels the total absence of 
any comforts or spiritual consolations.  As Williams asserts, this suffering consists of 
“…an identification with Jesus and the carrying of his cross” (179).  It is in this state that 
the soul, in absolute passivity, longing and suffering, is prepared for God’s voluntary 
movement of union with it. 
 “La noche oscura” picks up where this discipline, when pushed to its limits, 
leaves off.  The speaker of the poem has arrived at the state of total readiness for the 
loving union with God.  It is interesting to note that the speaker of the poem is female; St. 
John asserts that the identity of the mystic who has reached the ultimate stage of his or 
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her discipline is inevitably feminine.  The speaker signifies her renunciation of worldly 
pleasure by leaving home in the middle of the night, crossing the threshold from familial 
and domestic satisfactions to a space of spiritual satisfaction.  The light of the senses, the 
reason, and the will is utterly absent, and is replaced by the light burning in the heart of 
the speaker (15).   
 The speaker is utterly alone; the abnegation of her desires and thoughts 
necessitates an abnegation of social connection.  The spiritual journey the speaker takes 
must be taken alone.  She leaves her house “unnoticed” (“sin ser notada”)—implicitly, by 
her husband, whose affections are to be replaced—and arrives at a place where “no one 
appeared” (“nadie parecía)” (20).   At the moment of union with the Beloved, the speaker 
is “transformed” (25); the alterations made in the discipline of abnegation lead to a total 
relationship with God.   
 This relationship is evoked in concrete human imagery.  The Beloved rests his 
head on the speaker’s “flowery breast” (“mi pecho florido”) (26), and she runs her fingers 
through his hair (32).  The imagistic and conceptual center of the poem follows, when 
God touches the speaker: “his serene hand/ wounded my neck,/ and suspended all of my 
senses” (“con su mano serena/ en mi cuello hería/ y todos mis sentimientos suspendía”) 
(33-35).  The serenity and the violence with which God touches the lover is emblematic 
of Certeau’s description of the mystic oxymoron.  A tension in language plays a “deictic” 
function, pointing toward a transcendent reality—God’s love—which cannot be 
contained within language.   
 Having seen both the discipline and the poetic suggestion of that discipline’s goal, 
a crucial question for the purposes of this study arises: what happens after the mystic 
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experience?  Colin Thompson attempts to correct the view that what occurs at the 
moment of mystic union is the permanent dissolution of the human identity in God.  He 
asserts that the “transformation” that occurs in the mystic union is of the soul, not of the 
entire identity (11).  This is the theistic understanding of the mystic union, one that 
Thompson asserts is operative in St. John’s thought (12).   
 Origenistas, and particularly Lezama, show evidence of a monistic view of St. 
John’s mysticism, wherein it is believed that “…the self is merged into the One and loses 
its identity…” (Thompson 11).  This view motivates the efforts of origenistas to revise 
St. John’s mysticism, as they see the total absorption of the individual in God to be 
incompatible with the human task of poetry.  They see no way in which the mystic can 
return to an existence in time and in the concrete world, so they separate the religious and 
the poetic aspects of St. John’s work, revising what they think are his theological ideas 
and celebrating the exquisite beauty of his verse.  
 In Orígenes, this contrapuntal dialogue with St. John’s mystic poetry is at work at 
the earliest stages of the development of the Orígenes group.  Texts by St. John and 
works that explicitly pay homage to him are found throughout the early origenista 
magazines.14   In the second issue of Verbum (1937), Ángel Gaztelu pays tribute to the 
Spanish mystic in the sonnet “San Juan de la Cruz.”  The sonnet responds to St. John’s 
most famous poem in a way that is paradigmatic for the dialogue that other origenistas 
maintain with this part of their religious and poetic tradition.  Gaztelu draws on St. John 
for inspiration, though he places even greater emphasis on the sensory intensity of the 
mystic experience than the Spanish mystic does.  The body receives the “imprint” of the 
divine (El pecho…/ impreso en claridad de alta figura” (2)), and is able to taste the 
 50
“celestial sweetness” (“celestial dulzura” (6)) of heavenly perfection.  As Jesús Barquet 
observes, Gaztelu allows more importance for earthly elements than does St. John 
(España 38).   
 For the Spanish mystic, sensory experiences, like the feeling of being “inflamed” 
by love, serve an intermediary and metaphorical function, pointing to a non-sensory 
reality that is the ultimate object of contemplation.  As we have seen, the oxymoron 
occupies a central area of this metaphorical discourse, drawing a vector that points away 
from the plane of language.   For Gaztelu, and other origenistas who respond to St. John, 
certain sensory experiences, usually a visual image of natural beauty, are moments when 
the interpenetration of the divine and the earthly is apprehended.  Whereas St. John is at 
pains to remind his disciples that the true experience of God can be only imperfectly 
understood in physical terms, the origenista poetics attests to the immanence of the 
divine in nature.  Nonetheless, within the group, there are divergent visions of the nature 
of human access to that experience of the divine and of the methodology for recreating 
that experience in poetry.  As we will see, Lezama describes a much more active role for 
the poet, ascribing to him the ability to literally enact the union of the divine with the 
terrestrial through the power of the poetic image. 
 Lezama’s work draws inspiration from, and engages in dialogue with, St. John’s 
legacy, though he follows the spirit of St. John’s assertion of the possibility of an 
individual encounter with the divine, rather than the strict methodology that the mystic 
develops.  Lezama builds on St. John’s sensory and erotic metaphors for spiritual 
experience and allows them even freer reign than is allowed in Gaztelu’s poetry.  In his 
prose poem “Noche dichosa”—which, like the title of the journal in which it appeared, 
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Nadie parecía, is taken from St. John’s “Noche oscura”—Lezama puts forth a personal 
version of St. John’s poem that extends the zone of intersection between the body and 
spirit found in the Spanish mystic’s work.   
 Lezama’s poem follows the outline of its precedent, portraying the nocturnal 
emergence from a domestic space into a space of divine illumination.  In the poem, a 
fisherman emerges at night from his hut and enters a river, where the experience of his 
own body in the water is the medium for an experience of the divine.  This experience is 
a version of the erotic union of lover and Beloved in St. John’s poem.  Significantly, the 
body of Lezama’s speaker interacts with a natural reality (the water of the river) rather 
than with an embodied God.  Nature is in itself allowed to be a site for contact with the 
divine.   
 Returning home, the fisherman finds his hut, as well as his own body, illuminated, 
and God smiles benevolently on the scene.  As a natural expression of his joy the 
fisherman begins to urinate (1).  Lezama pushes the corporality of St. John’s discourse to 
a rebellious extreme, asserting an affiliation between the body and the spirit that is so 
total that even the body’s basest functions are expressions of transcendence.   
 In addition to the extension of the zone of contact between the body and the spirit, 
we find in Lezama’s work a radical revision of the essential passivity that characterizes 
the mystic’s preparation for union with God.  Lezama asserts a supreme creative agency 
for the poet in his quest for revelation.  It is true that his poetry evidences the same 
awareness of the absence of God in creation that motivates the mystic search; there is 
always a distance, across which a reconciliation between humanity and divinity must be 
made.  Yet, his reaction is different from the mystic response to this distance.   In 
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Lezama’s estimation, the task of the artist is to replicate God’s action of creating the 
universe through the sacred Word.  The need for this replication stems from humanity’s 
fallen state and its subsequent loss of pure connection to nature.  In this context, we can 
more fully understand the supreme importance Lezama places on artistic creation, as for 
him it consists of a profoundly sacred act.  As Gustavo Pellón succinctly puts it, “Nature 
for Lezama evokes Genesis, the garden of Eden, the fall of Adam and Eve.  Poetry (or 
life; for Lezama it is one and the same) has as its goal the recuperation of that nature lost 
through original sin” (48).  Without poetry, our experience of nature would be the 
experience of a reality devoid of illumination by the divine.  The role of the poet is of 
enormous importance; it is he or she who, by reshaping nature through language, restores 
its primal sanctity.   
 Lezama builds upon the same erotics of absence Certeau describes in his 
theorization of the nature of mysticism, though his response is to assert the possibility of 
enacting the contact between the human and the divine, rather than waiting longingly for 
that contact.  Further, this contact is made, not through the mystic rejection of the senses, 
but rather in the poetic manipulation of sensory materials.  At the closing of his essay 
“Introducción a un sistema poético,” Lezama asserts that the possibility of reconciliation 
between the human and the divine is the product of a spiritual capacity bestowed upon 
poets by “a divinity.”  This gift is one of potential; the contact between man and gods 
must be actively sought by poets when “…through the visible conjured in poetry they 
attempt to draw close to the smiling unknown of the gods” (“…a través de lo visible 
conjurado en la poesía intentan acercarse al risueño desconocido de los dioses”) (58).  
 53
The poet as conjurer makes a concrete reality appear.  This reality becomes a medium, a 
zone of transit toward contact with the gods.  
 In Lezama’s poem “Noche insular: Jardines invisibles” (“Insular Night, Invisible 
Gardens”), the speaker calls out for the reconciliation of the human and the godly within 
the space of the visible:  
 Dance la luz reconciliando 
 al hombre con sus dioses desdeñosos. 
 Ambos sonrientes, diciendo 
 los vencimientos de la muerte universal 
 y la calidad tranquila de la luz. (186-190)  
 
 Let light dance, reconciling 
 man with his disdainful gods. 
 Both smiling, speaking  
 the defeat of universal death 
 and the tranquil quality of light. 
Through the act of invocation, the speaker seeks to animate the visible, making light 
dance; this intervention into the visible makes possible the communication between 
humanity and the gods who had previously separated themselves and remained aloof 
from the human world.  Human speech is twinned with godly speech; in unison, their 
utterance creates the reality of immortality (“the defeat of universal death”).  In this 
fusion of sensory and spiritual spaces, human resurrection and eternal life are made 
possible.  Thus, in a strikingly heterodox turn, the speaker announces the possibility of 
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salvation through the poetic act.  Lezama’s poetic animations of nature repeatedly restage 
just this kind of restoration of spiritual nature through the image.       
 Thus, St. John’s most important legacy for the Cuban poet is his heterodoxy.  The 
individual will supplants Grace in Lezama’s appropriation of St. John’s language.   
Lezama embraces the heterodoxy and eroticism of St. John’s poetry, while rejecting the 
discipline of sensual abnegation the mystic prescribes in his treatises.  Mysticism 
becomes for Lezama an incomplete movement toward a freer religiosity that celebrates 
the erotic and the individual. 
 Rodríguez Feo evidences a similar outlook.  In a letter to Stevens, Rodríguez Feo 
implicitly agrees with a definition of mysticism put forth in Mark Schorer’s William 
Blake: The Politics of Vision:  
Of course, the mystic is in disaccord with the poet and Mr. Schorer puts it very 
well: “Mysticism in its highest moment is without images or symbols, it is 
entirely non-sensory, just as it is without ideas that relate to nature.”  Thus we can 
well say that even St. John of the Cross was not a mystic poet, but was a mystic 
who wrote the most perfect poetry of the Spanish language. (Secretaries 95)15
Rodríguez Feo, like Lezama, sees mysticism as a permanent abandonment of the senses.  
He thus separates this spiritual state of being from the sensuous nature of poetry.  This 
opinion is based on the monistic view of the mystic union.  Rodríguez Feo and Lezama 
both discard the problematics of the intersection between abnegative discipline and erotic 
metaphoricity in St. John, in favor of a division that allows them to reject the 
renunciation of the body and privilege the aesthetic nature of St. John’s poetry.  This 
vision of the strengths and inadequacies of St. John’s legacy is an operative element in 
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Lezama and Rodríguez Feo’s aesthetics, a fact that will become clear in our analysis of T. 
S. Eliot’s incorporation into Orígenes.   
 References to St. John are thus crucial as Lezama and Rodríguez Feo sketch a 
model for the general aesthetics of Orígenes.   In general, the origenistas ground art in 
sacred and secular traditions while simultaneously asserting its essential freedom to 
explore multiple creative avenues.  For Lezama, this freedom is fairly radical, while other 
origenistas put forth a somewhat more restrictive definition of the artist’s role, as we will 
examine below.  Nonetheless, the origenistas’ work grows out of a kind of sacred 
humanism, religious in tone and substance, but centered always on human experiences of, 
and responses to, the created world.  Lezama and Rodríguez Feo express this humanism 
forcefully: “Sabemos ya hoy que las esenciales cosas que nos mueven parten del hombre, 
surgen de él y después de trazar sus inquietantes aventuras, pueden regresar…” (Lezama 
and Rodríguez Feo 7) (“We know today that the essential things that move us come from 
man, emerge from him, and after tracing their restless adventures, they can return…”).  
This definition of what concerns the artist, taken in isolation, seems to exclude divine 
inspiration, as it is held that inspiration comes from human nature and human experience 
themselves.  Yet, this seemingly hubristic stance must be seen in the context of Lezama’s 
overarching religiosity, flexible and heterodox as it may be.   
 Vitier’s essays “Nemosine: Datos para una poética” and “Poesía Como 
Fidelidad,” published in Orígenes in 1948 and 1956, respectively, present a counterpoint 
to Lezama’s fictionalizing tendency.  In the two essays, Vitier employs a dialectical 
method that allows a more equal opposition between imagination and experience, and 
searches for a poetic synthesis that preserves a kind of experience that cannot be 
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subsumed by art.  For Vitier, as for Lezama, poetry molds the raw materials of experience 
into new entities that assume ontological independence.  He asserts that poetry tends 
toward a distillation of the multiplicity of experience into essential unities through the 
work of the shaping forces of poetic form.  Nonetheless, he is forceful in asserting that 
these processes do not eliminate concrete experience: “…el testimonio de la poesía viene 
a decirnos que dentro de las leyes esenciales e inmutables de su reino, la experiencia no 
puede ser borrada, y aquí radica tal vez la causa última de su fascinación terrible” 
(Nemosine 36) (“…poetry’s testimony comes to tell us that in the essential and 
immutable laws of its realm, experience cannot be erased, and from here perhaps the 
ultimate cause of its terrible fascination is rooted”).  
 He agrees with Lezama that the boundary between art and life is fluid, and that 
the image is the medium through which we make sense of our world:  “La poesía es 
espejo de la vida, pero a su vez ella misma es vida.  En la primera dimensión, es aquel 
plano expresivo donde la vida se vuelve imagen” (Fidelidad 21) (“Poetry is the mirror of 
life, but at the same time it is, in itself, life.  In the first dimension, it is that expressive 
plane where life becomes image”).  He goes beyond the notion of art as clear reflection of 
an external reality, represented by the image of the mirror, to assert that it is a space in 
which experience makes itself visible to us as structured image (“donde la vida se vuelve 
imagen”).   
 This assertion falls in line with Lezama’s tendency to assert art’s epistemological 
supremacy.  Nonetheless, Vitier assigns much less freedom to the poet to produce new 
manifestations of received images.  Whereas for Lezama, the poetic image is a joyful re-
enactment of Genesis, for Vitier, it is a solemn revelation (“Fidelidad” 27).  The poet’s 
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task is to immerse herself in concrete experience while remaining alert to the moment at 
which the intersection between the planes of the worldly and the transcendent makes 
itself visible in a structured and striking image.  The role of the poet is much more 
consonant with the demeanor of the mystic.  The poet is more constrained; in contrast to 
the audacity that characterizes Lezama’s description of the poet, Vitier identifies the 
essential virtues of the poet as obedience and faith:   
La fidelidad a la vida debe conducirnos a la vida del espíritu, cuya plenitud no la 
hallamos en lo imaginario ni en lo especulativo, sino en la libertad del 
consentimiento, en la obediencia … [e]l signo supremo del espíritu en el hombre 
no es la creación, que en él es siempre mediata, insuficiente y engañosa, sino la 
aceptación. (Fidelidad 28) 
 
Fidelity to life should direct us to the life of the spirit, whose plenitude we do not 
find in the imaginary nor in the speculative, but rather in the freedom of consent, 
in obedience … [t]he supreme sign of the spirit in man is not creation, which in 
him is always mediated, insufficient and deceiving, but rather, acceptance.   
Here, we find a fundamental dissonance between Lezama’s and Vitier’s expressions of 
the sacred significance of art.  As Vitier asserts that the plenitude of the spirit cannot be 
perfectly achieved through the autonomous activities of imagination and speculation, he 
affirms the artist’s fundamental dependence on external revelation.  
 Furthermore, though Vitier’s arguments run parallel to Lezama’s in their 
description of the profound desire that infuses the creative act, he characterizes that desire 
quite differently.  Lezama, as we have seen, ties his poetic thinking to a fundamental 
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emphasis on the body.  As a result, his poetics takes on the characteristics of an erotics.  
For Lezama, the longing in the act of creation appears as an erotic drive, wherein 
creativity is understood as potens, as an aggressive and conquering impulse.  Lezama’s 
poetics, grounded in a transgressive emphasis on the body which he develops in part 
through his reading of St. John, is a language of copulation and procreation.  Vitier 
considers this sexual notion of creative agency, and acknowledges the poet’s desire to 
“penetrate” the physical and temporal world with the instruments of experience and 
memory, though he is careful to point out that the purpose of the act is to facilitate or 
“mediate” an instance of “germination,” not to actively “propagate,” as Lezama’s 
language asserts (Nemosine 29). 
 The poet’s role for Vitier is often a passive one, and his longing comes from the 
experience of waiting for the revelation of the essential truths he searches for: 
…el poeta, cuya actividad misma la hemos contemplado como creación de su 
propio objeto, de su propio objetivo, se halla sin embargo normalmente en una 
actitud de signo pasivo y anhelante.  Sin duda él no puede decidir, prever or 
proveer nada en ese estado… (40) 
 
(…the poet, whose own activity we have contemplated as the creation of his own 
object, of his own objective, normally finds himself nonetheless in an attitude of a 
passive and longing sign.  Doubtless, he cannot decide, anticipate, or provide 
anything in this state…) 
Lezama would agree that the poet creates his own objective.  On the other hand, he would 
never describe the poet as passive.  In a stark contrast to the agency that infuses poetic 
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desire in Lezama’s writing, Vitier imagines a desirous and receptive state, in which the 
poet waits for transcendence rather than enacting it himself.  As Ben Heller explains, 
“God is the only true actor here [in Vitier’s description of poetic inspiration]; the poet 
himself cannot will creation, he can only desire it and wait for it, like the prophet who 
clamors in the desert for the appearance of his Lord” (84). 
 For Vitier, the poetic image does not achieve a total separation from the 
individual’s experience of the world; instead it expresses a longing for transcendence that 
itself reflects the poetic subjectivity’s continuing existence in the concrete world.  This 
longing is part of what Vitier calls “[el] trascender angustioso” (Nemosine 34) 
(“anguished transcendence”), an act of reaching beyond multiplicity and physicality that 
is driven and indelibly marked by those very conditions.  There is anguish in the act of 
poetic creation because the worldly body asserts its presence in spite of the soul’s lofty 
ambitions.  The medium of poetic language itself encompasses this dialectic, as it 
expresses spiritual truths, without ceasing to be a sensuous medium (36).  Clearly, Vitier 
is in dialogue with St. John’s mysticism, with its emphasis on the painful discipline that 
must precede an apprehension of the Divine.  Yet, Vitier’s discourse lingers at the 
threshold between physical and spiritual modes of being, insisting, not on the total 
abandonment of the former for the latter, but rather on the experience of the divine’s 
penetration of the physical plane.  The worldly and the spiritual are not separated by a 
line, but rather overlap in a zone occupied by the poetic imagination.   
 Vitier’s poems offer many examples of his concept of anguished transcendence.  
The desire to apprehend the spiritual essence of experience is perhaps immediately 
obvious to the reader, but it is important to note the dialectical opposite of this desire, 
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which contributes to the synthesis of the transcendent and the worldly for Vitier.  This 
other tendency can be observed where the speaker enacts a reaching out and a longing for 
contact with a concrete reality.  It is a kind of longing for deeper immersion in the natural 
world, the sympathetic reverse of the desire for transcendence.  Vitier asserts in “Poesía 
Como Fidelidad” that there is a “a Gongorian conception of things”16 (“concepción 
gongorina de las cosas”) that counterbalances what he calls poetry’s “Cartesian” impulse.  
In this Gongorian mode, “the poet responds in his own way to the question: what are 
things?”  (“el poeta a su modo responde a la pregunta: ¿qué son las cosas?”) (25).  
 Vitier, like Lezama, revises the mystic model of St. John of the Cross, but does so 
in a more cautious way.  Vitier places more emphasis on sense experience, and allows the 
world of that experience an important role in the project of apprehending the 
transcendent.  He rejects the mystic process of emptying the senses and asserts that 
revelation can take on concrete form.  Nonetheless, the broader outlines of Vitier’s poetic 
methodology are more faithful to St. John’s example by emphasizing an essential 
passivity on the part of the poet, who must await revelation.  The basic stance of the poet 
is similar to that of the mystic in the longing inherent in the poet’s passive state and in the 
“anguish” that the poet must experience as a sensory being as he strives toward contact 
with the divine. 
 
The Atheistic Counterpoint 
 In spite of differing methodologies, Lezama and Vitier, like the majority of the 
origenistas, build their aesthetics on individual versions of Catholic faith.  Though 
Virgilio Piñera did not publish a large body of work in Orígenes, the work that does 
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appear there, especially his play Falsa alarma and his essay on Kafka, forms a notable 
philosophical and aesthetic counterpoint to Lezama and Vitier’s work.  In her study of his 
dramatic work, Raquel Aguiliú de Murphy observes that for Piñera, the workings of the 
Cuban social sphere prior to the Revolution served as models of the literary construction 
of the absurd (9).  To the extent that his evocation of individual alienation in the social 
world springs from observations of the nation’s ills, Piñera’s work emerges from the 
same basic impulses as that of other origenistas.  Like them, he participates in the project 
of employing literature toward ontological ends, as his work seeks to probe the essences 
of human experiences of the social and political world.   
 The important difference, though, is that Piñera’s work, rather than reaching for 
renewal through spiritual insight, simply lays out a pathology of the human soul.  The 
public absurdity that for Lezama or Vitier can be opposed and redeemed through private 
works of creation is for Piñera inherent in all human relationships and as such is 
unredeemable.  In “La otra desintegración,” Lezama and Rodríguez Feo assert that art 
must go beyond a dissection of the nation’s body that lays bare its diseases toward the 
discovery of cures.  Their diagnosis is that the State suffers from a lack of imagination, 
the kind of imagination that Martí evidenced in the era of Cuban independence.  Thus, 
“…its remedy will have to spring from creation and from the image”  (“…su remedio 
tendrá que brotar de creación y de imagen”) (60).  Art that describes society’s problems 
while offering no solutions is a pitfall to be avoided; it is essential “…not to fall into the 
crude manichaenism of marking evil and the way of the Malign One…”  (“…no caer en 
el burdo maniqueísmo de señalar el mal y el paso del Maligno…”) (60).   
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 Perhaps the “manichaenism” Lezama and Rodríguez Feo describe refers in part to 
Piñera’s work.  “La otra desintegración” does not appear under a name, but rather appears 
under the heading “Señales,” which designated pieces that one must assume were co-
authored by the two editors.  The rhetoric of this passage sounds like Lezama’s, so we see 
a clear dialogue between the more optimistic, or “joyful” poet and the skeptical Piñera.  
Rodríguez-Feo was more sympathetic to Piñera’s concerns, and his supposed 
participation in the essay’s production raises another point of ambiguity or dissonance.   
 Piñera stood out among his fellow origenistas not simply because his work lacked 
what Lezama and Rodríguez Feo call a sense of “projection” toward creative redemption, 
but also because his work showed no religious foundation that might imply the necessity 
of that redemption, as it did for so many other origenistas.  If for Lezama and Vitier, 
poetry is, respectively, an act of sacred re-creation or contemplative faith, for Piñera, 
literature expresses the essential solitude of humankind in the universe and the 
impossibility of redemption.  Profoundly influenced by Sartre and Artaud’s notion of the 
theater of cruelty, the world that surrounds the characters of Piñera’s plays and stories is a 
dreary monolith of strained social relationships structured by the opposite poles of 
oppression and isolation.  There is no exit from this frightening binary, no third space of 
human creation punctuated by the sacred where the possibility of redemption can be 
ascertained (as for Vitier) or invented (as for Lezama).   
 Finally, in his essay “El secreto de Kafka,” published in Orígenes in 1945, Piñera 
presents another point of discrepancy with the majority position of his group, in adopting 
a stance that devalues what Lezama and Rodríguez Feo call the humanist foundation of 
art.  Piñera asserts that the essential and enduring value of Kafka’s work does not lie in its 
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investigations of human experience, but rather in the constant surprises of his technique; 
indeed, in the first sentence of his essay he states firmly that Kafka “…is nothing other 
than a man of letters”  (“…no es otra cosa que un literato”) (42).  His praise of Kafka’s 
work severs ties between the literary and the humanistic, and focuses all attention on the 
former.  The value that Piñera ascribes to Kafka’s work is summed up in two terms he 
repeats many times over the course of his short essay: “la invención” and “la sorpresa” 
(“invention” and “surprise”).  These values reveal Piñera’s aesthetic connection to the 
vanguardia, a fact that, in itself, establishes a critical distance between his poetics and the 
aesthetic projects outlined in the programmatic statements of Orígenes’ editors.   
 His insistence on these categories as essential sources of value in a body of 
literary work runs up against Lezama and Rodríguez Feo’s critique of avant garde 
aesthetics in the first issue of Orígenes, where the coeditors critique “superficial 
mutations” of literary form (5).  If the dominant rhetoric of origenismo privileges 
epistemological innovation, Piñera’s essay on Kafka foregrounds instead the formal 
surface of the text, privileging innovation that produces reactions of delight and surprise. 
 Thus we see in “El secreto de Kafka,” not the revelation of a secret about the 
writer’s work, but rather a schematization according to vanguardista formal values.  
Piñera’s reduction of Kafka’s work to technical rather than conceptual values is 
surprising when one takes into account the depth of the author’s influence on a text like 
Piñera’s play Falsa alarma.  The play’s opening scenario—the interrogation of the main 
character by a judge bent on proving his guilt by whatever machination possible—
reminds the reader of Kafka’s somber explorations of the inexplicable and inaccessible 
nature of the Law.  So why would Piñera do such violence to the philosophical 
 64
foundation of Kafka’s work in an essay meant to praise him?  Perhaps it is the scriptural 
foundation of the notion of Law put forth in his fiction that is for Piñera a false basis for 
an investigation of human predicaments.  Even formal aspects of Kafka’s work with 
Biblical influences, like his adaptation of parabolic structures in his short fiction, 
characteristics Piñera does not mention, might represent too much of a reliance on a 
tradition the Cuban author saw as invalid.  
 Piñera’s skepticism and vision of art as techné divorced from humanistic 
imperatives make him stand out as a foil that focuses, through opposition, the general 
coherence of agenda among other origenistas.  The majority position of Orígenes 
conflicts with Piñera’s skepticism.  Instead of Piñera’s valorization of formal innovation, 
the journal emphasizes innovations of humanistic knowledge.  And, in conflict with the 
absence of any kind of transcendent order in Piñera’s work, most origenistas affirm their 
own personal vision of a Christian basis for art.  
  
José Rodríguez Feo: Translation as Expression of the Orígenes Project 
 To this point, we have described the aesthetic, philosophical, religious and 
political foundations of Orígenes by way of explications of the ideas of Lezama and 
Vitier, allowing for the dissonant assertions of Virgilio Piñera.  These three writers are 
central to the counterpoints that inflect the magazine’s ideology.  José Rodríguez Feo is 
not included in this group, as his work does not contribute foundational concepts in the 
same way.   It is important nonetheless to highlight the role of coeditor José Rodríguez 
Feo alongside these writers, because his work as editor, translator and essayist played the 
most important role in establishing Orígenes’s transnational intertextuality, facilitating 
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connections among the multifaceted conceptual bases of Orígenes and the assertions and 
assumptions of foreign texts and traditions.  If other authors represent the magazine’s 
basic suppositions, Rodríguez Feo is the one who facilitates the dialogue between those 
and other, radically different notions of the nature and function of literature. 
 As we will see in the central chapters of this study, Rodríguez Feo’s work has two 
contrasting effects on the development of Orígenes as a grouping of explicit and implicit 
assertions about the proper role of literature in society.  First, we can observe moments in 
which his choice of texts by foreign authors, the correspondence he maintains with them, 
and the translations of their work, represent a continuation of different aspects of the 
central Orígenes ideologies.  For example, by soliciting two of Eliot’s Four Quartets, 
Rodríguez Feo seeks to bolster the journal’s basis in a spiritual conception of literature’s 
existence and relevance in society.  In the case of his correspondence with Wallace 
Stevens, we find many moments in which the Cuban editor defends the religiosity and 
internationalism of Orígenes against the American poet’s skepticism about both of those 
tendencies.  Finally, at many moments in his translations, Rodríguez Feo makes 
interventions into foreign texts in order to process and digest them for incorporation into 
the broader projects of his magazine. 
 In contrast to all of these activities, which have the effect of preserving certain 
established tenets of origenismo, Rodríguez Feo at times plays the role of introducing 
dissonances and counterpoints into the discursive space of the journal.  By publishing 
Allen Tate’s “The New Provincialism,” Rodríguez Feo introduces a number of ideas—
regionalism, a sociological-empirical basis for literature—that conflict with the 
magazine’s basic conceptions into its very textual body.  Also, Rodríguez Feo facilitates 
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the expression of Stevens’s notions of empiricism and atheist fictionalism in Orígenes, 
despite the philosophical tensions that result. 
 In addition to these conflictive or contrapuntal aspects of Rodríguez Feo’s role in 
Orígenes, we will come to see something largely ignored by previous scholarly work—
Rodríguez Feo’s critical and expository essays.  In these essays, we find a developing 
intellectual agenda that emphasizes concrete historical analysis of literature and its 
contextual significance, in contrast to Lezama’s conception of the poetic image’s 
temporal and spatial fluidity.  Rodríguez Feo the essayist introduces a materialist 
perspective on cultural phenomena, especially in his analysis of U.S. history.  As a result, 
he deploys a strain of thought in Orígenes that supports a concrete and engaged anti-
imperialism and hints at Marxist convictions, in stark contrast to the explicit origenista 
project of circumventing demands for political engagement.  Furthermore, as we have 
already seen, Rodríguez Feo deploys a concept of Protestant culture that is based on 
historical and sociological analysis.  This concept, in turn, shapes the journal’s 
encounters with North American authors.   
 As we study the transnational nexuses Rodríguez Feo establishes within Orígenes, 
we will gain a fuller appreciation of his role in developing and nuancing the journal’s 
projects.  We will be attentive to each of his roles—editor, correspondent, translator, and 
essayist—in order to fully appreciate the varied means by which Rodríguez Feo’s shaping 
of origenismo occurs. 
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Notes to Chapter One 
 
1 For the most useful political and historical contextualization of Orígenes, see 
Barquet, Consagración de la Habana.  For an analysis of the ethical dimensions of the 
journal and its group identity, see Arcos, Orígenes: la pobreza irradiante.  Bejel and 
Heller offer the most accessible introductions to the complex poetry and poetics of 
Lezama.  Further, Heller’s analysis places Lezama’s poetics in dialogue with Vitier’s in 
an illuminating way.  Pellón’s work on Lezama’s prose is also very helpful in gaining a 
general sense of the author’s literary thought.  For the best work on Vitier’s life and 
work, see Díaz Quiñones and Saínz. 
2 In these texts, Piñera accuses Lezama of settling into a comfortable pattern of 
poetic repetition, asserting that he fails to subject himself to the rigors of formal evolution 
(Prats Sariol 42).   
3 A heated personal dispute between Spanish poets Juan Ramón Jiménez and 
Jorge Guillén, played out in the pages of Orígenes, precipitated the dissolution.  Lezama 
defended Jiménez, a central influence on his work, and Rodríguez Feo was furious with 
Lezama for publishing Jiménez’s response (“Crítica paralela”) to an attack by Guillén 
(“Epigramas”).  Roberto Pérez León gives a detailed account of the entire melee in 
Tiempo de ciclón (9-24). 
4 Some scholars have asserted that this agenda is shaped in part by a fundamental 
insecurity, on the part of the cultural elites, about their real relevance in national debates.  
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Rosalie Sitman, in reference to the response of the Argentine magazine Sur to the 
political upheaval of the nation in the late 1930s, asserts: “…en la tradición europea la 
voz de los intelectuales repercutía por los corredores de la política con el prestigio y la 
autoridad moral conferidos por el ejemplo de un escritor como Zola, erguido como 
conciencia ética de la nación, mientras que en la periferia americana, y más en la 
Argentina, donde las relaciones entre los intelectuales y el poder político eran bastante 
precarias, apenas se escuchaba el eco en la caja de resonancia de la conciencia nacional.” 
(97) (“…in the European tradition the voice of the intellectuals reverberated in the halls 
of politics with the prestige and the moral authority conferred upon a writer like Zola, 
who was lifted up as the ethical conscience of the nation, while at the American 
periphery, and even more in Argentina, where the relations between intellectuals and 
political power were fairly precarious, there was hardly an echo heard in the sound box of 
the national consciousness.”)    
5 For an overview of the genesis of the Sur project, see Sitman, 73-87.   
6 This majority, it is important to remember, is a fluid one that at times excludes 
figures like Virgilio Piñera and Lorenzo García Vega, and also includes a liminal figure, 
José Rodríguez Feo, who participated in the articulation of this agenda while at the same 
time cultivating an interest in the techniques and concerns of the vanguardistas.  As we 
will see, many of the programmatic texts that articulate the magazine’s antivanguard 
orientation were co-authored by its two editors.  These texts are infused with Lezama’s 
characteristically exuberant metaphorical style, suggesting that Rodríguez-Feo’s role in 
their production was secondary.  Thus, it is a matter of debate to what extent the younger 
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editor agreed with their assertions.  We must look to his other work, especially his 
translations and his critical essays, for hints as to where he stood on the issue of avant-
garde aesthetics.   
7 The ethical and political outlook of the origenistas bears many similarities to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the significance of “minor” literatures.  Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest that any minor literature is inevitably political, no matter what its 
concern (17).  Further, they assert that every individual expression in a minor literature 
“takes on a collective value …[i]t is literature that produces an active solidarity in spite of 
skepticism” (17).  The idea of the individual enunciation’s inevitable relation to a 
collective expression is a crucial tenet of origenismo, a concept with poetic, political and 
religious origins.  Nonetheless, in radically challenging individual subjectivity, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s analysis of the implications of collective enunciation goes further than the 
thinking of the origenistas: “There isn’t a subject; there are only collective assemblages 
of enunciation…” (18).  
8 La expresión americana, where this essay is published, appeared in 1957, three 
years after the editors parted ways and a year after Orígenes ceased publication.  
Nonetheless, Lezama was working on these essays during the Orígenes years and they 
reflect a synthesis of the same central concerns that appear in his essays published in the 
magazine, though they are framed somewhat differently.   
9 Doris Sommer asserts that the belief “...that literature has the capacity to 
intervene in history, to help construct it” (78) is a characteristic trait of Latin American 
literature.  This is of course a generalization that needs to be tested.  Nonetheless, the 
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evidence that Sommer marshals to support her assertion, namely such “foundational 
fictions” as José de Alencar’s Iracema (1865) and Rómulo Gallegos’s Doña Bárbara 
(1929), is convincing.  These novels clearly stage dramas or “romances” of national 
identity, hoping to reshape the national consciousness of questions of race, ethnicity and 
class in order to facilitate the positing of a unifying national identity. 
10 Alessandra Riccio discusses the communal ethic of Orígenes in her essay “Los 
años de ‘Orígenes.’”   She mentions the subterranean rifts that were sometimes visible in 
spite of the unifying intent behind the ceremoniality of the origenistas (32-33).   
11 In a retrospective description of the religiosity of the origenistas, Cintio Vitier 
emphasizes both the Catholicism and the catholicity of Orígenes (Para llegar 71-72). 
12 The thesis of Smith’s survey of mysticism in Eastern and Western traditions is 
that the mystic represents the most authentic expression of “…the most vital element in 
all true religions, rising up in revolt against cold formality and religious torpor.” (3).  This 
assertion, which refutes the claims to primacy of the scholastic or ecclesiastic 
mechanisms of religious traditions, is common in studies of mysticism.   
13 St. John was imprisoned by members of his own order.  There is some evidence 
that the Inquisition was suspicious of his work (R. Williams 172). 
14 Two of St. John’s texts subsequently appeared in Clavileño in 1943: “Aviso 
espiritual” and “De cómo la fé es noche oscura para el alma.”  Nadie parecía opens its 
first issue in 1942 with verses from St. John, and included texts by Lezama, Gaztelu, and 
Ignacio Blain Moyúa that were inspired by the mystic’s poetry and theology. 
 71
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Rodríguez Feo comments to Allen Tate and Caroline Gordon, in a letter from 
February 1, 1947, that Schorer’s is “a fine study,” though the Cuban scholar “…found 
Mr. Schorer’s argument too loosely contoured, too many repetitions, etc.”   
16 Here, Vitier refers to the Spanish baroque poet Luis de Góngora (1561-1627), 
and goes on to attribute the originality and importance of his work in part to the pure 
“gaze” uncontaminated by restricting preconceptions, and ranging across all the 
variegations of a multiple concrete reality.  
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Chapter Two 
Discovering Life and Abstracting Experience: The Literary Exchanges 
of Wallace Stevens and José Rodríguez Feo 
 The textual interaction between Wallace Stevens and José Rodríguez Feo is the 
best-documented of the North-South encounters staged in Orígenes.  A crucial 
contribution to the small body of critical work on the topic is Secretaries of the Moon: 
The Letters of Wallace Stevens and José Rodríguez Feo, published in 1986 with an 
introduction by Beverley Coyle and Alan Filreis.  Subsequent to the appearance of this 
volume, scholars can not only examine the essay and five poems by Stevens that 
appeared in the magazine, but also contextualize their readings of those translated texts in 
an extensive and dense personal correspondence.1  Taking a roughly chronological 
perspective on the unfolding of the textual dialogue carried out between the two, one can 
see how the letters, the poems and the essay form part of a coherent and extended 
conversation about the proper sources and functions of literature and of art generally.  
The dialogic nature of the correspondence is not a separate backdrop to isolated literary 
texts contributed to the magazine, nor is the translation of those texts a mechanical aspect 
of the interaction with limited conceptual relevance.  Instead, I will try to demonstrate 
that each of these elements, along with the poems and essay, are part of a continuous 
textual dialogue. 
 Before beginning to narrate the unfolding of the dialogue between Wallace 
Stevens and José Rodríguez Feo, I wish to make clear the methodological foundations of 
my readings.  I will first address some of the obfuscations caused by reading Stevens’s 
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engagement with Cuban culture as exoticist, in order to clear the way for a more detailed 
analysis of what is actually communicated in the letters, poems, essays and translations.  
This communication must be considered in a dialogic context that places the assertions of 
each interlocutor on an equal footing, rather than from a monologic perspective that 
emphasizes Stevens’s role in the conversation.  Then, I will proceed to an analysis of the 
complex counterpoints that emerge from this conversation.  
 
The Politics and Epistemology of Exoticism 
 In his essay “Wallace Stevens y el discurso en La Habana: palabras de José 
Rodríguez Feo,” Roberto Ignacio Díaz analyzes the textual relationship between the two 
authors as a negotiation of exoticist discourses.  Díaz perceives in Stevens’s comments 
and questions to Rodríguez Feo a particular agenda—to use the young Cuban as a source 
of exotic details about a strange and unknown tropical place.  Díaz draws on an essential 
Todorovian principle of exoticism in his critique of Stevens.  For Todorov, the exoticist’s 
way of describing the Other is determined by the Other’s opposition to the exoticist’s 
cultural characteristics (264).2  Díaz asserts that Stevens is interested in Orígenes insofar 
as it contrasts with the familiar: “Orígenes le interesa sobre todo como espécimen de un 
curioso mundo nuevo; su lectura y sus consejos tratarán de acentuar tangiblemente las 
diferencias que pueda ofrecer esa revista de un país extraño…” (5) (“Orígenes interests 
him above all as a specimen of a curious new world; his readings and his advice will 
attempt to tangibly emphasize the differences that that magazine from a strange world 
can offer…”).  The exoticist idealizes the Other, without realizing that he lacks the 
epistemological tools to truly understand him.  For this reason, Todorov asserts: 
 74
“Knowledge is incompatible with exoticism, but lack of knowledge is in turn 
irreconcilable with praise of others; yet praise without knowledge is precisely what 
exoticism aspires to be.  This is its constitutive paradox” (265).   
 For Díaz, a “tacit hierarchy” (“la tácita jerarquía”) structures the Stevens-
Rodríguez Feo exchange (6).  In this hierarchy, Stevens is the towering literary figure 
from a culture and literary tradition enjoying centrality on the world stage, whereas 
Rodríguez Feo “…addresses the poet, looking for submissions for a magazine that was 
just founded in a city associated with many things, but not with high culture.  Stevens 
writes from a tradition that already occupied a key position in Western culture; Rodríguez 
Feo, on the other hand, pertains to a marginal, little-known tradition” (“…se dirige al 
poeta en busca de colaboraciones para una revista que acaba de fundar en una ciudad 
asociada con muchas cosas, pero no con la alta cultura.  Stevens escribe desde una 
tradición que ya ocupaba un puesto clave dentro de la cultura occidental; Rodríguez Feo, 
en cambio, pertenece a una tradición marginal, mal conocida”) (4-5). 
 In Díaz’s analysis, the positions from which the two correspondents address each 
other represent a clear global political opposition of superiority and inferiority.  This 
interpretive move facilitates a reading of the correspondence that characterizes it as a 
series of exoticist incursions on the part of Stevens and receptive or resistant responses by 
Rodríguez Feo.  The power dynamic that Díaz portrays determines his evaluation of the 
exchanges’ implications and results in a simplification of the complexity of the two 
writers’ interactions.  Because Díaz’s interpretive model places Stevens in a position of 
cultural power over Rodríguez Feo, Díaz takes each of the U.S. poet’s assertions to be 
patronizing or dismissive. 
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 I wish to revise Díaz’s emphasis on power dynamics that I believe are not entirely 
relevant to the literary issues raised in the dialogue.  The kind of power an author wields 
as a result of global-political, economic and cultural centrality may not be an advantage 
in the textual negotiation of issues such as the proper materials of poetry and the ideal 
makeup of a literary magazine.  Despite Díaz’s cynical remark about Havana’s global 
cultural status, both interlocutors are operating within the highly exclusive space of  high 
culture, one less intersected by global economics than are, for example, the arenas of 
popular culture—television dramas, magazine advertising and the like.  Relationships of 
high cultural production and consumption do not fit so easily into the pattern of economic 
and ideological hegemony that structures the majority of transfers or translations between 
global unequals.  In addition to the cultural register at which its meanings operate, the 
basic economic self-sufficiency of a magazine like Orígenes frees it to a certain extent 
from the global networks of economic power that structure other kinds of cultural 
exchanges.    
 A more significant advantage is held by the editors of the magazine and its most 
frequent contributors.  The fact that Rodríguez Feo, Lezama, and rest of the origenistas 
determine what the nature of the magazine is and how it will receive foreign texts is more 
significant than Cuba’s vulnerable economic position in relation to the U.S.  The activity 
of translation, which is central to the active reception of foreign texts, plays a significant 
role in this other kind of cultural power dynamic, lending a significant amount of agency 
to the receivers.  As I will argue later, Wallace Stevens himself evidences an awareness 
of the significance of the editor’s labor and of the centrality of translation in this cultural 
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interchange, and is interested in seeing the process of translation reshape and recast his 
work for reception in a new context. 
 As I hope to demonstrate, there is an explicit as well as an implicit agenda behind 
Stevens’s interactions with Rodríguez Feo and his contributions to Orígenes.  His explicit 
agenda is positing and problematizing the idea of the primacy of empirical experience in 
the construction of poetic images.  Stevens persistently argues for a realist foundation for 
poetry, though, as we will see, Stevens approaches this issue critically.  First, he asserts 
the important interrelations between the imaginative and the empirical faculties.  Second, 
he questions the authenticity of the materials that are available to us as “real experience.” 
 The implicit agenda becomes clear when we analyze Stevens’s assertions in their 
dialogic context, rather than from the point of view of a single-author study.  When we 
look at these assertions as part of a conversation with Rodríguez Feo (and, less directly, 
with the cultural agenda of the magazine he coedits), we see Stevens’s interest in eliciting 
responses.  Stevens is less interested in being admired from afar, or in being canonized in 
another language, than he is in seeing the reverberations and echoes that his assertions 
create in a transcultural dialogue.  This is not to deny Stevens his considerable cultural 
prejudices and ignorances.  But it is crucial to recognize that Stevens rarely seeks to 
impose viewpoints on Rodríguez Feo or to be treated with uncritical deference by him or 
other Cuban readers, editors and translators.  Instead, he hopes to construct counterpoints, 
clarify oppositions, and rework his own arguments in response to his interlocutor. 
 The dialogue Stevens sustains with Orígenes is thus another form of the 
imaginary encounter with a cultural Other that structures much of his poetry.  In these 
imaginary encounters, the possibility of a new and productive engagement with reality is 
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posed.  The journey to the foreign land promises, at the outset, the sloughing off of 
domestic meaning systems in preparation for empirical experience.  Yet, in Stevens’s 
poems, the authenticity of these experiences is questioned.  The imaginary contact with 
the Other is posed in a self-reflective, nuanced, tentative, and epistemologically critical 
way.   
“The Comedian as the Letter C” (1923) is an example of these characteristics.  
The poem narrates an epic journey that promises an escape from the stale, domesticated 
imagery of a European landscape.  The quest for the discovery of an exuberant, untamed 
and untroped Nature is framed in terms of the hero’s desire for a natural reality that is 
wholly other.  Crispin exemplifies Todorov’s definition of the exoticist, as the encounter 
he hopes to have with the foreign is inevitably posed as a dialectical opposite to the 
domestic.  Further, Crispin’s encounter with a foreign reality is structured by a lack, and 
the image of the Other that emerges is distorted in various ways by the desire that impels 
the subject toward the encounter.  Yet we must not confuse Stevens with the speaker of 
his poem; Crispin’s agenda is portrayed as a comic failure.  A careful reading of the 
poem helps us understand Stevens’s cynicism about just the kind of exoticist agenda of 
which Díaz accuses the poet. 
“Academic Discourse at Havana” (1929)3 is another poem that resists Díaz’s 
characterization of Stevens as exoticist.  The poem poses a journey to the Cuban capital 
as the search for a “difference” (3)4 from the worn-out mythologies of Romanticism 
(evoked in the image of the nightingale (3)) and Christianity (evoked by references to 
“Jehovah and the great sea-worm” (4)).  The imaginary locale he subsequently enters 
provides a particular kind of exoticism; it is radically different in a way that sets the stage 
 78
for the speaker’s pronouncement of the death of old symbols and the subsequent 
inauguration of a new realism.  The imagistic landscape of the poem is a scene of death 
and destruction, the locus of a project of clearing away symbolic detritus.  If “The 
Comedian as the Letter C” enacts a parodic dismantling of a colonialist realism, 
“Academic Discourse in Havana” broaches the subject of realism again, reasserting 
Crispin’s concern with escaping the symbols of a worn-out culture.  Still, the realism of 
the latter poem is not a stagnant one, like Crispin’s.  The speaker poses his new aesthetics 
as a tentative one that will be subject to future redefinitions.  The journey to Havana in 
the poem does not fit the definition of the exoticist encounter. 
 An understanding of the nuanced journeys toward difference staged in “The 
Comedian as the Letter C” and “Academic Discourse at Havana” must serve as the 
foundation for our examination of the cross-cultural encounter between Stevens and 
Orígenes.  For Todorov, an essential naiveté drives the exoticist project, wherein the 
viewer does not realize his own ignorance of the reality of the culture he encounters.  
This definition of exoticism is inherent in Díaz’s critique of Stevens.  Yet Stevens’s 
poetry, beginning in its earliest stages, calls forth the exotic locale as the setting for an 
investigation of epistemological and poetic questions rather than the scene for an 
indulgence in the flatteries of exoticism.  Stevens practices a critical exoticism like the 
one Roger Célestin investigates in his readings of Montaigne, Flaubert, Naipaul and 
others, a “…positing and elaboration of a (beckoning) outside (in texts that in fact 
constitute returns), that lends itself to a questioning of the basis and workings of 
representation itself…” (4). 
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 In dialogue with Stevens, Rodríguez Feo asserts his own agenda, as we will see.  
While he often agrees with his correspondent (on the weakness of propagandistic art, or 
the importance of “ordinary experience” to one’s intellectual development), he responds 
independently to Stevens’s assertions at every turn.  One method he employs is the 
evasive or laconic response to statements he does not agree with.  Another is the 
presentation of contrapuntal assertions, which is often executed through textual allusion 
or through translational interventions into Stevens’s poems and essays.  If Stevens’s 
argumentative stance is authorial, Rodríguez Feo’s is readerly and translational.  For this 
reason, it is important to be alert to the implications of Rodríguez Feo’s citations, and to 
the implications of his translation choices. 
 Through these strategies, Rodríguez Feo repeatedly asserts oppositions to 
Stevens’s positions.  In response to Stevens’s empiricism, Rodríguez Feo asserts himself 
as a “Platonist.”  He contravenes the U.S. poet’s rejection of the importance of reading 
with the assertion of a scholarly agenda.  Finally, he responds to Stevens’s rejection of 
religion as an intellectual basis for the arts with expressions of interest in Spanish 
mysticism. 
  
Opening Gestures: “Esthétique du Mal” and the Beginning of a Conversation  
 In his undergraduate studies at Harvard, Rodríguez Feo attempted translations of a 
number of poems from Stevens’s first major collection, Harmonium (1931), as well as of 
“Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” (1942).  In the first letter we have from Rodríguez 
Feo to Stevens, dated November 30, 1944, the young Cuban scholar, recently turned 
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coeditor of a promising new literary journal, proposes publishing a translation of 
“Esthétique du Mal,” a poem that had just appeared in the Kenyon Review.  
 There are two levels, one personal, the other literary, on which Rodríguez Feo 
initiates a personal and intellectual engagement with Stevens in this letter.  He signs off 
with a flattering quotation from the poem, as a way of forging a rapport with the older 
poet, and as a means of beginning a substantive dialogue on Stevens’s poetics:  “Allow 
me this opportunity, now, to wish you the happy greetings for Christmas.  And pardon 
such naïve familiarity.  Indeed, I feel I know you quite well already.  And if I have 
hesitated so long to address you, it is because ‘this is a part of the sublime from which we 
shrink’” (Secretaries 33-34).  On a personal level, the quotation asserts the sublime nature 
of Stevens the man and his work, implying that both are of monumental stature, 
constituting an overwhelming and intimidating force.  On a literary level, Rodríguez Feo 
is up to something more subtle: he takes up Stevens’s use of the concept of the sublime as 
a topic of discussion.   
 In the poem, the sublime as idea plays a negative role.  The speaker counterposes 
the idea to the brute physical reality to which it normally refers.  A young traveler in 
Naples sits in a café, “…reading paragraphs/ On the sublime…” (1.2-3).  The speaker of 
the poem juxtaposes the traveler’s interest in an abstract concept with the real danger of 
Mount Vesuvius, which leans threateningly over the scene.  The speaker parodies the 
reader’s abstracted state of mind by suggesting that 
  …Vesuvius might consume 
In solid fire the utmost earth and know 
 No pain (ignoring the cocks that crow us up 
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 To die).  This is a part of the sublime 
 From which we shrink. (1.16-20)   
The young man’s absorption by a theoretical discussion of the sublime appears ridiculous 
in relation to the image of physical danger that looms over the scene.  The speaker asserts 
implicitly that the sublime confuses the objective and the subjective, because its 
theorization of a particular aesthetic experience posits an overwhelming physical 
presence in strict relation to a human subjectivity.  The poem thus confronts the 
anthropomorphism that is constitutive of the sublime.   
 Stevens stages the poem to illustrate how the abstraction of a physical reality 
neutralizes its disruptive force, taking an experience that previously broached the limits 
of the human capacity to assimilate and process sensory data and making it assimilable.  
If, contrary to this operation of conceptual containment, the concrete potential of the 
volcano were allowed to rupture its theoretical frame and reassert its primacy, we would 
“shrink” from it.  The speaker of the poem attacks the projection of the human onto the 
natural as he asserts that Vesuvius might reap great human destruction while displaying 
no human emotion.  The natural, when its momentous power is meditated upon, explodes 
the compressed frame of human subjectivity, and assumes its proper extra-human scale.   
 The image of the volcano prefigures a warning that occurs near the poem’s end: 
“The greatest poverty is not to live/ In a physical world, to feel that one’s desire/ Is too 
difficult to tell from despair” (15.1-3).  Desire, in this context, is the desire for sense 
experience.  In an abstracted frame of mind, this desire is fruitless, as no clear access to 
concrete experience is allowed.  It thus becomes confused with its inevitable outcome—
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despair.  The speaker implicitly revalorizes this kind of desire as a force that might propel 
the subjectivity beyond its binding solipsism. 
   It is significant that Rodríguez Feo responds to this particular poem and initiates a 
dialogue with Stevens with a citation from it.  It is likely the young Cuban intellectual 
recognizes something of himself in the reader that appears at its opening.  Throughout his 
textual conversations with the older poet, Rodríguez Feo assumes the role of the 
insatiable reader seated at the café, drawing greater inspiration from textuality than from 
reality.  We see him playing this part at the very initiation of his correspondence with 
Stevens.  In a significant discursive move, he reverses the argumentative direction of 
Stevens’s discourse on the sublime.  When he asserts that Stevens’s body of poetic work, 
rather than a natural phenomenon, forms “a part of the sublime from which we shrink,” 
he retextualizes the poet’s image of the extratextual reality that lies outside the space of 
the theoretical.   The sublime returns to being a literary phenomenon.  This move asserts 
the primacy of the literary over the real, and is executed through a tribute to the poet’s 
work.  As such, Rodríguez Feo seeks to establish a rapport and enter into a sympathetic 
dialogue with Stevens while simultaneously claiming his right to contest the assertions he 
finds in the poet’s work. 
 The dialogic nature of Stevens’s metapoetics mirrors the contestatory space 
Rodríguez Feo opens up in his initiation of the dialogue.  Stevens’s assertion of the 
primacy of concrete reality is only one argumentative move in a broader oscillation 
between issues of objectivity and subjectivity in his poetry.  Rodríguez Feo, as careful 
and active reader of “Esthétique,” sees an opening for discussion with the poet, rather 
than a rigid stance he must reject.  We see this opening at the end of the poem, as the 
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speaker grudgingly accepts that the human reflex to subjectively restructure concrete 
experience is as essential as the experience itself: 
And out of what one sees and hears and out 
Of what one feels, who could have thought to make 
So many selves, so many sensuous worlds 
As if the air, the mid-day air, was swarming 
With the metaphysical changes that occur,  
Merely in living as and where we live.  (15.19-24)  
Surprisingly, the same poet who so expertly stages a parodic dismantlement of subjective 
projection evokes its beautiful reconstruction.  The “mid-day air,” as physical presence, is 
retroped in a process that the speaker accepts as natural and inevitable—the 
“metaphysical changes” in the physical element emerge naturally from human habitation 
of that space.  The fact that the subjective projection is enacted, in part, “out of what one 
sees and hears” marks the persistence of an argument for an empirical basis for the 
imagination’s “metaphysical changes,” in contrast to the inevitable emotional impulse 
(“what one feels”) behind the projection (what we can call the pathetic fallacy).  As we 
will see in the correspondence, Stevens’s periodic shifts of emphasis between the poles of 
the objective and the subjective often produce the kind of delicate reconciliation that we 
find at the closing of “Esthétique.” 
 
Continuing a Dialogue through Poetic Means: “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo” 
and “Paisant Chronicle” 
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 Stevens’s reply to Rodríguez Feo’s overture, though brief, is positive, expressing 
a willingness to allow “Esthétique” to be translated and an interest in perusing an issue of 
Orígenes.  Stevens receives a few issues of the magazine on January 3rd, 1945, and 
comments in a letter dated the next day that he is pleased with its presentation, though his 
Spanish is too limited to read the texts very thoroughly.  As the correspondence develops, 
the two men discuss the work of George Santayana, Yvor Winters, and Ernest 
Hemingway.  A relationship is established, and Rodríguez Feo feels comfortable, in a 
letter dated February 13, 1945, firing off a number of questions he has been struggling 
with, breathlessly ranging from Hemingway’s machismo to Stevens’s concept of “the 
major men,” to the work of John Malcolm Brinnin and Robert Penn Warren, to the 
concept of the grotesque.   
 Stevens’s reply takes poetic form, an event that will occur numerous times during 
the course of his textual conversation with Rodríguez Feo.  As I will try to show, these 
poems cannot be fully appreciated in isolation, but instead must be read as elements in 
the ongoing dialogue between the two men.  In response to Rodríguez Feo’s question 
about the grotesque, Stevens replies with the poem “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo,” 
which appears in the spring, 1945 issue of the magazine Voices.  The poem is part of a 
distinct mode of dialogic discourse on the basic questions of objectivity versus 
subjectivity and realism versus romanticism.  This discourse emerges from and sustains 
the conversation unfolded in the letters. 
 Like “Academic Discourse at Havana,” the poem evokes the Cuban capital, not as 
the setting for the indulgence of exoticism, but rather as a spectral zone where more 
abstract propositions are essayed.  The scant concrete detail used to evoke the place is 
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more appropriate to the exploration of an epistemological problem than to the narration 
of an exotic encounter.  The poem calls forth the concept of the grotesque in order to 
interrogate its relation to the question of subjectivity, in an operation similar to the one 
that opens “Esthétique.”   
 The image of the moon reappears, standing as an emblem of the imaginative.  
Rodríguez Feo, the passionate student, translator and editor of literature, is portrayed as 
one of the imagination’s “secretaries.”  Though there is a gentle irony in the 
characterization, Rodríguez Feo nonetheless stands as a positive figure in the poem, as he 
represents an intelligent devotion to art rather than a mindless surrender to fancy: “As one 
of the secretaries of the moon,/ The queen of ignorance, you have deplored/ How she 
presides over imbeciles” (1-3).  The “imbeciles” of the poem recognize the grotesque in 
nocturnal images, and ask: “…Is it because/ Night is the nature of man’s interior world?/ 
Is lunar Habana the Cuba of the self?” (4-6).  The question proposes a conflation of sense 
experience and subjectivity.  A chain of connections is posed—night, the grotesque, 
subjectivity—that traverses the boundary between the exterior and the interior.   
 Stevens explains to Rodríguez Feo in a letter that he means for the “interior 
world” of the poem to be associated with the concept of the subconscious (42).  Stevens 
intends the imbeciles of the second strophe to espouse a psychoanalytic method for 
understanding the grotesque: “We must enter boldly that interior world/ To pick up 
relaxations of the known” (7-8).  The adverb “boldly” is shaded with irony, as the project 
of probing the subconscious is not truly an adventure into an unknown territory, but 
rather a timid reformulation of “the known.”  The probing of the subconscious merely 
illustrates a fundamental solipsism.  What is already known “relax[es],” offers itself up to 
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new readings that can be easily “pick[ed] up,” rather than achieved through arduous 
labor.  This process is not an engagement with the reality that lies beneath the experience 
of the grotesque.  The grotesque simply becomes the occasion for a solipsism that 
deceptively poses itself as “bold” exploration.  Like Crispin in “The Comedian as the 
Letter C,” the explorer of the unconscious will not discover anything new, but will simply 
be brought back to his own preconceptions.   
 The speaker reaches a verdict on the psychoanalytic method of the “imbeciles,” 
asserting that: 
  …The spirit tires, 
It has, long since, grown tired, of such ideas. 
It says there is an absolute grotesque. 
There is a nature that is grotesque within 
The boulevards of the generals. (13-17)  
The speaker of the poem makes a transition from the parodic depiction of a solipsistic 
intellectual position to the definitive statement of an opposite stance: there is an objective 
reality that the term “grotesque” describes.  It is to be found, not in the image of Havana 
that a subjectivity internalizes, but in the very substance of the city itself.  This 
declaration poses the grotesque as an objective reality, rather than a projection. 
 Though this argument is made forcefully in the poem, an examination of its 
rhetorical formulation reveals attenuations.  Generally, the ironic treatment of an 
argument, when unaccompanied by the affirmative statement of an opposing point of 
view, is more thoroughly deconstructive.  This kind of irony deploys its tonal devices 
from an unmarked discursive space, attacking the structure of an argument from a 
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position whose precepts are left implicit.  It is often impossible to specify with certainty 
what motivates the ironic stance, what broader argument it is intended to make.  Thus, it 
is difficult to pose a challenging reply to the ironic gesture. 
 When an ironic characterization leads to an affirmative opposing statement, the 
general effect is less forcefully deconstructive, because the means of parodic 
representation reveal their philosophical foundations.  This is indeed what Stevens allows 
to happen when he asserts “an absolute grotesque.”  This assertion is open to criticism on 
any number of fronts, the most obvious being that it simply suppresses the 
epistemological problematics of subjectivity and objectivity that are embedded in the 
terminology.  The fact that the speaker makes the affirmation illustrates that the purpose 
of the poem is not to arrive at an absolute statement or slogan for objectivity.  Indeed, the 
fact that the assertion of “an absolute grotesque” is made by “the spirit” problematizes it 
from a philosophical perspective.  The assertion is not disguised as an intellection, but 
instead, is explicitly posed as something desired, as a proposition emerging from an 
opposition.  Again, as in “Esthétique,” objective reality appears as an object of subjective 
desire, thereby calling to question the possibility of unmediated access to that reality.   
 The second poem that Stevens writes in response to Rodríguez Feo is “Paisant 
Chronicle,” which appears with “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo” in Voices.  Stevens 
writes the poem in response to his correspondent’s request for a definition of “the major 
men” that figure in “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” a poem that links the figure to the 
theme denoted in its title: “The major abstraction is the idea of man/ And major man is its 
exponent, abler/ In the abstract than in his singular” (“It Must Be Abstract” 10.1-3).  The 
speaker of “Notes” explores the question of the necessity of both the abstraction (the 
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“Supreme Fiction”) and the Real.  The image of the “major man” illustrates what the 
speaker of “Notes” later describes as the interdependence of the two elements (“It Must 
Change,” section IV).  The “major man,” as exponent of abstraction, puts forth the 
abstraction in concrete form.  The abstraction relies on concrete exposition; for its 
existence, it depends on its ability to reduce itself to an apprehensible form.  Conversely, 
the concrete reality relies on the expansions and generalizations of abstraction in order to 
be meaningful.   
 In order to clarify his intention in the use of the figure of the “major men,” 
Stevens elaborates on his definition in “Paisant Chronicle”: “They are characters beyond/ 
Reality, composed thereof.  They are/ The fictive man created out of men” (14-16).  The 
need for a Supreme Fiction is implicit in the need to figure forth an abstract concept that 
describes the essence of human nature.  The concept must fulfill the contradictory need to 
believe in a force that is both beyond, and reflective of, the human.  The speaker proposes 
a means of arriving at that abstraction that is more grounded in empirical reality.  The  
abstraction, in contrast to the subconscious grotesque that is parodied in “A Word with 
José Rodríguez-Feo,” is to be a composite of concrete instances, something “beyond/ 
Reality” and “composed thereof.”  In order to be believable, the abstraction must take on 
a palpable specificity.  Further, this specificity cannot be constructed from spent clichés, 
but must rather refashion itself from novel images.  Thus, what the poem espouses is not 
a discarding of the imaginative projection, but rather the need for that projection to be 
periodically refigured.   
 “A Word,” in response to the issue of the grotesque, suggests the necessity of a 
kind of absolute realism, while admitting that it is “the spirit” that generates that 
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necessity.  “Paisant Chronicle,” on the other hand, takes up the question of this desire via 
an image in “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.”  It is clear from reading both “A Word” 
and “Paisant Chronicle” that Stevens asserts a necessary reciprocal relation between the 
objective and the subjective, rather than a programmatic espousal of one or the other 
conceptual pole as the basis for a poetics.  As we will see, this reciprocal relation in 
Stevens’s thinking is dynamic; it is continually in a process whereby one opposite 
challenges the other, forcing it to revise itself.   Rodríguez Feo, as poetic figure in the 
first poem, is valorized as an intelligent observer of this epistemological dynamic, 
despising a stagnant romanticism that fixes a single meaning in the archetypal image of 
the moon.  This depiction mirrors Stevens’s respect for Rodríguez Feo the real man (as he 
knows him through his letters), a respect that drives Stevens’s strategy of maintaining an 
exploratory dialogue that both enriches, and is enriched by, poetic texts. 
 
“Attention and Meditation” versus Platonic Intelligence: A Contrapuntal Discussion 
of Reading 
 After the exchanges that culminate in the poems that appear in Voices, the 
conversation turns to questions of the proper materials for poetry, continuing an 
engagement with the basic issues of the objective versus the subjective and the concrete 
versus the abstract.  In response to a request for his opinions on the work of Hemingway, 
Stevens replies with an assertion that he repeats in reference to various authors 
throughout the correspondence: “I don’t read him” (43).  Stevens frequently asserts that 
he avoids reading too much literary work—critical or creative—because the effect of 
doing so would be detrimental to his own poetry.  This assertion develops over the course 
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of the correspondence into a systematic rejection of textual sources for poetry, and 
Stevens instead advocates two fundamental activities: observation of the physical world 
and meditation upon observed and imagined images.  Stevens confides that “…I read 
little or no fiction, and really read very much less of everything than most people.  It is 
more interesting to sit round and look out of the window” (43).   It would be mistaken to 
read the comment, provoked by Rodríguez Feo’s question about Hemingway, as evidence 
of general malice, though there is, of course, a sharp edge to his remark.  His description 
of the act of looking out a window is not simply a sarcastic jab.  Instead, this seemingly 
inconsequential remark argues for an empirical basis for poetic creation over and above 
intertextuality.  
 This assertion is provoked by, and cuts against, Rodríguez Feo’s unflagging 
passion for books.  The young man’s mind is endowed with a boundless scholarly 
curiosity, and is constantly formulating complex systems of connections among texts of 
widely varying cultural, historical, and poetic contexts.  Stevens betrays a fundamental 
respect for this inclination, but is not convinced to change his own stance.  He argues 
from the position of a poet rather than of a scholar.  Furthermore, during the mid 1940s, 
Stevens is at a period in his career in which his poetic method involves an increasingly 
intense coordination of personal disciplines of observation and meditation, disciplines 
that exclude reading.   
 Stevens’s disavowal of textual sources for poetry is not precisely a rejection of 
subjectivity, but rather a resistance of an intersubjectivity facilitated by intertextuality.  
The image that is taken from another poet’s work is for Stevens something that has been 
abstracted twice.  Stevens finds the use of such images to be problematic because, as it 
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continues from one text to another, it results in a process of increasing abstraction from 
observable reality.  In “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words,” published in 1942, 
Stevens asserts: “The imagination loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to what is real.  
When it adheres to the unreal and intensifies what is unreal, while its first effect may be 
extraordinary, that effect is the maximum effect that it will ever have” (Angel 6).5  A 
poetic figure that the reader can “participate in” and which will sustain the greatest 
“vitality” (7) is one that animates an observed phenomenon.  To continue to make fresh 
impressions on the minds of readers, poetry should enact periodic returns to personal 
experience of, and meditation upon, the materials of the observable world.  Stevens does 
not reduce the ontological status of this image to one of pure objectivity; he is attentive in 
his comments to the constant interactions between the concrete instance and the 
principles by which the mind makes sense of it.  He simply asserts the need for the 
principle to be reformulated, as we see in “Esthétique”: “…out of what one sees and 
hears…”  
  When Stevens speaks of meditation, he refers to a personalized practice of using 
images to think through various abstract propositions, weighing competing assertions 
against each other at each step.  These concrete images come from observation.  As we 
have seen, he asserts that this connection supplants any link between reading and 
meditation.  In a letter dated June 20, 1945, Stevens offers Rodríguez Feo a remarkably 
candid picture of his own poetic methods, beginning with the assertion that he “…no 
longer read[s] because it doesn’t seem worth while...” (62).  Having negated again a 
textual basis for poetic inspiration, Stevens continues:  “Reality is the great fond, and it is 
because it is that the purely literary amounts to so little.  Moreover, in the world of 
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actuality, in spite of all I have just said, one is always living a little out of it” (62).  The 
rejection of “the purely literary” is clear, as is an assertion of the importance of an 
empirical method that proceeds from “[r]eality” and “actuality.”   
 Yet Stevens’s argument in this passage is somewhat less polished than at other 
moments, as evidenced in his diction (“…and it is because it is that.  ..”).  The looseness 
of his style shows him rushing through this clear statement of an empirical basis for 
poetry towards an attenuation of that argument in the next sentence, which is somewhat 
illogically introduced with the word “Moreover.”  Stevens asserts that the poet who 
immerses herself in observation of the actual world always has one foot outside that 
world.  It becomes clear from the statement that follows that this fact arises from the 
primacy, not of empiricism, but of poetic creation.  The poet is not a passively receptive 
and unbiased recorder of images and sensations; her immersion in the world of the actual 
is always motivated by the primary impulse toward the composition of new poetic 
images, a practice aligned with the discipline of meditation.   
 Stevens makes this connection via a passage from Henry James’s notebooks:  “To 
live in the world of creation—to get into it and stay in it—to frequent it and haunt it—to 
think intensely and fruitfully—to woo combinations and inspirations into being by a 
depth and continuity of attention and meditation—this is the only thing” (62).6  The 
citation describes an artistic discipline Stevens identifies with, and it is useful to read the 
passage through the interpretive lens of Stevens’s poetics.  James describes creation as a 
discipline, and so does Stevens in his own comments to Rodríguez Feo.  Furthermore, the 
passage centers on a central intellectual operation: the coordination of “attention” and 
“meditation.”  Seen from the perspective of Stevens’s empiricism, the first term suggests 
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attention to the details of the sensory image as well as of the mental image.  Attention to 
the mental image (which should have a firm empirical foundation) is the basis for 
meditation, a method of thinking that is sustained by the “continuity” of engagement with 
images, and which is imperiled chiefly by the potential for distraction.  The methodology 
of attention and meditation must unfold gradually, systematically, and without 
interruption.  In the context of comments by Stevens that we have seen so far, reading 
would represent just this kind of interruption. 
 In a letter dated July 1945, Rodríguez Feo responds to Stevens’s serious and 
extended statement of his own poetics with a surprising levity: “Your citation from James 
is delightfully personal” (63).  Though the Cuban acknowledges how the passage from 
James has allowed Stevens to open up to him and express closely held beliefs, the adverb 
“delightfully” deflates the American poet’s seriousness.  By refraining from commenting 
further on Stevens’s statements, Rodríguez Feo neither subscribes to, nor dismisses them.   
 Instead, he chooses, at a moment in which Stevens’s arguments have gathered a 
certain continuity and momentum over the course of several letters, to open a space for 
the assertion of his own literary, aesthetic, philosophical and political values.  This 
moment in the correspondence should lead the reader to revise any preconceptions of a 
rhetorical advantage sustained by Stevens over his younger Cuban counterpart.  
Rodríguez Feo exerts the power of the limited response to an enthusiastic statement from 
his correspondent, in order to maintain the coherence of his own constellation of ideas.  
 Rodríguez Feo deflects Stevens’s comments about observation and meditation by 
asserting his scholarly predilections.  He continues his relentless citations of authors he is 
studying—including George Leite, Henri Michaux, Léon Bloy, George Santayana, and 
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Djuna Barnes—asserting himself again as scholarly reader, in contrast to Stevens’s role 
as meditative poet.  The Cuban does not allow his correspondence with Stevens to 
become a kind of literary interview, in which the older poet espouses his personal 
aesthetics and the younger scholar responds with questions to stimulate elaborations or 
clarifications.  Instead, he maintains his agenda of sustaining a conversation between 
readers, in spite of Stevens’s inveterate lack of enthusiasm for scholarly pursuits.   
 In the same letter, Rodríguez Feo challenges Stevens’s assertions further by 
expressing an identification with “Platonism” and by suggesting that even Stevens 
himself must be a Platonist.  This second assertion is a more aggressive refutation of the 
American poet’s assertions, registering a personal challenge rather than a simple assertion 
of opinion.  Rodríguez Feo’s introduction of the concept of Platonism follows a lament 
on the stagnation of Cuba’s intellectual culture: “The terrible gap with us is intelligence!  
And really there cannot be passion without intelligence, or courage or real hatred—
Platonic, yes, but then all goes back to good old Plato who I realize must be your favorite 
boy too!”  (64-5).  Inasmuch as the “intelligence” he speaks of is “Platonic,” it suggests a 
knowledge, through contemplation, of eternal forms (noumena) that is contrasted with 
uncultivated emotion (“passion,” “courage,” “hatred”).  This knowledge has little to do 
with observation of the phenomenal world, which, according to Plato’s allegory of the 
Cave in the Republic, consists of flickering shadows of the unchanging Forms.   
 In the most immediate sense, Rodríguez Feo counterposes this Platonic 
intelligence to Stevens’s notion of meditation based on observation.  Where Stevens’s 
concept of meditation is a methodology of thinking through concrete images, his Cuban 
counterpart suggests a process of intellection that rejects the epistemological value of any 
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particular instantiation of the Form in favor of a process whereby the Form in intuited in 
a mental movement beyond the plane of sensory images.  
   Stevens responds in part to his correspondent’s epistemological differences, 
though he realizes that Rodríguez Feo’s comments do not completely oppose his own, as 
they describe a societal problem (a general intellectual listlessness) rather than a 
specifically poetic one.  Stevens recognizes that his correspondent’s comments challenge 
his poetics somewhat indirectly, a phenomenon we will see repeated throughout their 
dialogue.  In this case, the comments represent Rodríguez Feo’s effort to pose a relation 
between his own intellectual work within the context of the Orígenes project and a local 
cultural context.  He describes Cubans as a people whose thinking is so limited to the 
local that they soon feel that they know everything there is to know.  He poses Platonism 
as a remedy for this provincialism.7  Stevens’s assertion of the importance of observation 
translates in Rodríguez Feo’s thinking into the importance of limiting oneself to the 
Cuban realities that surround him, a practice he believes Cubans and Cuban literary 
culture have perfected to a fault.  Orígenes resists crude artistic localisms; it seeks a 
delicate balance between the assertion of a national identity and the idea that such an 
identity must flow in universal intellectual currents. 
 In a letter to Henry Church, dated July 19, 1945, Stevens opposes Rodríguez 
Feo’s comments on Cuban culture: 
My young man in Havana continues to send me letters of great interest... My 
particular José dislikes the taste of Cuba; yet it is Cuba that has been his own 
matrix.  His view is that of the Platonic young intellectual.  He says… “Is it 
because everybody knows and is bored to death before actually dying of 
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everything?”  This is merely his Platonism.  He lives like the perpetual reader, 
without sex or politics.  I speak of him because he is typical.  (508) 
 
Stevens deflates Rodríguez Feo’s Platonism as “merely” something typical of his age (he 
was 24 at the time).  He suggests that the normal tendency early in life is toward a form 
of idealism that retreats from a surrounding reality that seems to offer little in the way of 
novelty.  Stevens implies that this retreat causes one to live “like the perpetual reader,” an 
existence that the American poet has categorically rejected, as we have seen.   
 Stevens clearly laments the tendency of his young Cuban correspondent to retreat 
from local reality because he feels that the local forms one’s intellectual “matrix.”  
According to this metaphor, the local is a nurturing force surrounding an individual’s 
ideas; it is in a literal sense the womb in which ideas gestate (the word “matrix” derives 
from Latin mater, or “mother”).  This metaphor forcefully asserts the primacy of 
empirical reality, in strong resistance to a Platonic ontology.  This reality surrounds and 
feeds the idea like a womb, and thus both pre-exists and contains the abstract concept.  
Platonism asserts exactly the reverse; knowledge of the numinous is posited as a memory 
or nostalgia for the pre-existing Form, whose multiple instantiations are contained by it.   
  
“Four Poems”:  Realism versus Romanticism 
 Stevens’s response to Rodríguez Feo’s Platonic assertions takes the form of four 
poems, which the latter receives in August, 1945.  The poems are published in Orígenes 
in a translation by Óscar Rodríguez Feliú.  As we will see, these poems continue the two 
men’s textual conversation in way that recasts Stevens’s arguments, while introducing, 
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through the suggestiveness of their imagery, further and more nuanced developments of 
those arguments.   We will first need to read the original poems in the context of the 
correspondence.  Then, we see how the translations process the originals in identifiable 
ways for incorporation into the context of Orígenes, even though the translator is not the 
one engaged in the fruitful exchanges with the author that we have seen so far.  
 “The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm” depicts a reader intensely 
involved and invested in his book, a figure that clearly represents Rodríguez Feo to some 
extent.  Like the young scholar in the café in “Esthétique,” this reader is so wholly 
absorbed by the contemplation of abstract concepts through reading that the actuality of 
the world around him loses relevance.  Just as the concept of the sublime processes the 
threatening physical presence of Vesuvius into something manageable, the reader’s 
surroundings in “The House” are transformed by his contemplation: “…summer night/ 
Was like the conscious being of the book” (2-3).  The night becomes “…like a perfection 
of thought” (9); it loses its experiential specificity and becomes a Platonic Idea.   
 The reader leaves the world of experience behind in the hope that the textual 
world he enters will present him with absolute Truth: “…the reader leaned above the 
page,/ Wanted to lean, wanted much most to be/ The scholar to whom his book is true…” 
(8).  For this scholar, Truth is to be gained from a text, rather than from sense experience.  
Significantly, the speaker does not portray this epistemological stance as rational.  
Instead, he insists, through the repetition of the verb “wanted,” that desire drives the 
reader’s thinking.  Rather than arrive rationally at the assertion that Truth is to be found 
in a book, the reader believes the assertion because he wants to.  This problem of the 
primacy of desire over thought recurs throughout the four poems as a particularly 
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important example of a subjectivity that isolates itself from empirical reality.  Stevens’s 
speakers repeatedly lament the failure of the human mind to more directly receive 
information from the outside world and avoid the pitfalls of the will’s distortions of 
perception.   
Further, this desire does more than circumvent rational considerations; it drives a 
fundamental confusion of the subjective with the objective, a problem we have seen 
treated in “A Word with José Rodríguez Feo.”  The speaker is so intensely involved in 
his study that not only is the observable reshaped by concepts; more profoundly, the 
reader himself becomes indistinguishable from the Idea he contemplates.  In an 
astonishing twist of argument, executed through the continued repetition of the poem’s 
central terms (“calm,” “summer,” “night”), the reader’s subjectivity is itself subsumed by 
the Idea: 
And the world was calm.  The truth in a calm world, 
In which there is no other meaning, itself 
 
Is calm, itself is summer and night, itself 
Is the reader leaning late and reading there.  (13-16)         
The reader ceases to be independent from what he contemplates; the truth becomes him 
and he becomes the truth.  The scholar invests his subjectivity so totally in what he 
studies that his own person is no longer distinguishable from it.  The philosophical 
difficulty that this assertion raises is the breakdown of the distinction between subject and 
object.    
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 The result is a restatement of the problem of solipsism in surprisingly blunt terms; 
the reader, fused with what he contemplates, is unable to think about anything but 
himself.  This rhetorical move at the end of the poem encloses the reader in his own 
subjectivity in an exaggerated fashion.  The statement of the philosophical problem 
works through a rhetorical method of repetition that builds to a dramatization of the 
problem of solipsism; the assertion that results is categorical and inflexible.  These 
characteristics contrast with “Thinking of the Relation Between the Images of 
Metaphors” and “Continual Conversation With a Silent Man,” whose rhetoric betrays 
greater degrees of ambivalence. 
“Chaos in Motion and Not in Motion,” like “The World,” presents a categorical 
challenge to solipsism.  In the poem, the reader is replaced with the German painter 
Ludwig Richter (1803-84).  Richter’s romantic landscapes project human emotions onto 
natural phenomena.  Alongside the figure of the reader in the café, they dramatize the 
problem of solipsism and function as another negative example in relation to the 
epistemology Stevens develops in his letters.  Stevens’s use of the figure of Richter is 
somewhat oblique, as he comes to be associated with an operatic spectacle.  Perhaps the 
opera’s set design is done in a picturesque style like Richter’s.  The artist is closely 
associated with the spectacle’s absurdity, as if he were its creator. 
By taking up Richter as an object lesson, Stevens’s speaker evokes and confronts 
German Romanticism as a whole.  The speaker’s depiction of Richter’s work epitomizes 
a typically hostile vision of the German Romantic movement, or to its counterparts in 
England and France.  For Stevens’s speaker, Richter embodies what M. H. Abrams 
describes as the tendencies of the German “romantic extremists,” who “…made the work 
 100
of art out to be, in a fashion even more absolute than the world of perception, an 
expression of unadulterated spirit” (90).  As the creator who is indistinguishable from 
what he creates, Richter epitomizes this dynamic of exteriorization, this constant and 
unmediated “expression” (in its literal sense of pushing outward) of the interior spirit.  In 
this schematized vision of Romanticism, observation of the natural world never possesses 
independent value.  When nature appears, it always serves as the expression of an interior 
state.    
Richter’s interior world functions an emblem of solipsism, as does the reader’s 
mentality in “The House.”  Nonetheless, the turbulence of Richter’s world contrasts 
sharply with the tranquility of the scholar bent over his book:  
Oh, that this lashing wind was something more 
Than the spirit of Ludwig Richter… 
 
The rain is pouring down.  It is July. 
There is lightning and the thickest thunder. 
 
It is a spectacle.  Scene 10 becomes 11, 
In Series X, Act IV, et cetera.  (1-6) 
Though the spectacle is full of drama, the viewer/speaker’s boredom is comically evident 
in the exhausted tone of the third strophe.  The drama fails to hold his attention because it 
consists of nothing more than the exposition of its creator’s inner states; everything 
available to the sense experience of the viewer is “nothing more/ [t]han the spirit” of an 
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artist made manifest in a work.  The images do not remind the viewer of anything in 
reality.   
 Like the figure of the reader in the previous poem, Richter escapes the world of 
actuality through fiction.  Further, both figures are the fiction into which they retreat; 
Richter is only different in that the fiction is of his own making.  They both surrender any 
claim to a position of difference and distance from an object of contemplation.  Subject 
and object relationships break down as Richter: 
Knows desire without an object of desire, 
All mind and violence and nothing felt. 
 
He knows he has nothing more to think about, 
Like the wind that lashes everything at once.  (15-18) 
Again, as in “The House,” desire is responsible for the disintegration of a rational 
relationship to objective reality.  The speaker does not assert that desire is to be discarded 
completely, though.  Instead, he warns that the solipsist cannot exercise desire correctly, 
because no object exists outside the sphere of his all-encompassing subjectivity.  In a 
crucial distinction, the speaker asserts that desire is possible only when there is an 
objective world beyond the individual from which he can receive an emotional or 
aesthetic stimulus.   Ludwig Richter’s self-generating passion, in contrast, no longer 
responds to the outside world.  
 In “Thinking of a Relation Between the Images of Metaphors,” Stevens offers a 
positive example in relation to the poetics and epistemology he espouses, one that 
contrasts sharply with the figures of the scholar and the Romantic artist.  Following the 
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pattern of the previous two poems, there is a single figure who serves as a distillation of a 
constellation of traits, in this case positive.  Here, this figure is a fisherman on the banks 
of the Perkiomen, a stream that runs near the house in Reading, Pennsylvania, where 
Stevens himself grew up.  The autobiographical nature of the poem’s setting suggests a 
proximity between the speaker’s assertions and the poet’s.  The poem opens with images 
that prepare for the poem’s description of the possibility of an empirical revelation.   
 First, the opening images establish a contrast that helps the moment of revelation 
stand in relief.  The imagery of the bass “shrinking from the spit and splash/ Of waterish 
spears” (6-7) evokes a violence and frenzied movement that will come to contrast the 
placidity of the fisherman’s moment of revelation.  The dove, an emblem of peace, 
evokes a more profound sense of awed calm and silence in contrast to this opening 
image. 
 Second, a suggestion of atemporality provides sympathetic conceptual support 
(rather than an imagistic contrast, as seen in the previous example).  A synchronicity is 
established in the scene by the assertion that the fish’s behavior is still affected by the 
threat of Native American fisherman long vanished from the poem’s geographical 
location:  “The bass lie deep, still afraid of the Indians” (1-2).  In two basic ways, this 
temporal phenomenon is intimately connected to the empirical discipline that the poem 
describes and espouses.   First, it springs from the speaker’s observation of the fish’s 
behavior, though it also involves an imaginative leap to include the Indians in the scene.  
Second, and more importantly, the suggestion of a synchronicity supports the possibility 
of a revelation that lifts the observer out of the “stream” of time and allows him to 
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apprehend the singularity of the concrete reality rather than the concrete reality 
undergoing constant and multiple transformations through time. 
 The fisherman of the poem, in contrast to the Platonism, solipsism, and 
romanticism of figures in previous poems, represents an empirical ideal.  The fisherman 
is rhetorically reduced to the sense organs through which he receives visual and auditory 
images of the bass swimming in the stream and the doves singing above.  He becomes 
“[o]ne ear” (4) and “[o]ne eye” (8).  Rather than work toward the exteriorization of a 
subjective state as would the romantic artist, the fisherman strives to receive reality in an 
unmediated fashion: “The fisherman is all/ One eye, in which the dove resembles the 
dove” (7-8).  This rhetorical formulation of the fisherman’s realism suggests the outcome 
that has arisen from the intellectual activity described in the poem’s title.  The empirical 
revelation collapses the mechanism of resemblance built into metaphor.  As a result, 
metaphor becomes a mediated and unnecessary approximation of pure perception.  
 Nonetheless, Stevens’s speaker follows this deconstruction of metaphor with a 
musical metaphor for the fisherman’s approximation to the Real.  The doves’ song 
becomes a series of musical variations on an “unstated theme” (11).  Though the 
metaphor leads to the description of a state of pure empirical receptivity, by its very 
metaphorical nature, it already relativizes that description.  As we will see below, other 
rhetorical features reveal that the speaker only proposes the potential for this 
epistemological state.    
 The musical “theme” suggests a structuring reality behind the multiple aesthetic 
experiences the poem describes, and the fisherman’s attentive observation draws him 
close to its “disclosure” (13): 
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    …How close 
 
To the unstated theme each variation comes … 
In that one ear it might strike perfectly: 
 
State the disclosure.  In that one eye the dove  
Might spring to sight and yet remain a dove. 
 
The fisherman might be the single man 
In whose breast, the dove, alighting, would grow still.  (10-16) 
The image of “disclosure” suggests an unmediated revelation.  The image of the 
fisherman’s “breast” represents the site of an internalization of the objective reality, and 
the stillness that occurs after the dove “alights” there contrasts with the violent 
movements of subjectivity described in “Chaos.”  The objective reality, when it is 
apprehended perfectly, takes on the stillness of constancy.   
 Yet the metaphorical nature of these images undercuts their very potential as a 
means for espousing a realist epistemology.  Even further, we observe at the end of the 
poem the mediating presence of desire in the auxiliary verbs “might” and “would,” 
betraying a similarity with the reader in “The House.”  The poem testifies to the desire of 
both fisherman and poetic speaker for a moment of clarity and reception, rather than 
narrating that moment’s occurrence.  In the end, what Stevens suggests through the voice 
of this speaker is a methodology that promises an approximation to realism, rather than a 
dogmatic statement of realism as a program.8
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 Finally, “Continual Conversation with a Silent Man” is the most enigmatic of the 
four poems, a text whose analysis helps us understand the complexity of the messages 
encoded in the grouping of the four poems as a whole.  At the poem’s opening, the 
speaker situates a human collectivity between the poles of experiential reality and 
intersubjective abstraction.  These two elements are represented, respectively, by the 
image of a hen and of the sky.  The two images evoke the homely practicality of farm 
life, and more generally, the world of everyday experience. 
 The hen and the cartwheel stand opposite the sky and the leaves, which are 
upturned by “…the never-ending storm of will,/ One will and many wills, and the wind,/ 
Of many meanings in the leaves…” (7-9).  If the previous pair of images suggests a 
pragmatic, physical existence, the storm is a metaphor for subjectivity and abstraction (as 
it is in “Chaos”).  This world is chaotic in its multiplicity (“many wills,” “many 
meanings”), in contrast to the singularity of the images of the hen and the cartwheel.  The 
idea of multiple wills suggests the storm to be a site of intersubjectivity.  At this site, we 
find the thoughts and desires of many people in a state of volatile interaction.  There is an 
implicit connection between the intersubjectivity of the poem and the intertextuality that 
Stevens rejects as a proper basis for poetic thought and practice.  The “storm of will” can 
be read as an image for the multiple sites of conflictive interaction among texts, as 
textuality serves as a medium for the staging of those interactions.     
The speaker aligns everyday experience in its most concrete, unmediated form, 
with individuality.  The world of concepts, on the other hand, is inhabited by a 
collectivity full of conflicting desires and ideas.  In this contrast we find the now familiar 
opposition between concrete experience and abstract thinking. 
 106
 The central image of the poem is the connection between the farm and the storm, 
the “[l]ink, of that tempest, to the farm,/ The chain of the turquoise hen and sky/ And the 
wheel that broke as the cart went by” (11-13).  The speaker evokes the image of the link 
to call forth the mysterious connection between the collective subjectivity and the 
individual subjectivity “under the eaves.”  The “turquoise hen” appears at the site of this 
connection, her color changed from a natural brown to an unreal blue.  She thus embodies 
the fusion of the earthly and the otherworldly, doubling and emphasizing the “link” 
between those two realms.  The blue of the sky, which is the site of the storm of 
intersubjective abstraction, is “brought down” to the animal that inhabits the farm, the 
site of concrete considerations and of the domestic existence of the individual.  What this 
imagistic relationship evokes is the question of how practical decisions are informed by 
pervasive, dispersed, and collective ways of thinking.  The poem’s final two stanzas 
attempt a characterization of this phenomenon from the point of view of the individual 
inhabiting his concrete domestic space. 
 The speaker attempts this characterization through the image of the sound of the 
tempest “brought down” to the domestic space.  The sound thereby aligns itself with the 
turquoise hen and the “link.”  Negating that the sound is a “voice” (14) or “speech” (15), 
the speaker asserts that collective abstraction does not speak to us in a coherent, 
intelligible way.  Instead, the sound is indeterminate, anonymous, and vaguely 
threatening: 
 It is not speech, the sound we hear 
 In this conversation, but the sound 
 Of things and their motion: the other man, 
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 A turquoise monster moving round.  (15-18) 
The sound is connected to three sources:  “things,” a “man,” and a “monster,” leaving the 
reader without a clear sense of its meaning.  The characteristics of each disparate element 
add to the image of the intersubjective sphere, resulting in a complex and evocative 
description.  “The other man” condenses the many subjectivities of the tempest into a 
singular, personal Other.  This figure is the “silent man” of the poem’s title.  The 
individual is aware of being in dialogue with this intersubjective Other, though this figure 
paradoxically communicates nothing to him.   
 A comma marks the transition to a new embodiment of the intersubjective sphere, 
the “turquoise monster,” which adds its features to the complex characterization of that 
sphere.  The monster’s movement parallels the unsettled nature of the storm, suggesting 
the difficulty of finding any kind of certainty in an essentially chaotic sphere.  It is 
implied that the turquoise monster is a restatement of the identity of “the sound of things 
and their motion” and “the other man.”  The danger that the monster evokes repeats the 
threat of the “tempest.”  Through the connections we have established thus far, it is clear 
that this danger emerges in part from the presence of the Other in the sphere of 
intersubjectivity, a presence with the potential to subsume the subjectivity of the 
individual.  Etymologically, the word “monster” is based in the Latin monere (to warn), 
as are monstrare (to show), and monstrum (that which instructs).  The monster is the 
form that the threatening Other takes to warn the individual that he is standing on the 
precipice between intellectual self-sufficiency and its dissolution. 
 As a whole, the poem implicitly valorizes individual concrete experience that is 
undisturbed by the storm of intersubjective abstraction.  It thus stands as a continuation of 
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Stevens’s arguments for a realist aesthetics based on concrete observations and 
independent meditations upon those observations.  The form that the restatement of this 
theme takes in this poem is particularly dogmatic, as we have seen, marked as it is by an 
almost paranoid suspicion of dialogue, intertextuality, and the possibility of the 
destruction of individuality.  
   
“Cuatro Poemas”: The Refraction of Stevens’s Poetics through Translation 
 As a group, the four poems Stevens sends to Rodríguez Feo in the summer of 
1945 continue a line of argument begun in the two men’s correspondence.  As we have 
seen, their imagery calls forth the central issues of subjectivity and objectivity that are so 
central to that line of argument.  The poems allow Stevens to go beyond what can be 
conveyed in prose, employing poetic means to deepen and extend the scope of his 
dialogue with Rodríguez Feo.  The concreteness of his poetic images (reader, artist, 
fisherman, monster) allow Stevens to play out scenarios in which each side of the 
argument develops itself imagistically, with each implication taking on a visible form.  
Stevens’s deployment of poetic discourse to expand the expressive depth of the 
correspondence is evidence of the developing intellectual engagement between 
Rodríguez Feo and him.   
 Understanding the significance of Stevens’s poetic gestures makes it register as a 
great surprise that Rodríguez Feo’s response is so laconic.  It is clear from the Cuban’s 
acknowledgment of the poems that he does not immediately engage in a thorough reading 
of its images, which, as we have seen, require some interpretive processing before their 
place in the overarching discourse of the correspondence becomes clear.  Instead, 
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Rodríguez Feo offers a bland commendation of the poet’s style: “Your poems arrived 
successfully, full of that lucidity and nobility which your last style revealed” (67).  No 
significant response to the content or methods of the poems comes later in the 
correspondence either, representing a significant lacuna in the discussion of the 
philosophical bases of Stevens and Rodríguez Feo’s respective poetics.  
 Further, the Cuban editor’s refusal to translate the poems, despite his early 
attempts to render “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” and “Esthétique du Mal” into 
Spanish, represents a deliberate break in the dialogue in another way.  Rodríguez Feo 
explains to Stevens: “I have given [the poems] to a Cuban poet whom I trust more than 
myself since his poetic insight will suffice and probably render the poems with more 
exactitude than my insufficient manipulation of the language” (67).  Rodríguez Feo does 
not address an essential problem here: he himself is in the position to carry out a 
particularly informed interpretation of the poems, based on his studies, previous 
translations, and his ongoing correspondence with the poet. 
 Furthermore, by translating the poems himself, Rodríguez Feo could have offered 
a response to Stevens’s assertions in two senses.  First, the process of interpretation that 
precedes any good translation would be visible in the Spanish text, thereby registering 
Rodríguez Feo’s understanding of what the American poet hoped to convey.  Second, the 
act of processing the text such that it fits its new poetic context could embody a 
contrapuntal response to the poems’ original assertions, even though the American poet 
would have been poorly qualified to identify those linguistic operations in Spanish.  
These acts would not have been entirely intelligible to Stevens, but they would 
nonetheless become part of the contrapuntal textual formation examined in this study. 
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 It is difficult to speculate why Rodríguez Feo does not take up this challenge.  It 
will be useful nonetheless to examine each of Rodríguez Feliú’s translations, as they 
create the actual appearance of Stevens’s work in Orígenes and form an important part of 
the aforementioned textual edifice.  Furthermore, though he does so from an outside 
position, Rodríguez Feliú continues the conversation between Rodríguez Feo and 
Stevens.  We will approach them in the same order in which we have treated the original 
texts.   
 “The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm” appears as “La Casa y el 
Mundo en Calma...” (“The Calm House and World...”).  The shortening of the title in the 
translation renders a more concise title than the verbose original, though the most striking 
feature is the ellipsis that follows.  This punctuation announces a fundamental operation 
of the translation as a whole: an undermining of the poem’s completeness as a statement 
against readerly solipsism, and a subsequent attenuation of the text’s argumentative force.  
The ellipsis signals the introduction of a more provisional tone and an incomplete 
realization of argument in the translation. 
 The first moment that illustrates this process occurs at line 2, where the phrase 
“The reader became the book” is rendered as “El lector se hacía libro” (2).  Whereas the 
original categorically states the confusion of the reader’s subjectivity with what he is 
reading, the use of the imperfect aspect in the translation (“se hacía”) denotes an action in 
process.  This effect weakens the phrase’s logical connection to the fusions that follow, 
where the night and the calm atmosphere become part of the book’s meaning as a result 
of the process whereby the reader wholly submerges himself in the book.   
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 Another moment of attenuation follows.  At line 10 of the original, the speaker 
restates the implications of the reader’s total engagement with the abstract world of his 
book—that the objective world is reshaped according to the requirements of the reader’s 
mental state rather than the latter responding to the former: “The house was quiet because 
it had to be” (10).  The translation of this line reads: “La casa estaba en calma, 
justamente” (“The house was calm, justly [or rightly]”) (10).  Whereas the original marks 
the force exerted upon concrete reality with the phrase “had to be,” the translated text 
lacks the same emphasis.  The term “justamente” signifies that the calm was appropriate 
or right in a somewhat abstract sense; the original insists on the distorting force exerted 
on the empirical reality by a mental state.  Again, the original clearly makes a more 
pointed case against the state of affairs it describes. 
 At another significant moment, the “scholar” who so invests himself in his 
reading becomes “el estudiante” (“the student”), altering our sense of the scholar’s 
activity.  Because the term “scholar” connotes a higher degree of intellectual experience 
and disciplinary professionalism, his action of submerging himself in the book’s world is 
more deliberate and conscious.  These qualities make the scholar’s action a more 
substantial object for the speaker’s ironic treatment.  When the scholar becomes a 
“student,” the translation suggests a naiveté behind the desire for the book to be true.  The 
student’s mental states serve as a weaker representative of a coherent intellectual 
program.  As a result, the speaker’s irony registers with less force.   
 Finally, a breakdown in conveying the sense of the poem’s last four lines 
completes the translation’s process of obfuscating the original’s argumentative clarity.  
First, the original: 
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   ...The truth in a calm world, 
In which there is no other meaning, itself 
 
Is calm, itself is summer and night, itself 
Is the reader leaning late and reading there.  (13-16) 
As we have already stated, these lines systematically erase any distinction between 
subjective and objective realities.  In contrast, the translation renders a sentence fragment 
that fails to communicate this basic concept effectively: 
   ...La verdad en la calma, 
en un mundo donde no hay otro sentido, 
 
porque el mismo es la calma, el verano y la noche, 
y el nocturno lector que allí se inclina y lee. (13-16) 
 
    (...The truth in the calm, 
in a world where there is no other meaning, 
 
because it itself is the calm, the summer and the night, 
and the nocturnal reader who leans and reads there.) (13-16)  
The identification among the truth, the calm, the “summer and night,” and the reader 
breaks down in the translation. The verb “Is,” which states the ontological connection 
between the subjective and the objective, disappears, and is replaced by an illogical 
“because” (“porque”).  The resulting lines are very difficult to parse.  The translation’s 
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ending culminates a process whereby the speaker’s oppositional stance to the reader’s 
intellectual orientation is undermined.  The translation, as a result, reads like a description 
that suggests the confusion of the mental state with the empirical reality, with little of the 
polemical thrust of the original. 
 The translation as a whole represents an indirect, yet significant intervention into 
the overarching textual dialogue between Rodríguez Feo and Stevens.   As we have 
established, the reader of “The World” likely represents an aspect of Rodríguez Feo’s 
personality, as seen from Stevens’s point of view.  The operations that the translation 
carries out upon the original recast the image of Rodríguez Feo in the poem, thereby 
altering the tenor of the two men’s textual dialogue from a third position occupied by the 
translator, a man not involved in the conversation.  The fact that Rodríguez Feo appears 
as a student in the translation, and that his mental states express an intellectual program 
that is neither as extreme nor as serious as those of the scholar in the original, marks a 
deflection of Stevens’s poetic critique of his correspondent.  “La casa y el mundo en 
calma...” speaks for Rodríguez Feo, saying: I am but a student, with no pretensions to be 
a scholar; my intellectual positions are less solid and thus less effective as a distillation of 
the ideas you oppose.  In this manner, Rodríguez Feliú’s translation repeats the evasive 
and resistive act inherent in Rodríguez Feo’s decision to pass the translation task along to 
him.  To the extent that the figure of the student represents more possibility for 
intellectual change and flexibility than can be attributed to the scholar, it does perhaps 
represent Rodríguez Feo’s claim for a more nuanced and dynamic intellectual system, in 
resistance to the schematization that the symbolic figure of the reader enforces on him in 
Stevens’s poem.   
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 “El caos móvil e inmóvil” (“Mobile and Immobile Chaos”),  the translation of 
“Chaos in Motion and Not in Motion,” enacts a similar process of attenuation, though a 
profound alteration of sense at the very opening of the translation appears to be 
something more extreme—an act of pure sabotage.  In the first stanza of the original, the 
speaker laments that the spectacle he is viewing is nothing more than the expression of 
the interiority of the German Romantic artist.  Though the subjunctive verb “were” is not 
used, the subjunctive mood is still evoked in a colloquial sense with the verb “was”: “Oh, 
that this lashing wind was something more/ than the spirit of Ludwig Richter…” (1-2).   
In the translation, there is no hint of the subjunctive, and the idea that is subsequently 
expressed is the exact opposite of the original: “Este aire que todo lo castiga/ es todavía 
algo más que el espíritu de Ludwig Richter…” (1-2) (“This air that punishes everything/ 
is still something more than the spirit of Ludwig Richter…”).   These opening lines seem 
to dismantle the foundation of the speaker’s critique.  The natural imagery of the 
spectacle appears as something beyond the creative mind of Richter himself, perhaps an 
objective reality exterior to him. 
 Despite this profound alteration, the rest of the translation proceeds to offer a 
fairly faithful version of the original.  The poem’s imagery is rather accurately 
reconstructed and even the original’s final indictment of the creator’s indiscriminate 
mind, though it contradicts the translation’s opening statement, is preserved with only 
minor alterations.  
 Looking at the whole translation, the reader can see that what seems like a 
complete collapse at the beginning is simply an inflection of the original text’s argument.  
As the speaker asserts that the wind of the spectacle is indeed something more than the 
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spirit of its creator, it simply presents a more direct statement of what is implied in the 
irony of the original—that there is an extra-subjective reality that should be the source for 
art.  Yet, like the assertion of an “absolute grotesque” in “A Word with José Rodríguez 
Feo,” this feature of the translation betrays the philosophical basis from which the ironic 
treatment of Richter works, and thereby opens the text to more questioning than does the 
original.  The opening affirmation found in the translation can lead to challenging 
responses, such as: what exactly is the reality of the natural phenomenon evoked in the 
spectacle?  The original, in keeping the affirmation of an objective reality unstated, is 
more effective as a deconstruction of Richter’s solipsism.   
 “Thinking of a Relation Between the Images of Metaphors,” translated as 
“Unidad de las imágenes” (“Unity of Images”), contains an even greater number of 
breakdowns in the transfer of literal meanings than does “Caos.”  As we will see, the 
translation goes so far as to introduce a wholly new thematics.  Despite this fact, 
“Unidad” carries out some interpretive modulations from the literal that bolster the 
assertions of the original.     
 The natural imagery of the original is altered so strangely in the translation that 
the reader suspects poor eyesight on the part of the translator or typographical errors in 
the text from which he is working.  The opening lines of the original read: “The wood-
doves are singing along the Perkiomen./ The bass lie deep, still afraid of the Indians” (1-
2).  The translation reads: “Las palomas del bosque cantan sobre el Perkiomen./ Abajo el 
profundo esparto, temoroso todavía de los indios” (1-2) (“The wood doves sing above the 
Perkiomen./ Below, the deep esparto grass, still afraid of the Indians” (1-2).  The “bass” 
of lines 2, 5 and 9, become “grass” (“esparto”).  In the original, the bass avoid imaginary 
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Indians whose spears pierce the water’s surface: “The bass keep looking ahead, upstream, 
in one/ Direction, shrinking from the spit and splash/ Of waterish spears...” (5-7).  The 
translator finds himself lost at this moment, unable to make literal sense of the original.  
The translation reads: “En una sola dirección, corriente arriba,/ vigila el esparto 
erguido—lanzas de agua le estremecen” (5-6) (“In only one direction, upstream,/ the 
upright esparto grass keeps watch—spears of water shake it.”)  
 The basic confusion between fauna and flora nonetheless does not interfere with 
the original’s most basic aesthetic and thematic structures.  The contrast between 
movement and stillness, as well as the suggestion of a synchronicity (though it makes less 
literal sense with grass substituted for bass) are still present in the translation.  Further, 
the image of the fisherman and his empirical activity are quite clearly expressed in the 
translation. 
 Beyond this level of basic conceptual fidelity, we observe literal deviations that 
provide illuminating interpretations of the original.  For example, the depiction of the 
doves’ song in the original is altered in the translation to emphasize the contrast between 
the singularity of the underlying theme and the variations that the song produces.  In the 
original, the speaker asserts: “There is one dove, one bass, one fisherman./ Yet coo 
becomes rou-coo, rou-coo.  How close/ To the unstated theme each variation comes…” 
(9-11).  The speaker of the translation explicitly states the transition from the singularity 
evoked in line 9 to the contrasting multiplicity of the variations on a theme in the doves’ 
song: “Solo [sic] hay un pescador, un esparto, una paloma,/ pero el canto se hace doble.  
Cómo se acerca/ cada variación al tema no fijado…” (9-11) (“There is only one 
fisherman, one esparto grass, one dove,/ but the song doubles.  How each theme 
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approaches/ the unstated theme”).  The image of the dove’s song is not only preserved, 
but processed according to a perceptive reading of the poem on the part of the translator.  
The translation replaces the onomatopoetic evocation of the doves’ song in the original 
with the assertion that the song doubles itself, underlining the contrast between the ideal 
singularity that the empirical project of the fisherman works to apprehend and the real 
multiplicity in the empirical world that suggests that singularity without achieving it.  The 
translation even adds the adverb “Solo [sic]” (“Only”) (9) to further emphasize the 
singularity that the doves’ song can only approximate. 
 In the poem’s seventh strophe, a fundamental divergence from the original 
transforms the statement of the possibility of an empirical discovery into its affirmation.  
Up to this point we have discussed a revelation that exists as a possibility or a promise 
that is implied in the fisherman’s ideology, yet “the disclosure” occurs only in the 
conditional.  In the translation, a revelation is announced in the indicative mood: “La 
revelación se afirma” (13) (“The revelation states [asserts] itself”).  The translation 
thereby adopts a wholly different methodology—one of illustration rather than 
speculation.  The fisherman’s receptivity to the reality that surrounds him is rewarded 
with a revelation. 
 Beyond this fundamental shift of perspective and of argument, the fact that the 
“disclosure” of the original becomes “revelation” in the translation is significant.  “La 
revelación” is a term that introduces religious connotations into the descriptions of the 
fisherman’s empirical methodology, suggesting a divine agency behind the 
epistemological event.  “Disclosure” is more neutral and technical, denoting the opening 
of something previously closed.  At one stroke, the natural imagery that builds to this 
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moment is retroactively transformed into a sacred setting, a scene where perception of the 
exterior reality is not an end in itself but rather preparation for a different kind of vision. 
 Whereas the original figures the “disclosure” as an event of pure perception, the 
“revelation” in the translation does not occur in the same way.   The revelation “states 
itself.”  It implicitly occurs through language, suggesting that it is a revelation of a divine 
Word, especially when seen in the context of the connotative charge of the term 
“revelation” itself.    
 Following the “statement” of the revelation, the poem’s most peculiar modulation 
occurs.  The speaker of the original imagines the “disclosure” of reality as an act of pure 
visual perception, as the dove “Might spring to sight and yet remain a dove” (14).  In the 
translation, the same line reads “podría volverse mirada y ser aún paloma” (14) (“could 
become a gaze and still be a dove”).  Rather than simply make itself visible, the dove 
becomes a gaze; in the process, it makes a radical transition from being a pure object to 
being both an object and a subject, invested with the capacity to gaze back at the viewer.  
In the most immediate sense, this significant alteration in the translation continues the 
work done by the word “revelación”—it alters the purely empirical nature of the 
fisherman’s project in the original.  A disruption also arises from the image of the gaze in 
its suggestion of a challenge to the fisherman’s dominance over what he perceives.  
When the object of a gaze itself becomes a gaze, it stares back, undermining the subject’s 
status as pure subject by objectifying him.9   
 In relation to the sacred connotations that the translation introduces, we can also 
see the gaze as a divinity that is transposed onto the object.  The use of the term 
“revelation” plays a part in establishing the context for this reading of the gaze, as does 
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the fact that the object of observation in both the original and the translation is a dove, an 
image with Christian resonances.  The dove represents the Holy Spirit; the fisherman 
becomes like John the Baptist, who, at the moment he baptizes Jesus in the River Jordan, 
witnesses the descent of the Holy Spirit as a dove and hears God announce that Jesus is 
His Son (Matt. 3:16; Mark 1:10; Luke 3:22; John 1:32).  Within the Biblical context that 
these associations point to, the fisherman also evokes the episode in which Jesus calls 
upon the fishermen Simon and Andrew to become disciples, or “fishers of men” (Matt. 
4:19).10  
 The revelation that “states itself” can be read as a reference to the words of 
revelation that John the Baptist hears: “This is my beloved Son.  My favor rests on him” 
(Matt. 3:16).  The gaze into which the dove transforms itself would thus be an 
imaginative transposition of the gaze of a personal God onto the image that traditionally 
represents the non-human Holy Spirit.  The subjectivity that is ascribed to what was 
previously an object becomes the subjectivity of God.  The fact that the dove remains 
itself in spite of this transposition no longer means that it remains a pure objective reality, 
but instead, that the imaginative transposition allows the dove to remain a symbol of the 
Holy Spirit, its more traditional function.   
 The alighting of the dove in the breast of the fisherman, which is clearly conveyed 
in the translation, also constitutes an imaginative interjection.  When John baptizes Jesus, 
the sky opens, and the dove descends from heaven, hovering above Jesus’s body.  The 
translation extends this image, such that the dove of the Holy Spirit comes to rest in John 
himself (in the form of the fisherman/disciple); the revelation is thus, as in the original 
poem, portrayed as something that is profoundly internalized by the witness.  But further, 
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it suggests a Christian mystic sense of union with God, typically imagined as a corporal 
convergence (it is not the soul or the mind where the dove comes to rest but rather in “el 
pecho” (“the breast”).  In our initial Lacanian reading, we asserted the threatening nature 
of an object-become-gaze.  This fact is compatible with the spiritual allegory the 
translation constructs, as the divine gaze would indeed play the role of undermining the 
empiricist’s hubristic confidence that the fullness of reality is available through the 
apparatus of sense perception.   
 If the argument for an empiricist aesthetics is radically transformed in “Unidad” 
and “Conversación con un hombre silencioso,” the translation of “Continual 
Conversation With a Silent Man” enacts only minor refractions of the original’s formal 
and rhetorical features.  As a result, the overall effect of the original poem is replicated in 
the translation. The ambiguous nature of the individual’s relation to the conflictive world 
of intersubjectivity is not clarified or processed in any significant way in Rodríguez 
Feliú’s translation; the figures of sound (“el sonido”), man (“el otro hombre”), and 
monster (“un monstruo azul turquesa”) are cloaked with the same frustrating ambiguity.  
Furthermore, the threat that the monster evokes in the original is amplified in the 
translation of the final line: “un monstruo azul turquesa que nos ronda.” (18) (“a 
turquoise monster that circles in on us.”)  The verb “rondar” suggests a more predatory 
relationship between the monstrous Other and the individual enclosed in his domestic 
space, whereas the original suggests a directionless movement without the same 
purposefulness (“moving round”).  The translation thus dramatizes the threat that the 
sphere of intersubjectivity presents to the individual subject, suggesting that the Other’s 
presence in that sphere threatens to devour the individual subjectivity.  The result of these 
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implications is a statement, even more forceful than Stevens’s, of the necessity of an 
individuality based on one’s own concrete experiences and, conversely, of the supreme 
danger of immersion in the storm of intersubjectivity. 
 Looking at the four translations as a whole, we see that Rodríguez Feliú continues 
the conversation between Stevens and Rodríguez Feo and processes the poems for 
incorporation into Orígenes in significant ways.  “La casa y el mundo en calma” and 
“Caos móvil e inmóvil” make attenuations of Stevens’s critique of reading, solipsism and 
romanticism.  This act is consonant not only with Rodríguez Feo’s stance in opposition to 
the North American poet, but also digests the originals for a less conflictive incorporation 
into Orígenes.  As we have seen, the aesthetics of Orígenes does not emphasize realism 
and empiricism in the way Stevens does.  The poetics of the journal tends toward the 
manipulation of symbols and valorizes intertextuality. 
 Rodríguez Feliú’s radical incursion into “Thinking of a Relation Between the 
Images of Metaphors” introduces religious symbolism that is totally alien to Stevens’s 
poetics.  This act anticipates Rodríguez Feo’s introduction of the themes of Catholicism 
and mysticism into his conversation with Stevens in later correspondence.  Further, it 
places the text in sympathetic relation to the religiosity of Orígenes.   
 After Stevens peruses Rodríguez Feliú’s translations upon receiving number 8 of 
Orígenes in late February or early March of 1946, he describes a complex experience of 
recognition and estrangement.  Rodríguez Feo assures Stevens in his letter of February 15 
that the translations are of the highest order.11  In his response Stevens seems to agree: 
“Of course, I know nothing about Spanish and cannot even pronounce it decently; yet it 
seems to me that Mr. Feliú has caught my particular rhythm.  To me this seems to be 
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particularly true in the last few verses of the last poem [“Conversación”].” (80)  These 
comments communicate the recognition of a facet of his own work in the translation, 
which is a pleasant experience for the poet, who twice expresses his thanks to the 
translator.   
 Yet, later in his letter, Stevens relates his sense that the poems he submitted no 
longer seem relevant, authentic, or effective.  This sense develops out of a contrast 
between the real suffering of postwar Europe and the “unreal[ity]” of his poems:  
It is a curious experience to read poems like those that have just appeared in 
Orígenes after the lapse of six months or more from the time when they were 
written … The misery of Europe, which was greater six months ago than it is 
now, seems not to have been so real to us as it is now; and the more real it 
becomes the more sharply one feels that poetry of this sort is academic and 
unreal.  One is inclined, therefore, to sympathize with one’s more unsympathetic 
critics. (81) 
Stevens is spurred to the summary judgment that his poems no longer possess any force 
as an avocation of realism.  Instead, they have ironically come to seem “unreal” 
themselves.   
 This judgment is perhaps driven by the incongruity between the real violence that 
has produced Europe’s “misery” and the placid mood evoked by the dove, Stevens’s 
poetic emblem of reality in “Thinking of the Relation Between the Images of 
Metaphors.”  As we have seen, “Chaos in Motion and Not in Motion” and “Continual 
Conversation with a Silent Man” both associate violence with solipsism and 
intersubjectivity, respectively, through the common image of the storm.  Yet the reality 
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Stevens contemplates in war’s aftermath is not subjective.  To stage the drama of the pure 
revelation of objective reality in the idyllic setting of “Thinking” paradoxically comes to 
represent the same solipsistic evasion practiced by the reader in “The World Was Quiet 
and the House Was Calm.”12
 Yet, to explain Stevens’s lament in terms of the internal contradictions of the 
original texts is not fully satisfactory.  Though Stevens comments on the value of his 
original work in relation to the reality of the moment, his reaction is sparked by “reading” 
the translations of those poems.  Contemplating the texts in their transmuted form seems 
to have defamiliarized them and contributed to Stevens’s negative verdict.  Because of 
his limited grasp of the Spanish language, reading the poems out loud to himself, Stevens 
experiences his own work as something impenetrable and alien.  This experience 
amplifies and dramatizes the aforementioned inner sense that his texts have drifted away 
from their original metapoetic impulse.  
 Stevens’s comments illustrate a fascinating and rarely discussed effect of 
translation.  Not only does it reshape a text for incorporation into a new context, but it 
also can provoke significant responses from the author of the original.  The translation, in 
this sense, offers a kind of feedback that affects the producer of the original.  It is thus an 
active force, not only within the target context, but within the context of the production of 
the original text as well.   
 It can be speculated, then, that this feedback through translation might affect 
Stevens’s thinking.  The fact that the translation leads the poet to question the means by 
which he espouses his empiricist project suggests that we might find alterations in how 
that content is framed in the future.  More radically, the experience of defamiliarization 
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might impel the poet toward a questioning of the concept itself.  On a different level, it 
can be speculated that Stevens’s experience leads him to think differently about the 
nature of translation itself, recognizing the fundamental refocusing that can occur.  As we 
will see, in the poem “Attempt to Discover Life,” Stevens writes a poem that requests a 
radical rewriting.  It is tempting to draw a connection between this new approach to 
translation and the poet’s unsettling (and perhaps transformative) experience of reading 
his own work in translation. 
 
Metaphysical and Empirical Bases for Literature 
 After the publication of Cuatro Poemas, Rodríguez Feo sends Stevens a letter, 
dated October 9, 1945, in which he continues his established strategy of using textual 
references to assert his own intellectual agenda and resist Stevens’s aesthetic and 
philosophical assertions.  Rodríguez Feo makes a pointed assertion through his praise for 
Baron Jakob von Uexkull’s Bausteine zu einer biologischen Weltanschaung: Gesammelte 
Aufsätze (1913).  He asserts that “…this great biologist comes to the conclusion that life’s 
origin cannot be explained by material motives, refuting Darwin, and that Plato was 
nearer to the truth when he imagined the archetypes as the sources of all our ideas and 
beings.  Curious, eh?” (69).  This reference responds to Stevens’s assertions of the 
primacy of empirical activity in his intellectual system.  Again, Rodríguez Feo resists 
Stevens’s empiricism through a reference to Plato, a figure who has now become a 
central figure in the Cuban intellectual’s distinctly allusive method for asserting his own 
philosophical idealism.  As we have seen, as in the letter of July 1945, Stevens picks up 
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on Rodríguez Feo’s assertion of Platonism as a clear statement of opposition, a fact that, 
in turn, motivates the Cuban’s continued use of the term.   
 Yet, Rodríguez Feo does not fully engage his correspondent on the issues of 
empiricism and idealism; his comments are marked instead by a degree of evasion that 
has come to characterize his responses.  As we have seen, the evasive tactics of refraining 
from translating or even commenting on Stevens’s four submitted poems opens a 
discursive space for the initiation of new lines of inquiry.  Asserting an interest in the 
theorization of a non-physical origin for life is a somewhat oblique response to Stevens’s 
avocation of a poetics grounded on observation and meditation.  It does not directly 
refute the importance of these processes, but rather shifts the focus of inquiry to the 
question of origins.  Engaging in a debate strictly defined by Stevens’s interest in the 
poetic usefulness of intellectual programmatics (driven by his particularly focused 
interest on the epistemological status of the poetic image) would not allow Rodríguez Feo 
to fully air his own concerns.  The Cuban intellectual obviously does admire the North 
American poet’s imagistic thinking, but still wishes to engage him on questions that 
probe spiritual beliefs.  After broaching the issue of the nature of life’s origins, Rodríguez 
Feo mentions that he has recently read Paul Claudel’s play L’Annonce Faite à  Marie, 
mystère en quatre actes et un prologue (1912), a work that epitomizes the French 
author’s mystical Catholicism.  Rodríguez Feo’s allusive method persistently steers the 
conversation from poetic to theological questions.  
 Later in the same letter, Rodríguez Feo builds upon this discursive turn in the 
evocation of a mystic poetics that clearly refutes Stevens’s meditative methodology.  The 
Cuban expresses great interest in a letter from Arthur Rimbaud to his former teacher 
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Georges Izambard in which the adolescent French poet describes the role of the poet in 
distinctly mystical terms.  In Rodríguez Feo’s paraphrase, Rimbaud asserts that the poet 
must be “…a seer who must become a medium through a long and reasonable effort and 
thus disintegrate his senses until he arrives at the Unknown” (70).13  The profound effort 
necessary to arrive at the revelation that the poetic act facilitates is also important to the 
meditative discipline Stevens outlines, though the similarities end there.  Stevens does not 
advocate the abdication of individual agency implied in Rimbaud’s comments when the 
French poet asserts: “It’s wrong to say I think: one should say I am thought” (28).  More 
significantly, the mystic practice of superceding the sensory faculties in order to facilitate 
a spiritual apprehension directly contradicts Stevens’s assertion of the necessity of 
building poetic composites out of sensory information.  Rimbaud’s mystic method 
involves an arduous trip through a realm of sensory darkness toward an elusive 
destination in the illumination of the “Unknown.”  Stevens’s poetics posits, if tentatively, 
the continuous presence of the knowable in the light of an arduous empiricism.   
 Stevens’s response continues the method of evasion that both correspondents have 
now developed, avoiding the issues Rodríguez Feo raises and continuing instead with the 
exposition of his own methodology.  In his letter of October 17, 1945, Stevens seeks to 
instruct Rodríguez Feo in a particular meditative discipline, a way of considering general 
propositions through images.  He does so by drawing on seemingly insignificant figures 
Rodríguez Feo himself has evoked in a description of his rural residence, Villa Olga.  
These figures consist of a black cook; Lucera, a cow; and Pompilio, a mule.  Throughout, 
Stevens maintains a serious tone in spite of the comical banality of the images he seizes 
on to illustrate his propositions, a deliberate method meant to illustrate that nearly any 
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image, no matter how homely, can serve as a vehicle for meditation if approached 
seriously.  Anticipating his correspondent’s likely reaction, he pauses to assert: “[t]his is 
much more serious than you are likely to think from the first reading of this letter” (72).   
 In Stevens’s meditative method, images arrange themselves in such a way that 
they begin to suggest an argument.  Thus, Villa Olga’s residents—a black man, a cow, 
and a donkey—come to represent ignorance, a quality Stevens allies with realism.14  
Ignorance is of great value because education clutters the mind with abstract ideas that 
interfere with clear perception.  Pompilio is not burdened with received ideas, and thus 
“…does not have to divest himself of anything to see things as they are” (72).  With 
continued comic seriousness, Stevens warns Rodríguez Feo not to contaminate 
Pompilio’s blank mind with realities that cannot be directly experienced: “You won’t 
forget to take a look at Pompilio from my point of view.  Don’t paint a picture of the 
hereafter for him.  Don’t tell him about the wonderful weather in your Eastern provinces.  
Give him a bunch of carrots and swear at him in a decent way, just to show your interest 
in reality” (73-4).  Stevens counterposes these opinions to Rodríguez Feo’s insistence on 
a theological element in his poetic thinking, asserting that “…[t]he elaboration of the 
most commonplace ideas as, for example, the idea of God, has been terribly 
destructive…” of the realist ideal that Pompilio represents (72).  If Rodríguez Feo hopes 
to introduce theological concerns into the conversation, Stevens clearly refuses to 
cooperate.   
 Stevens continues his defense of realism through a forcefully restated aversion to 
reading:  
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This [discourse] has left me very little space to speak of things that you have been 
reading.  I think, therefore, that I shan’t speak of them at all, but instead try to 
raise a question in your mind as to the value of reading.  True, the desire to read is 
an insatiable desire and you must read.  Nevertheless, you must also think.  
Intellectual isolation loses value in an existence of books.  I think I sent you some 
time ago a quotation from Henry James about living in a world of creation.  A 
world of creation is one of the areas, and only one, of the world of thought and 
there is no passion like the passion of thinking[,] which grows stronger as one 
grows older, even though one never thinks anything of particular interest to 
anyone else.  Spend an hour or two a day even if in the beginning you are 
staggered by the confusion and aimlessness of your thoughts. (73) 
It is initially quite striking how the strategy of evasion we have seen employed by both 
correspondents is so openly evidenced at the opening of these comments; it has become 
an mutually recognized rule of their particular conversation game.  Yet, this evasion is 
immediately counterbalanced by the personal tone and conviction with which Stevens 
reiterates and develops his assertions.  When he asserts that he will attempt to “raise a 
question” in the mind of Rodríguez Feo, he evidences an uncharacteristically personal 
engagement with his correspondent.   
 Stevens’s restatement of his objection to bibliophilia revisits the underlying 
assertions of his recently submitted poems through a repeated connection between the 
practice of reading and desire.  Like the speaker of his recently published poem, Stevens 
diminishes the epistemological value of reading by so closely relating reading to desire, a 
force that is at odds with reason and perception.   
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Stevens assumes the role of a teacher who hopes to impart a methodology to his 
student.  He even gives Rodríguez Feo an explicit assignment to practice a kind of 
meditation on his own.  On the one hand, it is right to note a move to establish a position 
of power over his correspondent.  Yet this power, even if successfully exerted, is not 
total, as what Stevens pushes Rodríguez Feo to do is not to adopt a doctrine or set of 
intellectual precepts, but rather to try a methodology aimed at producing an individual 
result for each practitioner. 
 This distinction underlines the basic philosophical assumptions behind Stevens’s 
assertions.  His aversion to erudition and his espousal of “intellectual isolation” betray a 
strong belief in the ability of the self to generate its own form of knowledge.  The 
foundation of his comments is a conviction that each person, in response to his or her 
sensory experience, can produce new concepts that, undisturbed by received ideas, 
originate at the point of intersection between a wholly independent subjectivity and a 
wholly external world.  It is essential to pay explicit notice to this principle, as it 
undercuts the notion of Stevens’s imperialism or exoticism: Stevens’s engagement with 
an Other, though chronically symptomatic of cultural ignorance typical of a man of his 
cultural position and moment, is structured by an interest in that Other’s individuality.  
 Rodríguez Feo’s reply, written on October 20, 1945, continues the complex 
method of negotiation with Stevens’s assertions that we have seen thus far.  Again, he 
responds to Stevens’s seriousness with a gently deflating irony: “I was delighted to read 
the little discourse on my animals (they are not worthy of such elegant attention)…” (74).  
He literally diminishes Stevens’s rhetorical exercise (“little discourse”) while 
simultaneously expressing gratitude for the gesture.  He also agrees with Stevens on the 
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value of ignorance and on the importance of intense, isolated thinking, though he later 
refers to the second activity jokingly as “…our daily exercises of gymnastic thought” 
(75).  It is clear from this response that Stevens is exerting little influence on his 
correspondent’s intellectual projects; we instead see a contrapuntal dialogue sustained 
between the two rather than a unidirectional flow of influence. 
  
“Attempt to Discover Life”: Expanding the Means of Discursive Engagement  
 Despite the moments of evasion and resistance that we have noted so far, 
Rodríguez Feo does make gestures of sympathetic participation in Stevens’s discursive 
games.  An example occurs in the postscript to Rodríguez Feo’s letter of October 20, 
where he offers to continue the same “little discourse” on farm animals he has ironically 
deflated.  Signing the letter with “An affectionate embrace,” (75) he asks: “Did I ever talk 
to you of Linda, my lovely (she) dog—how do you say perra [female dog]?” (75).  He 
thus works to maintain the familiarity and openness his dialogue with Stevens has taken 
on, in spite of his obvious skepticism about the explanatory value of the poet’s musings 
on donkeys and cows.   
 These gestures lead to Rodríguez Feo’s description of a health resort at San 
Miguel de los Baños where the young man is convalescing, a site with natural mineral 
baths with purported therapeutic qualities.  Rodríguez Feo observes how images of the 
Cuban countryside have ignited the imagination of his distant correspondent and, more 
significantly, facilitated a continuing discussion on the proper approach to empirical 
experience.  He therefore offers up more images in order to see what Stevens might do 
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with them.  He thus continues a line of imagistic dialogue as a means for acquiring a 
fuller understanding of the poet’s thinking.  He writes of San Miguel: 
It is a lovely little village, surrounded by high lomas (hills). The vegetation is very 
puritanical in appearance; mostly palm trees—no flowers.  In the evening I meet 
some of the town’s capitans (that’s how we call here the Chinese) and play 
dominoes.… most of the time I just sit and watch the modest citizens (really very 
poor) walk about, selling lottery tickets or marching about the streets with their 
sad-looking horses to incite some rich sick-visitor to take a hike on horses and 
win therefore a few pesos. (82) 
Rodríguez Feo’s description both evokes a scene that would be familiar to Stevens and 
punctuates that scene with assertions of a foreign specificity.  The description of the 
landscape as “puritanical” employs a term associated with Stevens’s New England 
milieu, establishing a conceptual connection with what is familiar to the older poet.  On 
the other hand, the conscious use of Spanish words—“lomas,” “capitan[e]s”— highlights 
the place’s foreignness.   
 For Roberto Ignacio Díaz, Rodríguez Feo panders to Stevens’s patronizing 
exoticism by purveying imagery such as this, though a close examination of Stevens’s 
use of that imagery in his poetic response—“Attempt to Discover Life”—reveals that it 
works in the service of a critical exoticism like the one found in “Academic Discourse at 
Havana.”  This critical exoticism makes use of Cuban imagery to explore philosophical 
problems and does so by means of images that evoke destruction instead of the vibrancy 
that typically marks exotic images of tropical locales.  Rather than describe an 
exhilarating experience of the culturally unfamiliar, the poem questions the very value of 
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exotic experience itself.  Stevens himself declares that the setting, like that of 
“Discourse,” is not meant to give the reader a photographic representation of an 
unfamiliar cultural reality, but rather to show up its own unreal and symbolic nature in 
order to engage in a questioning of the reality of what is seen in the exotic encounter: 
“…the San Miguel of the poem is a spiritual not a physical place.  The question that is 
prompted by that poem is whether the experience of life is in the end worth more than 
tuppence: dos centavos” (91).  Yet, as we will see, this questioning of the value of 
experience diverges from the tentative avocation of realism in “Discourse.”  Whereas the 
earlier poem announces the project of a new, clearer way of seeing (modeled after the 
“white moonlight”), the later poem questions the authenticity of what is visible, and thus 
opens no clear path toward an empirical goal.    
 Stevens builds up an image of this “spiritual place” by lifting elements from 
Rodríguez Feo’s description and employing them in a new poetic context.  Yet, Stevens’s 
use of these elements is geared toward the visual evocation of a collage of the unreal 
rather than the composition of a tourist photograph.  The poem’s most evident example of 
this is the various roses that form its visual focal point: 
At San Miguel de los Baños, 
The waitress heaped up black Hermosas 
In the magnificence of a volcano. 
Round them she spilled the roses 
Of the place, blue and green, both streaked, 
And white roses shaded emerald on petals 
Out of the deadliest heat.  (1-7) 
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The description of flowers of any kind is in itself a divergence from the “reality” that 
Rodríguez Feo describes; the “puritanical” setting of the actual resort is devoid of 
flowers.  Furthermore, Hermosas are a variety of rose with a small, light-pink bloom; 
they are never black.  Blue roses do not exist.  The green rose, the R. chinensis 
viridiflora, does not have petals, but long, spiky sepals; it is not really the “rose of [any] 
place,” as it appears generally as a curiosity in the gardens of horticulturists.  It is clear to 
the reader who considers these facts that the poem’s setting may seem to the implicit 
observer within the text like a vibrant exposition of a cultural specificity and authenticity, 
but to the alert reader, it is a setting artificially arranged to cater to the aesthetic desires of 
that very observer. 
 The experience that the poem evaluates is thus artificial from the outset.  In 
contrast to the empirical experience of the fisherman in “Thinking of a Relation Between 
the Images of Metaphors,” the poem depicts a spectacle performed for a tourist.  The 
poem’s second strophe narrates the entrance of “a cadaverous person” (8) 
Who bowed and, bowing, brought, in her mantilla, 
A woman brilliant and pallid-skinned, 
Of fiery eyes and long thin arms. 
She stood with him at the table, 
Smiling and wetting her lips 
In the heavy air. (9-14) 
The action suggests a service being offered to a customer.  The roses are placed in a 
lavish display as if for a tourist, and the woman who smiles and wets her lips suggests 
someone paid to provide an erotic performance or service.  In the context of this potential 
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sexual exchange, the “deadliest heat,” the “volcano” of roses, and the mysterious 
woman’s “fiery eyes” together evoke a passionate desire that verges on the destructive.  
Yet the aesthetics of the scene are by no means erotically evocative.  
 Instead, the heat that is repeatedly evoked suggests a feverish illness; it is 
described as “deadly” at line 7, a description that is complemented by the appearance of 
the “cadaverous person.”  Even the impossible colors of the roses come to suggest a 
vision distorted by fever.  The scene’s unreality is thus linked to the subjective 
experience of sickness.   
 It becomes clear in the enigmatic final strophe of the poem that a strange form of 
treatment for this illness is the central experience of the poem.  The treatment for the 
fever is paradoxically formulated out of the heat of a spectacular fire, as the volcano of 
roses erupts, sending burning petals floating into the air: 
 The green roses drifted up from the table  
 In smoke.  The blue petals became 
 The yellowing fomentations of effulgence, 
 Among fomentations of black bloom and white bloom. 
 The cadaverous persons were dispelled. 
 On the table near which they stood 
 Two coins were lying—dos centavos. (15-21) 
“Fomentations,” in their etymological sense, are medicinal poultices or compresses, 
which employ moisture and heat to therapeutic effect.  The use of the term thus suggests 
that such is the purpose of the poem’s bizarre spectacle.  Stevens draws on both 
Rodríguez Feo’s description and his own imagination in devising the image, in that the 
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fomentations are a peculiar imagistic conflation of the healing waters of San Miguel and 
the imagined fire.  The commercial usage of the “therapy” responds as well to Rodríguez 
Feo’s description of the men “…marching about the streets with their sad-looking horses 
to incite some rich sick-visitor to take a hike on horses and win therefore a few pesos.”  
The “cadaverous persons” have been hired to enact a kind of healing ritual for a sickly 
visitor.  The “black bloom and white bloom” (18) thus are applied to the feverish vision 
of the tourist-patient like a salve.   
 In this context, the poem dramatizes exoticism as an attempt to regain vitality in 
the face of a spiritual and intellectual illness.  Stevens asserts that the setting is “spiritual” 
rather than physical; thus the vitality that the implicit client seeks to gain must not be read 
literally.  Instead, the poem stages a scene of spiritual malaise, a lack for which the 
extravagant spectacle attempts to compensate.  The terms “brilliant” (10) and 
“effulgence” (17), suggest a spiritual enlightenment promised by the spectacle.    
 Yet that promise seems to go unfulfilled.  The failure of the spectacle to heal this 
inner illness is implicit in the very term “fomentations,” whose other sense—something 
that incites suffering—contradicts its etymological origin.  The burning flowers incite 
injury as much as they heal.  As a result, the spiritual illness that the poem dramatizes 
remains incurable.   
 A parallel tension also emerges when we examine the poem as a whole.   The 
spiritual “effulgence” of the flowers and the “brilliance” of the woman, each promising a 
kind of healing insight, are counterbalanced by that same woman’s “fiery eyes,” which in 
a literal sense reflect the light of the fire that consumes the roses.  Fire represents a 
destructive force, its heat exacerbating the viewer’s fever as well as the “deadly” 
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atmosphere of the scene.  The mirroring of the destructive fire of the spectacle in the eyes 
of the nameless woman is significant.  The woman who is in one sense objectified and 
commodified by the implicit transaction that takes place in the poem is given a gaze 
invested with fire’s potency.  She is, like the dove in “Unidad de las imágenes,” an object 
that gazes back at the subject, in a similarly threatening dynamic, in a Lacanian sense.  
The illness of the viewer generates the desire for the salve, or “fomentation,” yet the cure 
hides a dangerous force that is directed back at the viewer through the eyes of the 
woman, inflaming the psychological and spiritual site of the illness.  The poem’s closing 
words, “dos centavos” (“two cents”), thus announce a skeptical verdict on the value of 
the experience that the poem dramatizes.  This verdict reflects these irreconcilable 
contradictions and gives them the sense of an ultimate failure.   
 At first, the spectacle seems to open itself to the desirous gaze of the tourist, 
exemplifying the alliance between the exotic and the erotic.  Nonetheless, as we have 
established, the spectacle does not satisfy the viewer’s desire; the “fiery” gaze of the 
objectified woman undermines the power position of the viewer.  This inadequacy is 
aligned with the illness.  Thus it is both the source of the desire for the healing spectacle, 
and what that spectacle paradoxically exacerbates.  The investment of the object’s gaze 
with destructive potential dramatizes this scopic reversal.   
 
From “Attempt to Discover Life” to “Tentativa por Descubrir la Vida” 
 In contrast to the four poems Stevens sent Rodríguez Feo in the summer of 1945, 
the use of imagery in “Attempt to Discover Life” is enigmatic and laconic in a way that 
other short poems by Stevens are not.  There is normally a discursive thrust to his shorter 
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lyrics that engages a philosophical or aesthetic issue and progresses through one or more 
explicit or implicit statements.  “Attempt,” on the other hand, has a cinematic feel, 
piecing together still images and short actions in sequence with minimal extra-narrative 
information to help the reader place the sequence in a clarifying context.15   
 Thus, the poem has little resonance with Stevens’s typical shorter poems.  In 
addition to its laconic nature, it lacks the deft, often virtuosic musical effects that are 
characteristic of what most readers consider Stevens’s best works.  The first strophe, for 
example, is surprisingly flat in tone and rhythm.  Line 9, in the second strophe, is 
purposefully clumsy, with its three commas and its blunt alliteration: “Who bowed and, 
bowing, brought, in her mantilla….”  Thus, “Attempt to Discover Life” does not read like 
a Stevens poem; it is not an example of his masterful stylistics. 
 This fact points the reader in the direction of Stevens’s true intention in allowing 
Rodríguez Feo to translate the poem for Orígenes.  The poet’s agenda is not to leave his 
poetic imprimatur upon a foreign textual formation, where it would stand apart as 
testament to his mastery.  It is clear that such has not been Stevens’s goal from the 
beginning.  As we have seen in the case of the first four poems he contributes, he is more 
interested in using poems to continue a dialogue.  With “Attempt,” he continues that 
project and extends its scope.  Not only does the poem continue an examination of the 
issues Stevens and Rodríguez Feo treat in their correspondence, but further, it provokes a 
more engaged response from his counterpart by its very laconic, almost incomplete 
nature.  The aforementioned interpretive difficulties that the text causes stem from the 
fact that the poem is purposefully schematic in construction.   
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 I thus argue that the text is essentially a poem-to-be translated, the template for a 
text in Spanish.   Knowing this, we can better understand Stevens’s use of Cuban 
imagery.  The use of that imagery is clearly deployed in a request that Rodríguez Feo 
create something out of the materials of his own local context.  In this way, Stevens 
hopes his counterpart will put into action his earlier assertion to Henry Church that the 
local context should be his creative “matrix.”  This maternal metaphor for the proper 
inspiration for creative activity encounters a striking resonance in the diction of 
Rodríguez Feo’s translation, as we will see. 
 While the original poem engages the issue of exoticism in a critical fashion, as we 
have established, the very presuppositions behind the poem’s existence as a text 
processed and refashioned by a Cuban translator deepens that criticism.  The result is a 
clear anti-exoticist gesture.  The text refuses to process the concrete imagery of a tropical 
locale (imagery afforded by Rodríguez Feo in his letters) for exoticist use.  Instead, in its 
function as a template or schema, it transfers agency for cultural representation from 
outsider to insider.  Its imagery bears invisible question marks; the incompleteness of its 
arrangement coalesces into a series of inquiries about the possible uses of Cuban 
imagery.  These questions open a dialogic space in which the translation can furnish an 
answer. 
 In his translation, Rodríguez Feo faithfully conveys the narration of the 
construction of the “volcano” of flowers and the entrance of the “cadaverous person” 
with the mysterious woman.  He makes no significant creative interventions until the end 
of the second strophe, when he enacts a surprising recasting of signification.  Where the 
original describes the woman “Smiling and wetting her lips/ In the heavy air” (13-14); the 
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translation has her: “Sonriendo y humedeciendo sus labios/ En el aire grávido” (13-14) 
(“Smiling and wetting her lips/ In the [pregnant/full/abundant/heavy] air”).  Whereas the 
original uses the adjective “heavy” to evoke an atmosphere of oppressive heat, the 
translation introduces “grávido,” a term that etymologically means “heavy,” but which 
also means “pregnant.”  This choice seizes on a term of lesser impact in the original 
(“heavy”) and layers it with more denotative and connotative resonance.  The concept of 
an impending birth introduces a faint suggestion of redemption into a dark scene.  More 
specifically, the “pregnant air,” in a relation of proximity to the displayed sexuality of the 
anonymous woman, shades that sexuality with the sense of a generative power, in 
contrast to the evocation of a sexually oppressive social context in the original.   
 Redemption and rebirth suggest themselves meekly by way of contrast to the 
atmosphere of illness evoked by the cadaverous persons of the first two strophes.  The 
positive tone with which Rodríguez Feo responds to the image of the cadaverous person 
is significant in this context.  The translator perceives a supernatural potential in a scene 
of illness.  The second of Rodríguez Feo’s significant interventions supports this 
inference. The final strophe begins: 
Las rosas verdes surgieron de la mesa 
En humo.  Los pétalos azules tornáronse 
En los ensayos amarillentos del fulgor, 
Entre ensayos de florecer negro y florecer blanco. (15-18) 
 
The green roses rose from the table 
In smoke.  The blue petals became 
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In16 yellowish essays of brilliance, 
Among essays of black blooming and white blooming. 
This translation erases the pharmacological sense of “fomentations.”  As the 
“fomentations” of the original become “essays,” there is no longer the sense of heat or 
fire as a form of negative incitation.  Instead, the word “essays” suggests an attempt or an 
endeavor whose outcome is uncertain, but whose initial impulse is generally positive.  An 
“essay” / “ensayo” is also literally a weighing (from the Latin exagium), a means of 
evaluation.  The term thus underlines the sense of the poem’s title, as well as introducing 
the concept of a means of measurement for the success or failure of the “attempt to 
discover life.”  Whereas the original employs the term “fomentations” to maintain the 
relevance of the theme of sickness, the translation disengages with that theme, clearing 
connotative space for a more positive assertion. 
 This positive assertion comes in the last significant alteration in the translation.  
The word “bloom” in the original is clearly a noun rather than a verb.  Yet Rodríguez Feo 
renders the word as “florecer,” an infinitive verb (“to bloom”).  Here it is used as a 
gerund, to mean “blooming.”17  The translation moves away from the image of the rose 
petals serving as poultices, which focuses on the physical substance of the blossoms.  
Rodríguez Feo’s image of “black blooming and white blooming” creates a wholly 
different image, one in which the fire is no longer destructive, but instead enacts a 
productive activity.  The original suggests that the flowers are consumed by the fire; the 
gerunds employed in the translation evoke a generative activity rather than a 
consumption. 
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 This positive connotation works sympathetically with the idea of new life 
encoded in the term “grávido.”  Together, they suggest a possible flourishing, a rebirth 
that emerges from the fire.  The redemption that these connotations evoke nonetheless 
remains a potential.  Noting the use of the term “ensayos,” it is clear that the experience 
that the poem stages is on trial.  It is, in the most literal sense, being weighed.  The two 
coins with which the poem closes appear on the opposite side of the balanced scale, 
forming a representation of the value of the experience.  In contrast to the original, it is 
unclear how to read the connotations of the “dos centavos” in the translation. Within the 
more optimistic context that the translation’s diction establishes, it is difficult to judge if 
those two cents are to be taken as such a paltry sum. 
 In the translation, there is less skepticism about the value of the artificial 
experience that the cadaverous persons offer to the viewer than in the original, in part 
because in the original, exoticism forms a more relevant context for that experience.  In 
the original, the aforementioned markers of Cuban cultural specificity call forth the 
question of authenticity when read from the point of view of a North American reader, 
who, by the mechanics of the poem’s narration, is allied with the implicit viewer.  The 
foreign-sounding locale, the strange people and even stranger spectacle call forth 
exoticism within that domestic readerly context, and the poem subsequently offers a 
negative assessment of the value of that experience, going so far as to detect an 
intellectual and spiritual listlessness at the heart of the exotic gaze.   
 The translation that appears in Orígenes, on the other hand, interpolates to some 
extent a Cuban or generally Hispanic reader whose imagination does not proceed across 
the same cultural trajectory.  As a result, the strangeness of the spectacle at the heart of 
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the poem might be striking, but it cannot represent the exotic in the same sense it would 
to a reader from the English-speaking world, because it is not shaped by the same 
political, economic and cultural conditions of reception. 
 Stevens, as we have established, designs the text as a poem-to-be-translated.  He 
does so as an anti-exoticist act, encouraging a completion of the poem’s schematics from 
a translational position within the culture that is so often exoticized by U.S. authors.  
Working from these conditions, Rodríguez Feo renders a text with divergent 
implications, an act that reaffirms the intentions of Stevens’s textual gesture.  As a result, 
the experience that the translation evaluates is not enclosed within the confounding 
epistemological problematics of exoticism, but rather comes to represent the possibility 
for magic transformations and spiritual rebirth. 
 
Individuality and Realism: The Question of Abstraction in Poetry and Painting 
 The final stage of Rodríguez Feo and Stevens’s textual dialogue centers on the 
topic of the visual arts.  As we will see, in their discussions of artists and their work, the 
two interlocutors expound their personal aesthetics.  First, we will see Stevens inflecting 
his emphasis on empiricism with a notion of individual authenticity.  Then, we will 
observe how his definition of realism enters into a sympathetic dialogue with the question 
of abstraction.  Finally, this phase of the dialogue leads to Rodríguez Feo’s translation 
and publication of Stevens’s essay “The Relations between Poetry and Painting” in 
Orígenes.  The essay continues the dialogue on artistic methodology unfolded in the 
correspondence, while also introducing Stevens’s concept of the Supreme Fiction.  
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Through his submission of the essay, Stevens states both his skepticism about religion 
and the fictionalism that he suggests might supplant theology.   
 The connection between two art forms that Stevens asserts in the essay leads us to 
read his comments on painting as representative of an aesthetics that also applies to 
literature.  In his comments on paintings, Stevens evidences an insistence on two 
fundamental concepts that apply to both disciplines: namely, a notion of creative 
authenticity and an empirical basis for imaginative work.  In this sense, the visual arts, as 
a topic, afford the occasion for the continued development of his argument in favor of 
individuality and realism.  Rodríguez Feo, on the other hand, asserts his own concept of 
authenticity, and affirms a transcendental or spiritual mode of artistic production.  The 
assertions of both men enter into dialogue with one another through the various 
discursive and textual means we have seen throughout their interactions. 
 On April 9, 1949, Rodríguez Feo describes his reaction to a Havana exhibition of 
Mexican painting, contrasting the artificiality of the Mexican muralists with a truer 
Cuban form of artistic expression.  He asserts that Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco 
and David Alfaro Siqueiros are “…embarked upon an academic stage which reveals their 
decadence.  The Cubans are less pretentious, more charming and some have produced 
works which surpassed the bloody, screaming, cultural and nationalistic propaganda of 
the mejicanos” (123).  In Rodríguez Feo’s estimation, the Mexican muralist movement 
has lost the cultural relevance it had enjoyed in the 1920s, becoming “academic” and 
“pretentious,” in an essential betrayal of its populist political origins.  A criterion of 
authenticity is implicit in these pejorative adjectives.   
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 This concept of authenticity is consonant with the editorial statements, attributed 
to Rodríguez Feo and coeditor José Lezama Lima, in which Orígenes poses itself as a 
project that avoids propaganda and resists defining itself in relation to artistic 
generations, schools or dogmas.  Rodríguez Feo asserts that Cuban art is more authentic 
because it does not bear the burden of maintaining itself as an “ism” and does not need to 
“scream” to be heard.  Instead, he defines Cuban art as “charming,” suggesting that 
artistic authenticity is not to be confused with intensity of emotion and political belief.18   
 Wallace Stevens’s response to Rodríguez Feo’s statements on muralism is 
sympathetic.  He laments how Mexican painting has developed a “generalized doctrine” 
and “undertake[s] to teach” rather than striving to be original (125).  Yet, these notes of 
concurrence come by way of a negative assessment of the latest work of the origenista 
artist Mariano Rodríguez.  Stevens was originally taken with the illustrations Mariano did 
in the early numbers of Orígenes.19  Like Rodríguez Feo, Stevens at this point seems 
drawn to an aesthetics of charm and placidity rather than one of force and passion.  At the 
Feigl Gallery in New York City in the spring of 1948, though, Stevens finds an entirely 
different Mariano.  We do not know precisely what works were displayed, but it is clear 
that they emerge from a different aesthetic.  In the mid-to-late 1940s, Mariano’s work 
takes on a more daring use of color and depicts massive, monumental human figures.20    
Stevens is shocked by what he sees, describing the works as “lurid and rhetorical” 
(124).  This characterization is posed in contrast to his own aesthetic values.  In place of 
the lurid (the shocking, the sensational, the gruesome), Stevens values the cool and 
restrained qualities he finds in Mariano’s earlier drawings.  Instead of a rhetorical 
(artificial, stylized) approach, Stevens values what appears natural. 
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 Judging from these comments, it is tempting to assert that Stevens advocates an 
Appolonian, rather than a Dionysian aesthetic.  Yet, in a letter dated December 14, 1948, 
Stevens praises the work of French painter and sculptor Jean Dubuffet and urges 
Rodríguez Feo to see it.  Dubuffet’s aggressive aesthetics is far from the placid beauty of 
Mariano’s drawings in Orígenes or of the French landscapes Stevens so enthusiastically 
acquires for his own art collection.  What Stevens admires about Dubuffet is not the 
aesthetic impression it makes on him as a viewer, but rather what he knows of the artist’s 
rigorous methodology: “Jean Dubuffet goes to Africa in the winter and there he and his 
wife and his children … live on the desert, in a tent, with the Arabs … And there in the 
desert he struggles against everything that he has picked up at home in an effort to arrive 
at what he himself is and what he himself sees, feels and thinks” (148).  The criterion for 
assessing the value of Dubuffet’s art is not its aesthetic surface, but rather the rigor and 
honesty of the artist’s effort to achieve a fully authentic mode of personal expression.   
 Thus, it becomes clear that Stevens does not react negatively to Mariano’s style in 
itself, but rather what he extrapolates about the artist’s methodology.  When Stevens 
looks at a painting, he asks himself: how did the artist draw on “what he himself is and 
what he himself sees, feels and thinks” in order to produce this work?  Along with the 
values of rigor and honesty, this question is built upon a fundamental link between 
artistic expression and personal individuality:  “I just don’t think Mariano is being 
himself … There is not the slightest doubt that Mariano is an interesting figure.  But a 
man does not achieve himself by willing to do something: he does it as part of the 
experience of himself: of living his own life in his own world” (125).  It is important to 
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note that Stevens’s standard of judgment relies upon a significant interpretive leap from 
the formal surface of the painting to what he believes to be its personal origins.  
 Stevens’s opinions on art continue the argument for originality that he has made 
to José Rodríguez Feo in his comments about literature.  At the same time, they push the 
idea of originality toward a nearly solipsistic description of the artistic process, as we can 
see in the phrase “the experience of himself.”  Rather than the idea of an art that reshapes 
observed reality, Stevens seems to insist on an art of introspection.21  This suggestion 
strikes a discordant note with the parodies of solipsism and the attempts to embody a 
notion of pure realism we have seen in his poetry as well as his letters.  The emphasis of 
Stevens’s aesthetics seems to be shifting from empiricism to individualism. 
 Yet, in Stevens’s reaction against the abstraction of Mariano’s work, we see the 
value of realistic representation raised again.22  His comments reveal his reaction against 
a particular kind of abstraction: 
I think that all this abstract painting that is going on nowadays is just so much 
frustration and evasion.  Eventually it will lead to a new reality.  When a thing has 
been blurred by the obscurity of metaphysics and eventually emerges from that 
blur, it has all the characteristics of a brilliantly clear day after a month of mist 
and rain. (124)   
Abstraction is a bivalent term here.  In the first sense, it is an “evasion” of reality, a 
refusal to draw on empirical resources.  When Stevens describes abstraction as a 
“metaphysics,” he opposes it to a creative process built on empirical data.  In the second 
sense, which is less prominent, abstraction is a movement that, despite its obfuscations, 
makes visible a “new reality.”  Stevens’s positive statements to various correspondents 
 147
about Georges Braque, Paul Klee, and Jean Arp illustrate the fact that his aesthetics is not 
dogmatically representational. 
 Instead, we observe the same fact we noted in evaluating the criteria of rigor, 
authenticity and individuality—the imagined source of the aesthetic fact is primary in 
Stevens’s critiques.  What the abstraction works from is most important to Stevens, rather 
than the abstraction itself.  In “‘Beyond the Rhetorician’s Touch’: Stevens’s Painterly 
Abstractions,” Alan Filreis offers an illuminating interpretation of abstraction’s positive 
sense for Stevens: “a ‘new knowledge of reality’… was to be derived not from an 
unreflectively revived form of realism but from a realist’s assimilation of the 
abstractionist project itself” (246).  In other words, Stevens saw in abstraction the 
possibility for a new way of perceiving reality.  In support of this assertion, Filreis cites a 
letter to Barbara Church in which Stevens muses:  
One wonders sometimes whether this is not exactly what the whole effort of 
modern art has been about: the attachment to real things.  When people were 
painting cubist pictures, were they not attempting to get at not the invisible but the 
visible?  They assumed that back of the peculiar reality that we see, there lay a 
more prismatic one of many facets.  Apparently deviating from reality, they were 
trying to fix it… (Letters 601) 
In these comments, we find a surprising reconciliation of Stevens’s realist project with 
abstraction.  He allows a pictorial language like cubism an empirical purpose—the 
making visible of a concrete reality that was previously invisible because of limited ways 
of seeing.  Stevens’s comments support Filreis’s assertion that, in the poet’s estimation, 
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“abstraction can lead uniquely and freshly back to reality” (Rhetorician 247).  The two 
senses Stevens makes of abstraction parallel two modes of the imagination.    
In his essay “Imagination as Value,” Stevens distinguishes “…between the 
imagination as metaphysics and as a power of the mind over external objects” (Angel 
136).  Through a quote from Ernst Cassirer, Stevens associates the first valence of the 
imagination with romanticism, Fichtean idealism, and the assertion that art is of supreme 
epistemological value (136).  The second he describes as a movement toward a 
“visionary” experience that uses reality as its starting point.  This second mode of 
imagination he associates with art in its true form (137).  The purpose of this artistic 
(rather than romantic) imagination is a form of “abstraction” (139), whose primary 
operations are upon “external objects.”  
 If we read them in the broader context of Stevens’s general thinking about art, we 
can see his statements about artists such as Mariano and Dubuffet as a manifestation of a 
process of reconciling his two central concerns—reality and the imagination.  Rodríguez 
Feo responds to Stevens’s ideas with assertions of his own.  As we have seen, he lays out 
his anti-academic and antipropagandistic program for art in his comments about 
muralism, receiving a sympathetic response from Stevens.  But in the case of the work of 
Jean Arp, Rodríguez Feo disagrees strongly.  On January 27, 1949, Stevens recommends 
that Rodríguez Feo see an exhibit of Arp’s sculptures at the Gallery Matisse in New 
York, describing the French artist as “exquisite” and  “a man of taste” (150).  Stevens’s 
assessment is not surprising, given the organic forms that Arp’s sculptures typically 
assume.  Arp’s abstraction is recognizably the result of a process that works from natural 
forms and develops an analytical presentation of those forms.   
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 Yet, after seeing the exhibit, Rodríguez Feo responds to Stevens’s enthusiasm 
with sarcasm. 
I went to N.Y. just as I said and took a good look at Arpie; but I came back very 
disappointed.  I guess that sort of Latin’s delicacy is too much for us South of the 
Border.  I found M. Arp geometrical a las Descartes, but who cares for French 
precision, classicism, razon.  I took off to a little bar on second Avenue and got 
drunk. (152) 
Rodríguez Feo, like Stevens, illustrates his aesthetic values through negative assessments.  
His description of Arp’s work touches on both its aesthetic surface and its conceptual 
foundations.  He dislikes its formal “delicacy” as well as the classical rationality 
(“raz[ó]n”) he believes it embodies.  Rodríguez Feo establishes an implicit connection 
between art and everyday experience by contrasting the Apollonian repose of Arp’s 
sculpture with Dionysian drunkenness, implying a preference for the latter.   
 Though it seems like nothing more than an offhand comment, Rodríguez Feo’s 
statement of preference for drunkenness over classical repose is really a manifestation of 
an underlying aesthetic philosophy that is central to his thinking as a Cuban literary 
professional.  This aesthetics is an opposition to what he describes as the “puritanism” of 
U.S. culture.  This Puritanism consists of an inveterate repression of emotions of all 
kinds, in favor of a calculating rationality.  As we have asserted before, Rodríguez Feo 
identifies himself (and Cuban culture) with a cultural and spiritual Catholicism that 
stands opposite a repressive Protestantism.  Rodríguez Feo illustrates this opposition 
further when he describes to Stevens a lecture given by the French Catholic priest and 
poet Pierre Emmanuel at Princeton.  The discourse was “…all about anguish, suffering, 
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the Cruxificion [sic] and Ressurection (?) [sic], and I was much amused to see the 
expressions on the men of letters’ snouts as they heard him undress his soul and told what 
made his poetry tick” (147).  His parody of the reserved and repressed Princeton 
professors implies a valuation of Emmanuel’s spirituality, acceptance (or even 
indulgence) of suffering, and the honesty with which he revealed those qualities to his 
audience.23     
It is important to note that during this period in his correspondence with Stevens, 
Rodríguez Feo mentions St. John of the Cross on two occasions.24  He continues to use 
the Spanish mystic as a means for asserting himself as a Catholic and for alluding to his 
own belief in a spiritual basis for art.  His insistence on the importance of physical and 
spiritual suffering in his comments about Emmanuel is consistent with his interest in the 
Spanish mystic tradition, which is an important foundation for much of the religiosity and 
the poetics of Orígenes.  As we will see, this religious element plays a role in the 
interaction between Stevens’s “The Relations between Poetry and Painting” and its 
Orígenes context.  
 Leading up to the appearance of Stevens’s essay on painting and poetry in 
Orígenes in 1952, two pieces published in the previous year help to round out our 
examination of the context for the essay’s appearance.  In issue number 28, two texts 
translated by Rodríguez Feo appear: “Braque,” an essay on the French artist by Marcel 
Arland, and “Cuadernos” (“Notebooks”), a selection from Braque’s famous aphorisms.25  
One of these aphorisms stands out as an anticipation of Stevens’s essay: “El arte abstracto 
se lee, pero no se ve” (“Abstract art is read, but not seen”) (35).  Braque asserts an 
intersection between the textual and the visual in the sphere of modern art, a statement 
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that supports the agenda behind Stevens’s essay—finding the essential commonalities 
between poetry and the visual arts.    
The Arland essay parallels Stevens’s interest in the creative methodology behind 
paintings.  Arland praises Braque’s discipline, his individuality, and his refusal to 
subscribe to the doctrines of any particular school (31-32).  More significantly, Arland 
connects the disciplinary and methodological brilliance of Braque’s work to a spiritual 
one.  He asserts that his methodology possesses a “religious irradiation” (“irradiación 
religiosa”), and that his work as a whole “is a metaphysical world … the world 
illuminated by Grace…” (“Es un mundo metafísico … el mundo iluminado por la 
Gracia…”) (34).  These assertions interact dynamically with Stevens’s exploration of the 
theological thrust behind modern art in “Relations,” as we will see.  Rodríguez Feo, as 
editor and translator, establishes this dynamic context for Stevens’s essay by 
incorporating these texts by Arland and Braque into Orígenes. 
 Stevens’s “The Relations between Poetry and Painting” attempts to illustrate the 
fundamental connection between two art forms.  It does so in two ways, one descriptive 
and the other speculative.  Stevens begins the essay by describing the most immediate 
manifestation of this connection: the fact that critical comments about paintings so often 
could apply just as well to poems (160-61).  Then, he tackles the question of the technical 
similarities between poetry and painting, asserting that the concept of “composition” is 
common to both (161-63).  He then moves to the issue of the shared organizing principles 
in modern art and modern poetry.  Both are “uncompromising,” or unwilling to deviate 
from its strict program (166-7), are “plausible,” in that they each have a totalizing 
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tendency to find “a reason for everything” (167), and are “bigoted,” or opposed to the 
assertions of competing schools (167). 
 Stevens thus begins the essay in a descriptive mode of analysis.  He subsequently 
makes a jarring transition to a speculative mode, wherein he proposes a Nietzschean 
theological and philosophical basis for the unity of poetry and painting.  For Stevens, this 
unity is part of a broader commonality among the arts in the face of the death of God in 
modern Western societies.  Stevens asserts that: 
…in an age in which disbelief is so profoundly prevalent … poetry and painting, 
and the arts in general, are, in their measure, a compensation for what has been 
lost.  Men feel that the imagination is the next greatest power to faith: the reigning 
prince.  Consequently, their interest in the imagination and its work is to be 
regarded not as a phase of humanism but as a vital self-assertion in a world in 
which nothing but the self remains, if that remains. (170-1) 
As religion declines as a means for making sense of human experience, art promises to 
fill the void.  Stevens’s discussion of the technical affinities of modern art forms opens 
out dramatically to a diagnosis of the essential modern problem—the irrelevance of 
religion and of any other kind of totalizing ideology.  
 What will reanimate humanity’s capacity for belief is, of course, the Supreme 
Fiction: “Our own time … is a time in which the search for the supreme truth has been a 
search in reality or through reality or even a search for some supremely acceptable 
fiction” (173).  This new fiction is to be acknowledged as a wholly human creation, yet 
its role is to take the place of theology; it “…seems to become in time a mystical 
theology…” (173).  The positive, rather than lamenting, tone with which Stevens 
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announces the triumph of fictionalism epitomizes a common tenet of Modernism, as 
described by Ellmann Crasnow: “…the fact that value has a human origin can prompt 
celebration instead of apology: the capacity to add meaning, to construct reality, will then 
be acknowledged as an essential human resource” (370).  Stevens ultimately sees the 
triumph of fictionalism in modern thinking to be a positive development that rescues 
“[t]he greatest truth we could hope to discover … that man’s truth is the final resolution 
of everything” (175).  Whereas to this point in his exchange with Rodríguez Feo, Stevens 
has sounded like a realist along the lines of William Carlos Williams, the forceful 
statements of “Relations” finally offer us an image of Stevens that fits what we 
understand as his role in U.S. Modernism.  
 It is at first surprising to note that Rodríguez Feo explicitly requests to publish this 
essay in Orígenes.  Rodríguez Feo’s translation and publication of Stevens’s essay places 
the idea of the Supreme Fiction in direct confrontation with the religious foundations of 
Orígenes.  We can see how Stevens’s assertion that artistic activity replaces faith enters 
into a conflictive context in Orígenes.  Even the poetic freedoms Lezama affirms are not 
human constructions meant to supplant religiosity.  There is always a Catholic belief-
system that undergirds the aesthetics of Lezama and the majority of origenistas, as 
heterodox as the poetic manifestations of those beliefs might be.      
 Rodríguez Feo explains to Stevens that his decision to publish “Relaciones” “…is 
due to Mariano’s great interest in what you have to say there about his own art [painting 
generally]” (189).  This comment reveals an important fact about Rodríguez Feo as editor 
and about Orígenes as a whole; the essay is not required to affirm beliefs consistent with 
the origenista agenda, but only to be considered of some kind of thematic relevance to 
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some feature of that program.  Stevens’s essay is indeed relevant to the connections 
among Rodríguez Feo, Stevens and Mariano, and to the dialogue about modern art 
(through letters as well as through texts published in Orígenes) that we have 
reconstructed heretofore.  Rodríguez Feo clearly finds it valuable, rather than detrimental, 
that Stevens’s essay would conflict with magazine’s general tenets because that conflict 
is direct and topical. 
 Furthermore, though the conflict between the atheism behind Stevens’s assertion 
of the Supreme Fiction and the theological bases of the journal in which the essay is 
published emerges as a surprising dissonance, it is important to keep in mind the sense in 
which the assertion rounds out Stevens’s ideas about abstraction and realism.  
Understanding this other implication of the Fiction’s appearance, we can see how it 
engages in a more sympathetic dialogue with Rodríguez Feo’s origenismo.  As we have 
seen in our discussion of the “major man,” the Supreme Fiction is a statement of 
Stevens’s belief in the importance of coordinations and reconciliations between the 
concrete and the abstract.  Stevens’s long poem “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” 
elaborates, through improvisations and careful structural arrangements, a schema in 
which the concrete instance and abstract belief enter into dynamic interactions.  In this 
light, we can see how the theological assertions of “The Relations between Poetry and 
Painting” are, in part, a restatement of Stevens’s assertions about a specific kind of 
reconciliation between abstraction and realism, where each opposite is dependent upon 
the other. 
 This reconciliation is consonant with Rodríguez Feo’s broader intellectual system.  
The Cuban translator and editor, like the North American poet, is interested in a synergy 
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of the concrete and the abstract.  Rodríguez Feo’s critical essays engage in a mode of 
historical critique that is more factual and specific than the prevailing origenista agenda 
of treating societal problems poetically and spiritually.  Yet, this factual self exists 
alongside the mystical Rodríguez Feo, who resists Stevens’s affirmations of the 
importance of a strict empiricism. 
 Thus, it is not surprising to see that Rodríguez Feo’s translation of the essay is 
rigorously transparent on a linguistic level.  The translation renders Stevens’s atheist 
argument quite clearly, allowing the text to enter into a direct, conflictive relationship 
with the spiritual grounds of the magazine and the translator himself.   There is only one 
significant alteration the translation—an omission—that refracts the original essay’s 
intent in a significant way.  Stevens’s description of the disciplinary elements common to 
modern poetry and painting is attenuated by virtue of a missing sentence.26  The flow of 
his argument is fairly well preserved in spite of its absence.  The effect, then, is one of 
slight de-emphasis; a point Stevens attempts to make through a deliberate progression of 
assertions comes across with a measurable diminishment of clarity.  The slight 
suppression that this omission represents suggests that the translation is less interested in 
the line of argument that threads through that passage of the text.  Instead, it appears that 
it is the bold philosophical thesis with which the essay closes that is more important to 
the translation’s process of confronting the original text with a new context.     
 
Conclusion 
 Our detailed and chronologically linear treatment of the literary dialogue 
sustained between Stevens and Rodríguez Feo has given us a sense of the substance and 
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duration of what must be one of the most fruitful literary exchanges of the period.  First, 
we have come to appreciate the way in which the communication between the two figures 
steadily gains in momentum and in openness over the course of time, though we have 
also noticed pronounced moments of silence and evasion.  Also, it is evident that, counter 
to the assertions of Roberto Ignacio Díaz, Stevens develops an interest in eliciting 
original responses from Rodríguez Feo, rather than imposing viewpoints upon him 
through a kind of cultural colonialism.  We observe that both the prose and the poetic 
texts that make up Stevens’s half of the interaction are dialogic, both in its origins and in 
its results.  Stevens writes letters and poems in response to Rodríguez Feo, and his 
responses are gauged to continue, rather than forestall, discussion.  His poem “Attempt to 
Discover Life” is the most interesting manifestation of this mode of expression.  The 
intentional incompleteness of the text solicits a translational elaboration, resulting in a 
dynamic pairing of original and translation that continues multiple lines of dialogue 
through its contrapuntal textual body. 
 Rodríguez Feo’s textual production—arguments, allusions, editorial and 
translational acts— participates in the same dialogic system that Stevens’s does.  Like his 
counterpart, he sustains an expression of his aesthetic, philosophical and religious 
convictions through a variety of textual processes.  The result of his responses is a 
constellation of counterpoints that embodies the problematic relationship between his 
own identification with the Orígenes project and his interest in Stevens’s skeptical, 
individualistic aesthetics.  Through silence and irony, Rodríguez Feo refuses to enter into 
a subordinate discursive relation to the famous poet.  In his assertions, allusions, and 
activities as editor and translator, he converts silence into encoded oppositions. 
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 Deciphering the codes through which Rodríguez Feo puts forth his resistances, we 
discover, in more detail, how the young editor envisions the agendas of Orígenes.  The 
thematics we have seen developed through this interaction center around the opposition 
between Stevens’s emphasis on observation and individuality and of the origenista 
valuation of a metaphysical and collective mode of literary production.  As we have seen, 
Rodríguez Feo’s vision of the role of Orígenes results in gestures that resist (through 
argument) or reshape (through translation) Stevens’s aesthetics for incorporation into 
Orígenes.  At other times, though, we have seen how Rodríguez Feo allows Stevens’s 
work to conflict with its new Cuban context in an unmediated way.  In his translation of 
Stevens’s “Four Poems,” Óscar Rodríguez Feliú continues Rodríguez Feo’s agenda in his 
reshaping of Stevens’s empiricism and his introduction of sacred imagery into Stevens’s 
discourse.  These two modes of operation—one incorporative, the other contrapuntal—




                                                 
Notes to Chapter Two    
 
1 Brazeau’s oral biography offers the reader a great deal of information about  
Stevens’s life.  Helen Vendler’s book-length study is perhaps the most respected work on 
Stevens’s long poems.  Alan Filreis, in Wallace Stevens and the Actual World, gives a 
well-documented and carefully considered contextualization of Steven’s poetry in the 
historical events of the World War II period. 
2 Todorov asserts that the exoticist believes that “…the country with superior 
values is a country whose only relevant characteristic is that it is not my own.”  (264). 
3 The poem was originally published in Broom in 1923 as “Discourse in a Cantina 
at Havana,” and was reprinted as “Academic Discourse at Havana” in Hound and Horn 
in 1929.  The poem appears in translation as “Discurso académico en La Habana,” in 
revista de avance in 1929. 
4 All Stevens poems cited in this study can be found in the Collected Poems.  The 
earliest published version of each poem has been consulted, to assure that none of the 
divergences of a translation are attributable to a different version.   
5 Stevens makes this argument via an image from Plato.  His rejection of the 
twice-abstracted image parallels Plato’s skepticism about the epistemological value of 
art, though his insistence on the importance of the concrete world as a foundation of 
knowledge diverges sharply from Plato’s argument for the abstract apprehension of 
Forms. 
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6 As Filreis and Coyle point out (62), Stevens found this passage in F. O. 
Matthiessen’s Henry James: The Major Phase (1944).  Matthiessen and Kenneth B. 
Murdock later edited The Notebooks of Henry James (1947). 
7 As we will see in our examination of Allen Tate’s essay “The New 
Provincialism,” Rodríguez Feo’s critique of the narrow cultural outlook of Cubans as a 
national group is in conflict with Tate’s emphasis on the importance of an extremely 
focused localism. 
8 In Stevens’s poem “The Pediment of Appearance,” hunters are engaged in a 
search for the “transparence,” the objective image, though they become lost in their own 
wills and the image they seek becomes a threatening mirror that “scowl[s]” back at them. 
9 For Lacan, the example par excellance of the returned gaze is the anamorphic 
skull in the foreground of Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors.  The skull’s gaze, set in a 
scene meant to symbolize vanitas, undoes the vanity of the viewer (88).  Because the 
field of the gaze is the field of desire (85), the challenge of the returned gaze is a 
challenge to the figure that organizes all desire—the phallus.  In this context, we can 
understand how Holbein’s painting “…makes visible … the subject as annihilated…” 
through a symbolic castration (88-89).   
10 In Luke 5:10, Jesus says to Simon: “Do not be afraid.  From now on you will be 
catching men.”   
11 After perusing Rodríguez Feliú’s translations, Rodríguez Feo remarks to 
Stevens in a letter dated February 15, 1946: “The translations are probably the best you 
can get; far superior to those made for Sur by [Jorge Luis] Borges and [Adolfo] Bioy 
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[Casares]—and that is saying a great deal!  I myself was astounded when Rodríguez Feliú 
handed them in for your poetry is quite difficult to apprehend and its flavour can escape 
easily a less conscious and artistic effort.” (79) 
12 Though it is clear that Stevens criticizes himself for straying from an 
engagement with reality, this criticism is in a sense unfair, according to the poet’s own 
strictly empirical definition of realism.  Stevens’s dramatization of realism in “Thinking” 
emerges from memories of a natural environment he himself experienced as a child.  The 
chaos of Europe, on the other hand, though real, is not a reality directly available to 
Stevens as experience. 
13 Rimbaud writes: “I want to be a poet, and I’m working to turn myself into a 
seer... It has to do with making your way toward the unknown by a derangement of all 
the senses.  The suffering is tremendous, but one must bear up against it, to be born a 
poet, and I know that’s what I am.  It’s not my fault.  It’s wrong to say I think: one should 
say I am thought.” (28)  It is interesting to note that the young poet was aware of the 
suffering that arises from the sacrificing one’s sensory existence.  This amounts, in this 
context, to a recognition of the painful nature of the mystic discipline, a facet Rowan 
Williams seeks to make clear in his explication of St. John of the Cross, for whom “...it 
was fundamentally important to be able to interpret his mental anguish as itself ‘grace,’ 
the mark of God’s intimacy” (174). 
14 It is important to acknowledge the racism inherent in Stevens’s imagery.  
Nonetheless, this racism is not particularly relevant to the discursive relationship between 
Stevens and Rodríguez Feo. 
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15 The final two lines, for example, have the feel of a closeup that breaks away 
from the narrative sequence to place an explicit emphasis on an object or objects.  Here, 
the reader is impelled to take the image of the two coins lying on the table as especially 
significant and subsequently to believe that the speaker emphatically minimizes the value 
of the “experience” that the poem represents. 
16 The insertion of the preposition “En” (“In”) is essentially an error, resulting in a 
sentence fragment.  “Tornarse” means “to become,” which is a literal translation of the 
word “became” in the original.  “Tornáronse en” (“became in”) is nonsensical, unless a 
comma is implicit between the verb and the preposition, which would lead to the 
statement of a predicate for the verb (“became[,] in...”)  Notwithstanding this basic 
problem, I wish to focus on the rich semantic significance of the term “ensayos.” 
17 In Spanish, two distinct words designate the flower (“flor”) and the act of 
blossoming (“florecer”). 
18 Just two years earlier, Orígenes devoted the entire spring, 1947 issue to 
Mexico, with a cover by José Clemente Orozco, an essay by Alfonso Reyes, and poetry 
by Alí Chumacero, Efraín Huerta and Octavio Paz.  Rodríguez Feo and Lezama penned a 
preface praising the “splendid muralist tradition” (“su espléndida tradición muralista”) 
(3), and the issue included a promotional statement by Justino Fernández that marveled at 
the “novelty and vital force” (“la novedad y fuerza vital”) (28) of muralism in the 1940s.  
Rodríguez Feo’s comments on April 9, 1948 mark the first clear assertion of muralism’s 
“decadence,” which he claims to have “suspected all the time,” in spite of his role in 
producing the homage (Secretaries 123).     
 162
                                                                                                                                                 
19 After seeing the magazine for the first time in January of 1945, Stevens 
remarks: “Mariano’s happy little drawings touch me (Mariano is in fact exquisite).  
Nothing quite so unconcerned has come my way for a long time.  Man’s fever is not 
present here” (35).   
20 For collections of Mariano’s work, see Rodríguez, Mariano: una energía 
voluptuosa and Todos los colores de Mariano.   
21 In a letter to Barbara Church dated June 22, 1948, Stevens confesses that what 
he has lately been searching for in philosophical treatises is explorations of the 
“…question of my relation to things about me” (Letters 601). 
22 In 1948, Mariano’s work still had strong representational elements in it, with 
significant parallels with the cubist work of Picasso and Georges Braque.  In the 1960s, 
Mariano executed truly “abstract” paintings that Stevens most likely would have enjoyed 
even less. 
23 The atmosphere of Princeton University, where he is pursuing graduate studies, 
seems to Rodríguez Feo the embodiment of American puritanism.  In his letter of 
November 15, 1948, Rodríguez Feo asks: “How can we cultivate the passions in 
Princeton. [sic]  They dry up here and we float through the campus, classes and Firestone 
library a disembodied body, pure spirit, in the air like a gas-balloon” (139). 
24 In his letter of Dec. 15, 1948, Rodríguez Feo mentions that his own birthday 
(December 28) is the same day St. John of the Cross died (148).  A letter from January, 
1949, recounts Rodríguez Feo’s reference to the Spanish mystic in a question to art 
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historian Suzanne Langer.  Rodríguez Feo was frustrated that Langer apparently “didn’t 
understand what I was trying to say to her” (151).  
25 Many of these aphorisms, assembled by Pierre Reverdy, appear in 1917 in 
Nord-Sud. 
26 The missing sentence, which serves as an expansion upon the idea of “an effort 
of the mind” necessary to creation, reads: “In short, these two arts, poetry and painting, 
have in common a laborious element, which, when it is exercised, is not only a labor but 
a consummation as well” (165).  The omission of this sentence in the translation does not 
fully obfuscate the communication of Stevens’s basic assertion about discipline and rigor, 
though.  As with Stevens’s poems, the first published version of Stevens’s essay was 
consulted, though the citation here refers to the reprinting in The Necessary Angel.   
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Chapter Three 
Liminality and Caricature: The Contrapuntal Incorporation of Eliot’s 
“Burnt Norton” and “East Coker” into Orígenes 
 The appearance of two important poems by Eliot in the pages of Orígenes 
produces a complex of concurrences and conflicts, sympathies and antipathies, between 
the poet and the cultural, philosophical and religious tenets of the journal.1  As we will 
see, Eliot’s work finds a sympathetic context in Cintio Vitier’s poems and essays, as 
those texts testify to a similar coordination of literary and religious concerns.  
Nonetheless, the concepts that are operative in Rodríguez Feo’s translations bear many 
points of contention with the translator’s vision of what Eliot represents.  These concepts, 
tacitly shared by the translator and his coeditor Lezama, facilitate alterations in both the 
conceptual thrust of Eliot’s poems and in the image of the personal characteristics of the 
poet himself.  An vision of Eliot as pessimistic, passive renouncer of the world around 
him, informed by a slanted notion of the mysticism that informs his work, controls the 
transfer of the poems into the context of Orígenes.  Through this act of contrapuntal 
incorporation, Lezama and Rodríguez Feo assert their vision of origenismo.  Most 
evidently, they assert the journal as an embodiment of Lezama’s notions of malleable 
history and of the poetic celebration of the body.  But also, they implicitly position 
origenismo within a set of cultural and sociological tendencies associated with their own 
notion of Catholic culture.  They do so by way of their portrayal of Eliot as an 




The Facts of the Exchange 
 The first text related to Eliot to appear in Orígenes is F. O. Matthiessen’s “The 
Quartets.”  The text is published, in Rodríguez Feo’s translation, in 1944.2  It is likely that 
Rodríguez Feo plans at this point to follow the essay with translations of all four poems.  
The essay’s appearance inaugurates this project and prepares for the translations.  The 
fact that Rodríguez Feo intends, from the beginning, to devote so much space in the 
magazine to Eliot’s work clearly indicates great interest and respect.  Further, in the first 
year of Orígenes’ life, Rodríguez Feo is most likely thinking about quickly establishing 
the seriousness and ambition of the journal.    
 Opening the Eliot sequence with a fourteen page critical essay establishes a 
critical framework that will influence the interpretations of the poems by Spanish-
speaking readers of Orígenes.  The translation of Matthiessen’s essay appears with a 
footnote, praising the author as “…one of the most rigorous critics his country possesses” 
and confessing that the publication of the essay “…constitutes a real pleasure for the 
editors of Orígenes” (3).3  The reverent tone of the note authorizes Matthiessen as an 
authority in the interpretation of Eliot’s work, working to establish a privileged role for 
the critical essay in shaping the domestic reception of the poems.  Matthiessen’s essay is 
not a particularly penetrating meditation on Eliot’s philosophical and religious ideas, 
though it does contextualize the poems within the poet’s broader work and elucidate their 
formal and musical structures well.  As we will see in our analysis of Rodríguez Feo’s 
translations of Eliot’s poems, the Cuban editor effectively allows this detailed discussion 
of the poems’ formal and musical characteristics to compensate for the absence of a sense 
of those structures in the translation.  This compromise illustrates an important duality: 
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Rodríguez Feo wants readers to have a sense of the technical ambitions that were so 
important to Eliot, yet he does not attempt to recreate them in his translation.  Thus, 
despite Rodríguez Feo’s initial intentions, the translations themselves distort the 
coordination of musical and conceptual structures in the poem.  This fact will become 
clear in the last section of this chapter.   
 In 1946,  Rodríguez Feo sends a letter to T. S. Eliot in London, asking his 
permission to publish a translation of “East Coker” (Rodríguez Feo, Correspondencia, 
17), which Eliot wrote in 1940 and which subsequently appeared in 1943 as the second of 
the Four Quartets.  Upon receiving the request, Eliot probably remembers that in 1940, 
the first section of his poem “The Hollow Men” (“A penny for the Old Guy”) was 
published in the bimonthly Espuela de plata, one of Orígenes’ predecessors.4   He 
consents, and the translation of “East Coker” appears in Orígenes in the spring of 1946.   
 In May of 1947, Rodríguez Feo meets Eliot for the first time, at Eliot’s lecture on 
Milton at the Frick Museum in New York.  Many luminaries of the literary world are in 
attendance to hear Eliot’s remarks—W. H. Auden, E. E. Cummings, E. M. Forster, 
Archibald MacLeish, I. A. Richards, Stephen Spender and Allen Tate (Rodríguez Feo, 
Correspondencia, 54).  Rodríguez Feo’s admiration for Eliot’s intellect is clear in his 
description of the event in a letter to Lezama: “Hoy tuve el raro privilegio de oír a T. S. 
Eliot en una brillante conferencia sobre el gran genio poético Milton” (“Today I had the 
rare privilege of hearing T. S. Eliot in a brilliant lecture on the great poetic genius 
Milton”) (54).  After the lecture, Rodríguez Feo is introduced to Eliot, and accompanies 
the poet and a group of his friends to the Plaza Hotel bar.  There, the Cuban editor obtains 
Eliot’s permission to translate “Burnt Norton.”  Though it is the second of the Quartets to 
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appear in Orígenes, it was the first of the four poems to be completed by Eliot, in 1935.  
It first appeared in Collected Poems 1909-35, and came to be the opening poem of the 
Quartets. 
 Eliot remarks to Rodríguez Feo that the job of translating the poem would require 
a “titanic” effort.  In 1989, Rodríguez Feo remembers that the remark was delivered with 
what he calls Eliot’s “proverbial irony” (“…me pareció muy a tono con su proverbial 
ironía”) (17).  There may have been “titanic” difficulties, for the poem does not appear 
for two years.  Some of these difficulties probably stem from the translator’s souring 
personal feelings for the famous poet.  The arrogance that lies behind Eliot’s irony is one 
impulse for the Cuban translator’s changing estimation. 
  Nonetheless, on this evening in New York, Rodríguez Feo is clearly very excited 
to have met a man of such great stature.  He sends his colleague Lezama a note two days 
later, describing Eliot with a mixture of awe and scientific curiosity: “Es un hombre muy 
fino, de nariz alargada y recta, pelo medio canoso por los lados, ojos azules, y un acento 
semi-Cambridge.  Usa  unas gafas que recuerdan a Joyce.  Lo presentaron como ‘el poeta 
más grande vivo de la lengua inglesa’ y el buen señor ni pestañeó” (“He is a very fine 
man, with a long, straight nose, hair a bit gray on the sides, blue eyes, and a semi-
Cambridge accent.  He wears glasses that remind one of Joyce.  They presented him as 
‘the greatest living poet of the English language,’ and the good sir did not even blink”) 
(Rodríguez Feo, Correspondencia, 54).   
 In the fall of 1948, Eliot arrives at Princeton to join the Institute for Advanced 
Studies.  Rodríguez Feo began graduate studies in Spanish literature at Princeton in the 
fall of the previous year.  On October 8, Rodríguez Feo exclaims, in a letter to Wallace 
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Stevens: “Eliot is around but so well disguised that I cannot detect him.  I hope to see him 
soon.  I am anxious to feel his pulse.  Does it beat with the same ‘primaveral’ gusto that 
shines through your adivinations [?]” (135).  The young Cuban thrives on the opportunity 
to make personal contacts with writers and establish lively and extended dialogues with 
them, and we see in his comment to Stevens the nearly romantic admiration the young 
man is capable of feeling for an esteemed author.  This sense of reverent intimacy is 
clearly enhanced by the labor of having translating Eliot’s poem, a “titanic” task of 
rigorous analysis that often becomes an act of identification with the author.      
 Nonetheless, this awe gradually turns to frustration and resentment, as Rodríguez 
Feo later learns how inaccessible Eliot can be.  Though it is clear that he and Eliot 
exchange a few letters, Rodríguez Feo remarks to Lezama in a letter dated October 1948: 
“No he visto a Eliot aún.  Ya está aquí.  Le voy a escribir rogando audiencia.  Veremos.” 
(“I have not seen Eliot yet.  He’s here.  I’m going to write him, and ask for an audience.  
We will see”) (100).  Sarcasm creeps into his remarks; his diction implies that Eliot sees 
himself as a king or a pope.  Soon, Rodríguez Feo decides on a disappointing answer to 
his own question about Eliot’s “gusto”: Eliot is an incurable snob, a repressed intellectual 
fearful of other people and his own emotions.   
 In November of 1948, Rodríguez Feo, unable to see the poet privately, takes 
advantage of a public occasion to inform him of his verdict.  Emboldened by 
drunkenness, he vents his anger and disillusionment upon Eliot at a cocktail party, in a 
“…remark … about his perverse academic attitude toward life.  He would visit his own 
prep school but was not prepared to see anything or anyone that might disturb his 
Olympic serenity” (Secretaries 146).  The regal or papal Eliot now becomes a disdainful 
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god, at a complete remove from ordinary human beings.  One can only speculate how 
Eliot responds to the attack.   
 Rodríguez Feo, in the same letter to Stevens, elaborates a theory about Eliot’s 
inner workings, asserting that the man is full of demonic passions that he meticulously 
represses: “…I suspect that the man is really a devil; he is possessed and has been 
kneeling in his night-shirt ever since he felt the sting of the dart … Like all great men he 
must shorten, and oh how carefully, the leash lest his demon barks at the master” (146).  
What he sees as Eliot’s repressed nature is part of a general pattern he perceives in the 
academic atmosphere of Princeton, which itself magnifies the Puritan component of U.S. 
culture.  The “…expressions on the [Princeton] men of letters’ snouts…” as French 
Catholic poet Pierre Emmanuel discusses suffering and Crucifixion, is another example, 
mentioned in the same letter, of an American cultural puritanism (Secretaries 147).   
 As of October, 1948, Rodríguez Feo is still working on the translation of “Burnt 
Norton” proposed over a year before.  He informs Lezama that he is still waiting to hear 
from Eliot, which implies that he is waiting for the poet’s approval of the translation 
before sending it off to Havana (Rodríguez Feo, Correspondencia, 100).  Rodríguez Feo 
also anticipates publishing a translation of “The Dry Salvages” after completing “Burnt 
Norton” (Correspondencia 102).   After feeling snubbed and subsequently making his 
confrontational remark at the party, Rodríguez Feo likely shelves “Burnt Norton” in 
disgust.  In November, 1948, Eliot is informed that he has won the Nobel Prize for 
Literature, and leaves Princeton.  He accepts the prize on December 10.   
 Rodríguez Feo’s translation of “Burnt Norton” is finally printed in the summer, 
1949 number.  “The Dry Salvages” never appears, though Rodríguez Feo is working on a 
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translation of the poem as of November of 1948 (Correspondencia 104).  In March of 
1949, Lezama asks Rodríguez Feo what has become of his translation, joking: “¿Por qué 
esa pereza, lo mismo cuando estás en país frío o caliente?” (“Why such laziness, which is 
the same whether you are in cold or hot countries?”) (114).  Rodríguez Feo never 
responds to Lezama’s affectionate prodding.  And, though he most likely had plans at the 
outset to publish “Little Gidding,” the last of the Quartets, there is no evidence in his 
correspondence that he ever begins work on a translation.  
 Between his run-in with the poet and the appearance of the translation of “Burnt 
Norton,” there is evidence of Rodríguez Feo’s continued rancor.  Upon hearing the Nobel 
announcement, Rodríguez Feo writes in a snarl to Lezama, “T. S. Eliot se ha embolsado 
$44.000 y el honorífico Premio Nobel.  En seguida se disparó ‘incógnito’ de Princeton, 
pues los sabuesos de la prensa andaban a su caza” (“T. S. Eliot has pocketed $44,000 and 
the honorific Nobel Prize.  Immediately, he shot off incognito from Princeton, as the 
bloodhounds of the press were hunting him down”) (102).  Four months later, he asks 
Wallace Stevens, “Have you seen Mr. Eliot’s pretentious little essay on Kultur” (155), in 
reference to “Notes Towards a Definition of Culture,” which had appeared in 1943 in The 
New English Weekly and the next year in Partisan Review.5  The essay promises an 
ambitious definition, but does not deliver, serving only to voice Eliot’s concerns about 
the disintegration of what he identifies as his culture—aristocratic, Christian and British.  
When he uses the term “Kultur,” it is clear that Rodríguez Feo sniffs out parallels to 
fascism in Eliot’s longing for a national culture rooted in a stable sense of history and 
localized on a particular sacred soil, in his reservations about allowing “achievement” to 
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determine who the society’s elite are, and in his efforts at blurring the distinctions 
between religion and national identity.6   
 It is tempting to draw a causal connection between Rodríguez Feo’s conclusions 
about Eliot’s character and the distorting effects his translations have on Eliot’s poems.  
Nonetheless, this theory does not stand the test of a historical view of the two men’s 
exchanges.  Though he translates “East Coker” at a time before his feelings about Eliot 
have soured, his textual incursions into that text betray the same negative presuppositions 
about Eliot’s philosophical and religious ideas that are found in the translation of “Burnt 
Norton.”   
 Thus, it appears that Rodríguez Feo’s negative comments about Eliot’s 
personality emerge from an underlying feeling about the poet’s work that originates in an 
association with Lezama’s notion of the “futurity” of poetic discourse (Lezama Lima and 
Rodríguez Feo, Desintregración, 61) and Rodríguez Feo’s own operative concept of 
puritanism.7  In relation to these conceptual contexts, Eliot himself and his work come to 
represent a poetics of skepticism and repression.  As we will see, these origenista 
ideologies explain not only Rodríguez Feo’s reactions to Eliot’s behavior, but also 
elucidate the pressures exerted upon Eliot’s poems in Rodríguez Feo’s translations. 
 First, we will read each of Eliot’s poems carefully, in order to appreciate the 
complexity of his poetic, philosophical and religious agendas.  Then we will examine the 
consonances between Eliot’s ideas and the ideas of Cintio Vitier.  Subsequently, we will 
sketch out the conflict between Eliot’s and Lezama’s notions of time and poetic agency.   
Then, we will move to an interpretation of Rodríguez Feo’s translations, in order to 
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illustrate the distortions and simplifications of these agendas that they enact, as they 
mobilize certain key concepts of origenismo that the translator shares with Lezama. 
 
“Burnt Norton” and “East Coker”: Concrete Experience, Liminality, 
Transcendence 
 The fact that the poems “Burnt Norton” and “East Coker” are personal reflections 
is signaled by the titles, each one denominating a place of significance for the poet.  
Knowing the importance of each place contributes to our understanding of each poem’s 
approach to the fundamental theme of time.  Burnt Norton is an English estate where the 
poet had walked in 1935 with Emily Hale, the woman he realized he should have married 
instead of Vivienne Haigh-Wood, the wife from whom he was separated in 1933.  Eliot 
found himself in a morass of regret, and the poem’s expression of longing for the union 
of the past and the present emerges in large part from a feeling of frustrated romantic love 
(Donoghue 2).  “East Coker” is a village in Somerset, England, from which Eliot’s 
ancestors had immigrated to America.  Eliot’s ashes were interred in the parish church 
there.  The themes of cycles and ancestry are underscored by the title. 
 The two poems deal with the same constellation of philosophical problems, which 
revolve around the central issue of subjective experiences of temporality.  Yet, each 
poem has a distinct emotional and experiential perspective on the issues.  As its 
emotional impulse derives from a reflection on mis-steps and lost opportunities, “Burnt 
Norton” sinks more often into regret and despair in the face of linear time.  “East Coker,” 
on the other hand, is inspired by a sense of continuity and repetition.  This sense is 
derived from pondering ancestral linkages and the natural world’s cyclical movements.  
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“East Coker” therefore inflects the despairing vision found in “Burnt Norton” with 
notions of a redemptive temporality.   
 In both poems, human experience is mapped out in a space between two distinct, 
though intersecting dimensions.  The first is the dimension of time-as-progression, which 
is associated with concrete experience, movement, change, limited agency, and restricted 
consciousness of the world.  The second is the dimension of God’s time or eternity, 
which is associated with transcendence, stasis, constancy, power, and total consciousness.  
Human beings do not exclusively inhabit one or the other of these dimensions, but rather 
struggle endlessly with their intermediary position in relation to them.  The poems are not 
“about” eternity or transcendence, just as they are not “about” progression or worldliness.  
Rather, the poems explicate and dramatize moments of relation between these opposites.  
As Jewel Spears Brooker asserts, Eliot “…focuses not on fragments or experiences or 
ideas, but rather on relations between them, on the gaps opened by intersection and 
difference.  Thus, in the Quartets, a focus on betweenness, on what is absent or ‘not 
there,’ causes relation-in-itself to emerge as the most important presence of the sequence” 
(90).  What the poems aspire toward is thus subtle; they work to gradually and 
systematically build up a pattern of interlocking conceptual relationships in the mind of 
the reader.   
 As a result of this emphasis on relation, it is important to recognize the general 
progression by which the Quartets move.  Operating in each poem is a discourse that 
periodically undoes itself, erases what it has inscribed, and returns to originary points of 
development to reinitiate its movements.  The poems systematically frustrate the readerly 
expectation of progressively accruing information or insight.  Instead, they enunciate 
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their authority in such a way that prepares for inevitable disarticulations that occur at 
measured intervals throughout the poems.  At these moments, the poems engage in a 
metapoetic reflection on the inefficacy of intellectual pursuits, the poetic discourse of the 
poems themselves, and communication in general. Eliot interrupts ambitious attempts at 
characterizing subtle spiritual and experiential states with deflating declarations of 
failure.  Language’s polysemy undermines its user’s ambitions, and the very object of 
linguistic communication itself is so dynamic as to make even a perfected poetic 
language hopelessly inadequate.  
 In order to elaborate a language suited to the weighty task of evoking the dualities 
of human existence, and to explore the human longing to break free of the plane of 
worldliness and inhabit the plane of transcendence, Eliot draws from his deep and broad 
immersion in Western mysticisms—The Cloud of Unknowing, St. John of the Cross—and 
in the Eastern strains of religious and philosophical thought with which they are so 
compatible—the teachings of the Buddha, the Bhagavad-Gita, the Upanishads.8  The 
poems echo many of the exhortations made in these varied texts.  Desire is evoked as the 
source of suffering and as a state of enslavement to linear time.  In response, the speaker 
re-enacts the teachings of mystic disciplines of humility, the mastery of bodily desires, 
and the aspiration toward a union with God.  The physical and spiritual selves must enter 
a space of darkness, in which sense and belief are both erased and preparations are made 
for a new and transformative spiritual experience. 
 In teaching these traditions, “Burnt Norton” and “East Coker” also express an 
acceptance of the persistence of desire, of immersion in the fleeting moment, and of the 
aesthetic or sensory orientation to the world.  This acceptance is not a departure from 
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Western or Eastern mysticisms, nor from fundamental Buddhist teachings.  For these 
traditions, the enlightened one does not totally withdraw from concrete experience.  
Instead, after reaching a certain stage of spiritual vision, the enlightened one returns to 
time and the physical world and experiences them in a new way.  After his enlightenment 
under the bodhi tree, the Buddha returns to the world to teach the “Middle Way” to his 
followers.  The mystic in the tradition of St. John must also return.  Rowan Williams 
argues that, for St. John, the mystic makes a transformed return to worldly life after his 
illumination.  Only after the individual comes to feel the presence of God in the night of 
the soul, after he has had what Williams calls “…the sense of being drawn into a central 
magnetic area of obscurity,” (181) can his aesthetic sense subsequently be restored to 
him.  As Williams explains, St. John asserts that the union with God is an experience that 
makes possible a certain kind of return to existence in the world: “…the state of union 
involves a re-conversion to creatures.  If union is a ‘new light on things,’ it is a fresh 
sense of the world as God’s world, of the continuity as well as the discontinuity between 
created and uncreated beauty” (188). 
 The possibility of this return to creation is based upon the continued independence 
of the mystic’s identity, even after the moment of loving union with God.  As we have 
seen, Colin Thompson explains that St. John’s mysticism must be seen as theistic, rather 
than monistic (11-12).  The distinction between God the Beloved and the human lover 
persists, raising the question of how the mystic will continue to exist as a human being in 
the phenomenal world.     
     Eliot’s poems engage this question.  Consonant with this understanding of the 
mystic’s life in the physical world, neither “Burnt Norton” nor “East Coker” announces a 
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permanent transition from a worldly to a spiritual mode of existence, but rather elaborates 
moments in which the transcendent expresses itself through a presence, and linear time 
makes a glimpse of eternity possible.  It is important to recognize that Eliot’s poems are 
not just a set of instructions in the mystic discipline, like St. John of the Cross’s Subida al 
Monte Carmelo.  Nor are they metaphorical evocations of the loving union with God, as 
found in the “Noche oscura.”   Eliot’s evocation of the notion of a mystic union exists in 
a persistent and dynamic relationship to a series of opposing phenomena—sense 
perception, worldly desire, and change.  The mystic does not reach a state of stasis when 
she is enlightened; instead she returns repeatedly to the created world and experiences a 
different encounter with it, because of her enlightenment. 
 Formally, the poems take on a musical shape.  By calling the group of poems 
“quartets,” Eliot signals a number of intentions.  In a specific, technical sense, Eliot aims 
at the interweaving of different themes and an emphasis on the moments of transition 
between passages of great lyrical intensity and ones that are flatly prosaic.9  These 
techniques of counterpoint and transition exteriorize the poems’ conceptual focus on 
liminality, relation and intersection.  Music is a mode of expression, like language, built 
on shared perceptions of relationships.  Further, the musical text, like the poetic text, 
occupies a liminal space between its manifestation as stable and synchronic (as written 
text) and its manifestation as diachronic and changing (as performance).  The true life of 
poetry and music is lived in the space between these two realities.  The musical metaphor 
is thus an apt means for Eliot to emphasize his orientation toward dynamic relationships, 
rather than toward one or another conceptual entity.  
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“Burnt Norton”: Tentative Resolutions  
 Denis Donoghue likens the opening of “Burnt Norton” to “a bewildered seminar” 
(4) that establishes a pessimistic stance toward human existence in time.  It proceeds, 
heavily, discursively, and repetitively, with a discouraging assertion of the idea of 
determinism: 
 Time present and time past 
 Are both perhaps present in time future, 
 And time future contained in time past. 
 If all time is eternally present 
 All time is unredeemable. (1-5) 
Contemplating the idea that the entirety of time is predetermined, static, and present in 
every moment, the individual feels a total loss of agency.  A totalizing perspective on 
time is introduced into the human frame of experience, with the oppressive implication 
that human action in the present cannot alter a static pattern. 
 The personal impetus behind this meditation becomes clear upon further reading.  
The intellectual self that recognizes the inevitability of his situation in time cedes control 
to an emotional self that still wishes to go back in time and alter the course of events, if 
only imaginatively.  Eliot himself, standing in a manorial garden with the woman he truly 
loves but never married, is recognizable in this transition from intellection to longing.  
The speaker moves from a statement of “unredeemable” temporality to a regretful musing 
on “what might have been” (6), a sphere of action that exists “…only in a world of 
speculation” (8).  The speaker follows an imagined invitation to indulge in just this kind 
of rueful “speculation”: 
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 Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden. (11-14) 
The speaker imaginatively returns to the past and enters a rose-garden, the point of access 
into an Edenic “first world” (24).  There, the speaker is beckoned by invisible figures 
who lead him to a dry pool that miraculously “…filled with water out of sunlight/ And 
the lotos rose, quietly, quietly…” (27-8).   
 Here, we find a transition between two similar images—the rose and the lotus.  
The roses, signifying a romantic ideal unrealized, stand at an erotically charged distance 
intersected by the boundary of the door.  Visible through the open door, the roses draw 
the speaker toward a vision of a lotus reaching upward toward the sun.  In Hindu and 
Buddhist traditions, this image evokes the concepts of emerging life and emerging 
wisdom.10  The relationship between the rose and the lotus is crucial, and it highlights a 
broader conceptual relationship that organizes much of the poem.  Romantic desire and 
enlightenment are placed in a sympathetic relationship, the former leading the speaker to 
the threshold of the latter.  Throughout the Quartets, the sensual and the spiritual 
interpenetrate, rather than arranging themselves in a binary opposition or as discrete 
stages in a progression toward enlightenment.   
 In the vision of the lotus, the speaker achieves a pure state of mind and spirit that 
allows for a glimpse of transcendent reality.  Yet, the moment of illumination is brief.  
The speaker is called away from the scene of his vision by a bird, who reveals to him that 
“…human kind/ Cannot bear very much reality” (44-5).  This statement returns to the 
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theme of the poem’s opening—the unity of time in a pattern that transcends progression.  
This is precisely the reality human beings “cannot bear”: the reality of God’s time, of a 
prevailing order that renders their sense of agency illusory.  Desire’s impulse toward 
action is forestalled by this sense of time. 
 The verse that opens the second section creates a jarring transition from the 
prosaic closing of the first.  The lines, after some rhythmic irregularity at the outset, settle 
into iambic tetrameter, with an irregular rhyme scheme.  If the looser verse of the first 
section evoked the action of wandering through an imagined space, the more structured 
verse that opens the second section evokes the way movements resolve themselves into 
broader patterns:  
 The dance along the artery 
 The circulation of the lymph 
 Are figured in the drift of stars 
 Ascend to summer in the tree 
 We move above the moving tree 
 In light upon the figured leaf 
 And hear upon the sodden floor 
 Below, the boarhound and the boar 
 Pursue their pattern as before 
 But reconciled among the stars. (52-61)    
These images evoke movements that order themselves into worldly and celestial patterns.  
The most resonant term in the passage is “reconciled,” suggesting the delicate 
relationship between opposing forces, in this case, of movement and stasis.   
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 The tightly structured lyricism of this opening breaks off, and a wholly different 
kind of discourse picks up the same thematic thread.  This discourse expands on the 
concept of the reconciliation, through the paradigmatic image of the dance.  The 
discourse is one of religious instruction, employing the rhetorical tradition of the via 
negativa; the speaker proposes two opposite ways of characterizing the concept of the 
reconciliation, negating each one in turn: 
 At the still point of the turning world.  Neither flesh nor fleshless; 
 Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, 
 But neither arrest nor movement.  And do not call it fixity, 
 Where past and future are gathered.  Neither movement from nor towards, 
 Neither ascent nor decline… (62-6)  
The dance described is both spatial and temporal.  It is the reconciliation both of change 
and constancy in the physical world, and of the past and the future in the present moment.  
In order to draw the reader toward a meditation on this complex spatial-temporal duality, 
Eliot employs a discourse of philosophical and spiritual instruction designed to challenge 
the listener to supercede limiting conceptions of metaphysical realities.  It is a discourse 
that removes familiar points of reference (“Neither movement from not towards”) and 
rejects binaries (“Neither flesh nor fleshless”) in order to intimate a third space and to 
argue for the recognition of a new set of reference points. 
 In continuing this process of evoking a third space of subtle reconciliation, Eliot 
evokes both Eastern and Western mystic disciplines of transcending worldly desires in 
pursuit of enlightenment, though he pointedly modifies the propositions of those 
disciplines in order to declare the possibility of a synthesis of aesthetics and spirituality: 
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 The inner freedom from the practical desire, 
 The release from action and suffering, release from the inner 
 And the outer compulsion, yet surrounded  
 By a grace of sense, a white light still and moving, 
 Erhebung without motion, concentration 
 Without elimination… (70-5) 
These acts of purifying the soul by eliminating desire, willfulness, and narrow thinking 
are balanced by a crucial opposite—“a grace of sense.”  This opposite ushers in the 
restoration and enlightenment of sensibility rather than its total eradication.  The concept 
of the “grace of sense” is itself a reconciliation, in its suggestion of both God’s grace and 
a human grace, each of which is associated with an aesthetic sense.   
 What is suggested here is a kind of transcendent sensibility, evoked by the image 
of  “white light.”  The fact that this light “surrounds” the abnegative activities of the 
mystic or meditator suggests that it transforms those activities and preserves sensibility as 
a fundamental category for them.  Thus, the speaker characterizes this reconciliation 
between spiritual and aesthetic senses as an elevation (Erhebung) without motion, a 
spiritual infusion into the workings of the aesthetic sense without removing it from its 
sphere of activity in the sensible world.  Further, the roaming of sense is redirected 
toward a metaphysical center (“[c]oncentration”) without sacrificing its multiplicity 
(“[w]ithout elimination”).  The result of these syntheses is a tempering of the extremism 
inherent in spiritual disciplines of abnegation, such that sensory experience is not fully 
rejected in the search for enlightenment. 
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 The preservation of the aesthetic is essentially a spatial phenomenon, concerned 
with the relationship between the sensory apparatus of the human body with its physical 
surroundings.  This spatial phenomenon is connected, as we have asserted before, to a 
temporal counterpart, an evocation of which closes the second section of “Burnt Norton.”  
The closing states what many spiritual disciplines assert—that only a transcendence of 
time-as-progression allows us to glimpse the static totality of time: “Time past and time 
future/ Allow but a little consciousness./ To be conscious is not to be in time” (83-4).  
Subjection to linear time is seen as a profound impediment to a more total consciousness.  
The speaker, following the rhetorical pattern we have seen above, calls forth this 
problematic in order to revise it, proposing the union of opposites: 
 But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden, 
 The moment in the arbour where the rain beat, 
 The moment in the draughty church at smokefall 
 Be remembered; involved with past and future. 
 Only through time time is conquered. (86-90) 
The speaker proposes memory as a reconciliation between time and eternity.  The 
moment of remembrance is dependent upon progression, yet enacts a temporal unity.   
Only one immersed in the flow of time-as-progression can subsequently experience the 
moment of synchronicity, when the past is relived. 
 In the third section, the speaker assumes a darker and less gentle tone.  
Suggestions of luminous intersections of worldliness and transcendence, of time and 
memory, give way to the vivid depiction of a scene of human mediocrity and ignorance.  
This scene is characteristic of the spiritually vacant modernity often encountered in 
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Eliot’s work.  “Men and bits of paper” blow through the scene, “…whirled by the cold 
wind” (104) that blows through “…London,/ Hampstead and Clerkenwell, Campden and 
Putney,/Highgate, Primrose and Ludgate” (110-12).  The speaker continues the technique 
of the via negativa employed previously in the poem, though he inverts its function.  He 
asserts that the modern person occupies a space of “dim light” (92) between the radiance 
of aesthetic sense and the darkness of spiritual purity: “ …neither daylight/ Investing 
form with lucid stillness…/ Nor darkness to purify the soul…/ Neither plenitude nor 
vacancy…” (92-9).   
 The speaker’s description of this particular intellectual and spiritual problem 
facilitates a return to mystic discourse, making clear what obstacles are to be overcome in 
pursuit of enlightenment.  Mysticism is implicitly posed as a cure for the ills of 
modernity.  At this moment of distinct transition, the speaker alters his mode of address, 
enunciating commands to the “torpid” (109) modern persons he describes: 
 Descend lower, descend only 
 Into the world of perpetual solitude, 
 World not world, but that which is not world, 
 Internal darkness, deprivation 
 And destitution of all property, 
 Desiccation of the world of sense, 
 Evacuation of the world of fancy 
 Inoperancy of the world of spirit (114-21) 
The heavy, repeated “d” sounds thud with the weight of a forceful pronouncement: one 
who is dissolute, distracted, and able to appreciate neither beauty nor piety, must begin 
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by following, step by excruciating step, the mystic regimen of mortification.  At this 
stage, there is no room for “grace of sense.”   
 The discrete stages of abnegation the speaker of Eliot’s poem describes follow 
precisely the stages of spiritual progress St. John of the Cross describes in Subida al 
Monte Carmelo.  At the earliest stage, the night of the senses, the practitioner rejects the 
objects of his bodily appetites, along with false goals of worldly success (Book 1 Chapter 
4).  Similarly, Eliot’s speaker calls for “destitution” and “desiccation of … sense.”  At the 
second stage in St. John’s progression, the practitioner enters into a night of the spirit, 
where he loses not only his physical comforts, but also his image of God and even his 
faith itself.  Because they are imperfect, this image and this faith are also obliterated, so 
that the practitioner can feel the absence of God, thereby experiencing the sense of total 
abandonment felt by Christ on the Cross (2.7).  Appropriately, the speaker of “Burnt 
Norton” calls for the “[i]noperancy of the world of spirit.”  It is in this state of total loss 
that the soul is prepared for the third night of the soul, the moment of union with God.  
The speaker closes the third section of the poem by asserting that the individual who 
practices this discipline will arrive at a state of stillness that is, by implication, an escape 
from linear time.  This implication arises from the contrast between the mystic 
practitioner and the modern world, which “…moves/ In appetency, on its metalled ways/ 
Of time past and time future” (124-6).   
 Thus, the speaker asserts the need for the modern subject to arrive at a state of 
total stillness outside of time.  As we have seen above, the speaker declares the 
possibility of living in an awareness of the interpenetrations of stillness and movement, 
progression and eternity.  This moment in the discourse is more extreme.  Yet, the 
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reconciliation of the worldly and the spiritual is only possible after the distractions of 
modern life are thoroughly discarded and the individual experiences the mystic darkness.  
Only then can there be a return, wherein the physical world is seen again, but through the 
eyes of one enlightened by a spiritual discipline.  
 The fourth section of the poem calls forth the possibility, in an interrogative 
mode, of just this moment of restoration of sense after the movement into darkness.  This 
restoration perhaps can occur within a new sphere of existence that has been cleansed and 
enlightened by the mystic experience.  The speaker makes a brief, tentative description of 
the moment of transcendence through a contemplation of the natural world.  
Appropriately, this moment comes at dusk, the intermediary point between the light of 
the visual sense and the darkness of the spiritual sense.  The speaker asks if, at this 
moment, nature will become animated, and reach toward us for a moment of contact: 
 Will the sunflower turn to us, will the clematis 
 Stray down, bend to us; tendril and spray 
 Clutch and cling? 
 Chill 
 Fingers of yew be curled 
 Down on us? … (129-34)  
The speaker suggests that the sunflower might turn to the enlightened viewer of the scene 
because the light of divine wisdom makes her metaphorically like the sun.  Yet the 
clematis and the branches of the yew approach the viewers with a threatening 
desperation, and it is unclear if the embrace suggested between plant and human is 
affectionate or violent.  Though an enlightened engagement with the physical world is 
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posited, nature still possesses a vaguely threatening quality.  This ambiguity recalls the 
moment, in St. John’s “La noche oscura,” when God’s “serene hand” “wound[s]” the 
neck of the mystic lover.  The elusiveness of Eliot’s imagery resonates with the deictic 
function of St. John’s contradiction, pointing to a spiritual reality beyond words.  The 
surface of the language bristles with this discursive tension.      
 This tension finds an oblique, yet sublime suggestion of a resolution, in an image 
of light, movement and stillness: “…After the kingfisher’s wing/ Has answered light to 
light, and is silent, the light is still/ At the still point of the turning world” (134-6).  The 
flight of the kingfisher recapitulates the dance of section two: a movement resolved into 
stillness.  The wing of the bird is invested with a peculiar agency.  It does not simply 
reflect light, but answers it.  Further, its response is what implicitly allows the moment of 
stillness to take place.  Thus, the physical entity is invested with a similar level of 
importance as the image of sunlight, with its symbolism of truth and life-origins.  Again, 
the movement of signification reconciles opposites; motion enables stillness, and the 
visible frames an awareness of the metaphysical. 
 The final section of the poem contains an ambivalence of tone and argument that 
comes to shade the poem as a whole.  The speaker is uncertain about the power of words 
to precisely communicate essences:  
                 …Words strain, 
  Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
  Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
 Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,  
 Will not stay still.  (149-53) 
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This lament raises a problem that exemplifies the philosophical paradoxes the speaker 
engages throughout the poem.  Words, though they are implored to stay still, are in a 
constant dance of signification.  This frustration with polysemy is driven by the clarity of 
the speaker’s vision, and by the urgency of his efforts to communicate that vision to the 
listener.  Though the speaker has enacted delicate reconciliations of just these kinds of 
tensions—as in the workings of the “grace of sense,” the dance, and the kingfisher’s 
wing—he is not sure what to make of a similar tension within the verbal medium he has 
attempted to use to communicate those reconciliations.   
 Careful readers might find the answer to the speaker’s concerns earlier in the 
section: “…Only by the form, the pattern,/ Can words or music reach/ The stillness…” 
(140-2).  This statement is a direct assertion of the importance of the poet’s art.  The 
formal coherence of the text is the means by which the play of signification is controlled.  
Repetitions, metrical patterns, and structural affinities to music all act to organize the 
instabilities of meaning into larger coherences.  Yet, this beautiful statement is followed 
by the uncertainty seen above, reminding us of the poem’s darker, unsettled tonal 
undercurrent that flows from an emotional core of regret and frustration. 
 The duality of careful reconciliation of opposites and despairing 
acknowledgments of chaos closes the poem.  The speaker posits love as a fruitful 
intermediary between the extremes of desire and disinterest, movement and stillness:  
 Desire itself is movement 
 Not in itself desirable; 
 Love is itself unmoving, 
 Only the cause and end of movement… (161-4) 
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The evocation of love—as human desire infused with aspirations toward the divine—
would be a consummate note on which to close the poem.  It would present the highest of 
the forms of metaphysical synthesis the poem suggests.   
 But, nonetheless, the speaker breaks off his discourse on a profoundly ambivalent 
note.  The sound of children playing emerges, synaesthetized in the image of a shaft of 
sunlight, and embodying the duality of the fleeting moment and the glimpse of a richly 
patterned transcendent reality.  In response, the speaker implores the reader to look 
quickly before missing this intimation of the eternal: “Quick now, here, now, always” 
(173).  His haste is driven by a knowledge of the impermanence of any human contact 
with the divine; he urges us to look carefully, for what is “always here” is not always 
visible.  Though the “children in the foliage” (172) rehearse the dance that reconciles 
time with eternity, the speaker cannot simply appreciate the beauty of the moment.  The 
aforementioned emotional core of the poem draws his mind back to despair, as he 
exclaims, “Ridiculous the waste sad time/ Stretching before and after” (174-5).  Whereas 
the poem suggests ways in which an existence in the flow of time can still produce 
insights into totalities, its ending is drawn back to the experience of a man who feels he 
has wasted years of his life and cannot recuperate them. 
 
“East Coker”: Abnegation and Redemption 
 “East Coker” follows the same formal template as “Burnt Norton,” with an equal 
number of sections and similar transitions of theme and tone.  Like the earlier poem, it 
opens with a meditation on time from a broad point of view that highlights the static 
patterns that order the flux of progression.  In a further parallel with “Burnt Norton,” its 
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breadth of perspective opens outward from a center in individual subjective experience.  
The speaker muses on the persistent cycles time organizes itself into, yet sees those 
cycles through the lens of his own life: “In my beginning is my end” (1).   
 Yet there is a difference of tone that is perceptible at the outset.  Whereas “Burnt 
Norton” betrays a feeling of regret in the face of time, the opening of “East Coker” takes 
a less emotionally charged view of time, evoking a sense of resignation: 
 Houses live and die: there is a time for building 
 And a time for living and for generation 
 And a time for the wind to break the loosened pane 
 And to shake the wainscot where the field-mouse trots 
 And to shake the tattered arras woven with a silent motto. (9-13) 
This passage is clearly inspired by Ecclesiastes 4, where the author Qoheleth resigns 
himself to the will of the Almighty when he asserts that “There is an appointed time for 
everything …whatever God does will endure forever; there is no adding to it, or taking 
from it” (3:1; 3:14).  Thus, the reader is led to acknowledge that he is not the force behind 
his own actions, and that he is simply playing out a script that has already been written. 
 Qoheleth goes on to express this idea of cosmic determinism in temporal terms, in 
a verse that haunts the whole of “East Coker”: “What now is has already been; what is to 
be, already is; and God restores what would otherwise be displaced” (3:15).  Eliot restates 
and explores Qoheleth’s concept of a temporal determinism within which “God restores.”  
Inspired by this crucial notion of redemption, “East Coker” presents numerous instances 
of resurrection after death or destruction—“new building[s]” and “new fires.”   
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 Thus, the attitude of the speaker toward the fact of cosmic determinism is not 
negative.  The opening is calibrated to express a reconciliation between the speaker and 
the inevitability of his human fate.  This reconciliation has brought peace.  The idea of 
heaven underlies this reconciliation; the speaker is willing to see the cycles of death and 
rebirth without lamenting them because he sees in the progress of his own life the 
inevitability of his own resurrection after death.  Thus, the speaker repeats the assertion: 
“In my beginning is my end” (1, 14).  Resurrection is a possibility that hovers above the 
speaker’s musings on time and death. 
 After repeating his statement of faith, the speaker follows the pattern established 
in “Burnt Norton,” making a transition to the narration of a vision of transcendence.  In 
the preceding poem, this section is narrated in first person plural, whereas in “East 
Coker,” the speaker narrates it in the second person, drawing the reader even closer to the 
scene of the vision:  
      Now the light falls  
 Across the open field, leaving the deep lane  
 Shuttered with branches, dark in the afternoon, 
 Where you lean against a bank while a van passes, 
 And the deep lane insists on the direction 
 Into the village… (14-19) 
Like the moment at dusk at which the vision of “Burnt Norton,” section 4, takes place, 
the afternoon is drawn in vivid contrasts of light and shadow.  These contrasts of light 
and darkness evoke the duality of the visible and the invisible, which itself suggests the 
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interaction of the worldly and the spiritual.  The reader is reminded of the central 
relationship between sensory light and spiritual darkness.  
 The speaker continues to address the reader, informing him of the possibility of 
the vision of a past reanimated in the present: 
    In that open field, 
 If you do not come too close, if you do not come too close, 
 On a summer midnight, you can hear the music 
 Of the weak pipe and the little drum 
 And see them dancing around the bonfire 
 The association of man and woman (23-8) 
Whereas the opening of the poem describes cyclical movements of time, the vision in the 
field is of the momentary intersection of past and present.  In keeping with a general 
tendency of the poem, this temporal vision is personal.  The lines that describe the 
dancing “of man and woman” are pieced together from The Boke Named the Governour 
(1530) by Sir Thomas Elyot (1490?-1546), an ancestor of the poet.  Eliot’s rendering 
reads:    
 In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie— 
 A dignified and commodious sacrament. 
 Two and two, necessarye coniunction, 
 Holding eche other by the hand or arm 
 Whiche betokeneth concorde… (29-33) 
Elyot’s text is a discourse on the propriety of certain social activities.  Its condoning of 
dancing and its clearly sexual suggestions as a “sacrament[al]” symbol of matrimony 
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strikes a compromise between the order demanded by a higher authority and the 
disordering movements of the body.  This reconciliation of the political and the corporal 
forms an interesting example of the kind of relationship between conceptual poles that 
forms the thematic backbone of the poem.  Just as it arises from a particular relationship 
between past and present, the vision is in itself expressive of a particular relationship 
between order and chaos.  In this way, the image of “daunsinge” parallels the more 
discursive development of the idea of the dance in both “East Coker” and “Burnt 
Norton.” 
 Further, Eliot quotes directly from the text, preserving its sixteenth-century 
spellings in order to establish the presence of the past in the very substance of poetic 
discourse.  This presence is a joyful one, in which humans and animals celebrate their 
own and the earth’s fecundity.  Furthermore, on a personal level, Eliot preserves those 
spellings to establish an intimacy with his ancestor, and thus place himself in a temporal 
frame in which his predecessors are present in his own act of enunciation.  This is indeed 
a self-empowering gesture on the part of the poet, declaring not only the momentary 
transcendence of linear time, but also an enriching polyvocality of poetic expression 
endorsed by the continuity of ancestry.  This joy contrasts starkly with the depressed 
ruminations on poetic failures in “Burnt Norton.”   
 In the second section, Eliot follows the pattern of “Burnt Norton” and employs an 
iambic tetrameter that settles into a lilting regularity, marked by rhyming couplets and a 
rhyming tercet.  Similar to its precedent, this patterned verse enacts a tone of instruction 
that illustrates cosmic orders.  In this case, though, the speaker does not build up an 
impression of interlocked patterns or “reconciliations,” but rather points to a system of 
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“disturbance[s]” (52).  A warm spell in November, the eruption of thunder, “constellated 
wars” (60) between gods, and the seemingly conflictual movements of stars and 
constellations all resolve themselves into a broader pattern of cataclysms: 
 Comets weep and Leonids fly 
 Hunt the heavens and the plains 
 Whirled in a vortex that shall bring 
 The world to that destructive fire 
 Which burns before the ice-cap reigns.  (63-7) 
Though a darker tone is introduced in these dramatizations, the disaster alluded to is seen 
from a great distance.  The speaker offers the reader a God-like vision of change in the 
universe that simulates the experience of total knowledge and thus total disinterest.   
 Despite the considerable skill with which this totalizing effect is achieved, a 
metapoetic discourse irrupts into the verse, shaking the reader’s sense of the speaker’s 
mastery and interrupting the metrical verse that evidences it.  As in “Burnt Norton,” this 
voice laments the difficulties of the very poetic communication attempted in the poem.  
Referring to the iambic verses immediately preceding, the speaker sighs:  
 That was a way of putting it—not very satisfactory: 
 A periphrastic study in a worn-out poetical fashion, 
 Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle  
 With words and meanings.  The poetry does not matter 
 It was not (to start again) what one had expected. (68-72) 
In contrast to the apparent confidence with which the speaker confronts the juggernaut of 
Time, he takes a dim view here of his own attempts to communicate his hard-won 
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insights into metaphysical questions.  The assertion that “[t]he poetry does not matter,” 
made in the course of a considerably ambitious poetic endeavor, is a monumental act of 
self- deflation.  Noting that, in his descent into pessimism, he is “start[ing]” again,” the 
speaker highlights a negative cyclicality that shadows the redemptive cycles of the poem. 
 This moment of frustration does not immediately resolve into any kind of 
uplifting insight.  Instead, it ushers in, without so much as a pause, an even darker 
meditation on the value of striving for wisdom through experience.  The speaker wonders 
why many thoughtful people place so much stock in the wisdom to be gained in old age.  
The speaker muses that this wisdom is nothing but “the knowledge of dead secrets” (79).  
The wisdom is “dead” because it “…imposes a pattern, and falsifies,/ For the pattern is 
new in every moment” (84-5).  In tension with previous evocations of the stability to be 
found in chaos, the speaker at this moment asserts the primacy of flux in the universe.  
Intellectual attempts at resolving experience into higher orders are rendered perpetually 
obsolete by persistent change.  Human intellectual projects thus are doomed to failure; 
growth, learning, and progress are negated, and there can be no secure transmission of 
knowledge from one generation to the next.  These implications are of no small 
significance to the poet who so carefully illustrates them, dedicated as he has been 
throughout his career to the project of defining the role of tradition in cultural pursuits. 
 The speaker comes to identify the illusion of wisdom with hubris, declaring that 
“The only wisdom we can hope to acquire/ Is the wisdom of humility: humility is 
endless” (97-8).  As Edward Lobb notes, humility can be endless because it opens a space 
for the infinity of God’s grace: “In theological terms, the recognition of our 
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powerlessness enables us to accept grace and transcend our limitations…” (26).  But the 
speaker of “East Coker” asserts that before grace come crucial stages of abnegation.     
 Thus, the assertion of the importance of humility prepares the way for the opening 
of section three, an eloquent play on the classical ubi sunt motif: 
 O dark dark dark.  They all go into the dark, 
 The vacant interstellar spaces, the vacant into the vacant, 
 The captains, merchant bankers, eminent men of letters, 
 The generous patrons of art, the statesmen and the rulers, 
 Distinguished civil servants, chairmen of many committees, 
 Industrial lords and petty contractors, all go into the dark… (101-6) 
The negation of wisdom in section two leads here to a negation of the importance of 
achievement and distinction, in the face of human mortality.   The great leveler, death 
erases distinctions so profoundly that it seems to eradicate, not just the distinction 
between the “lord” and the “contractor,” but even personhood itself: “…we all go with 
them, into the silent funeral,/ Nobody’s funeral, for there is no one to bury” (110-11). 
 This meditation on death is an action of disciplined preparation for the experience 
of mystical union.  The speaker shifts rhetorically to a kind of confessional mode, in 
which he reveals his soul’s aspiration toward “the darkness of God” (113).  This darkness 
is to “come upon” him (112), implying an attitude of resignation and passivity on the part 
of the speaker.  The speaker abdicates the hubris, striving and ambition he critiques 
earlier.   
 The speaker goes on to describe two successive stages in the process of emptying 
the self in preparation for the mystical experience.  The first stage is a sensory 
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displacement, likened to the changing of scenery in a dark theater between acts of a play, 
when “…we know that the hills and the trees, the distant panorama/ And the bold 
imposing façade are all being rolled away…” (116-17).  In this moment, the audience 
member realizes the illusory nature of what he sees, and is drawn into an embrace of 
sensory darkness.   
 The second stage is intellectual:   
  …when an underground train, in the tube, stops too long between stations 
 And the conversation rises and slowly fades into silence 
 And you see behind every face the mental emptiness deepen 
 Leaving only the growing terror of nothing to think about… (118-21) 
When the rhythm of the quotidian is interrupted, a constructive discomfort arises, 
wherein the practical exigencies of life (like arriving at one’s destination on time, or at 
all) are cleared aside and the passenger is forced by his circumstances to enter a 
contemplative state.  The passenger realizes how much of his thinking is tyrannized by 
exigency, and feels terrified by the emptying of his consciousness, leaving a void that is 
to be filled by the contemplation of God.   
 In a marked transition, the speaker shifts to a confessional mode, describing his 
own attempts at the mystic discipline.  What follows is a recapitulation and further 
development of the exhortations to “[d]escend lower” that end section three of “Burnt 
Norton.”  Here, the speaker relates a dialogue in which he instructs his own soul to “…be 
still, and wait without hope/ For hope would be hope for the wrong thing; wait without 
love/ For love would be love of the wrong thing…” (123-25).  The project of abnegation 
is proposed again, in a rhetoric that continues the instructional tone found at different 
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points in the poem: “Wait without thought, for you are not ready for thought” (127).  The 
speaker asserts that once worldly “hope,” “love” and “thought” are abandoned, 
enlightenment is possible.  This mode of instruction is categorical and totalizing; it 
preaches total disengagement. 
 This total darkness is sought because, at the moment of God’s presence, it 
becomes light: “So the darkness shall be the light…” (128).  In a similar inversion, the 
total abnegation of desire, which produces a physical, mental, emotional and spiritual 
stillness, facilitates an enlightened and joyful movement, allying “stillness” with 
“dancing” (128).  The dance, now clearly a central motif in both poems, is obviously 
consonant with their musical form.  But further, it is established in “Burnt Norton” as a 
reconciliation of chaos and stasis, and in section one of “East Coker” as a celebration of 
the living body.  The image of the dance in section three of “East Coker” brings these two 
meanings together.  Through its duality of stillness and movement, dancing here 
embodies an exquisite interrelation between abnegation and desire, and between the body 
and the spirit.  Though, like the “light” of the same line, the image of the dance seems to 
replace a spiritually imperfect state with a perfect one, it is still marked by intratextual 
associations with the dynamic and the corporal. 
 This ambiguity, which encapsulates the conceptual content of the Four Quartets 
as a whole, is dramatized and elaborated in the highly aestheticized images that follow.  
As we will see, the images represent a temporary departure from the speaker’s avowal of 
the mystic discipline, though this departure ends up validating that discipline: 
 Whisper of running streams, and winter lightning. 
 The wild thyme unseen and the wild strawberry, 
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 The laughter in the garden, echoed ecstasy 
 Not lost, but requiring, pointing to the agony 
 Of death and birth. (129-33) 
Here, the speaker returns to a scene like the rose garden of “Burnt Norton.”  The 
“laughter in the garden, echoed ecstasy” takes up the drama that instigates “Burnt 
Norton”: a romantic/erotic desire thwarted long ago, yet not quite “lost,” as it is relived 
by the speaker in the present.  The natural environment around him speaks of elusiveness, 
full as it is of “whisper[s],” the fleeting illuminations of “winter lightning,” and what is 
“unseen.”  Yet, like the echo, these natural elements are still present.  Though the 
“echoed ecstasy” hints at a moment of synchronicity, its basic function is indication.  A 
recognition of “the agony/ Of death and birth,” of the suffering of an existence in time is 
the insight that the reliving of a lost desire facilitates. 
 The desolation that this insight into “agony” produces leads back to a statement of 
the mystical project.  The moment among the thyme and the strawberries is contained 
within this larger mystic discourse, and serves a subservient function.  Its role is to 
strengthen the argument for disciplined desolation by illustrating the impermanence of 
moments of aesthetic ecstasy.  The pain of life-in-time is inevitable, even though there 
might be glimpses of beauty, so one must engage in a process whereby that pain can be 
superceded.  
 Thus, the speaker returns to a scene of mystical instruction, warning the reader 
that he will repeat himself (133-35).  Not only does he do so, but he also repeats the 
words of St. John of the Cross, in what amounts to a near-translation of the Spanish 
mystic’s introductory verses to Subida al Monte Carmelo.11  The speaker intones:  
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 In order to arrive at what you do not know 
      You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance. 
 In order to possess what you do not possess 
      You must go by the way of dispossession, 
 In order to arrive at what you are not 
      You must go through the way in which you are not.  (138-43) 
Eliot echoes St. John’s use of negation and paradox to stimulate the mind to challenge its 
limits.  As we have seen before, the speaker describes the mystical process 
confessionally, but what stands out here, and is more dominant throughout the poem, is 
an instructional mode of address.   
 At section four, Eliot executes another of the contrasting transitions that are 
central to his technique.  Like section four of “Burnt Norton,” there is a shift to a shorter, 
eight syllable line.  In this case, the line is more uniformly iambic.  Musically, the entire 
section is graceless and droning, characteristics that are consonant with its preachy, 
aphoristic tone.  These qualities contrast with the delicate lyricism of the equivalent 
section in “Burnt Norton.”   
 The speaker lectures his audience on the inevitability of death, asserting that its 
arrival is to be welcomed, because such is the only release from the “sickness” of our 
worldly existence.  He employs the paradox again, in order to challenge the audience to 
alter its view on the nature of life: 
 Our only health is the disease 
 If we obey the dying nurse 
 Whose constant care is not to please 
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 But to remind of our, and Adam’s curse, 
 And that, to be restored, our sickness must grow worse. (152-56) 
The role of the “dying nurse” and that of the speaker are the same: not to “please” us but 
to make us look at death head-on and to accept it as our only portal of access to eternity.  
The speaker explicitly builds a message that leads the mind of the audience toward the 
idea of resurrection in the assertion: “If to be warmed, then I must freeze/ And quake in 
frigid purgatorial fires” (164-65), and in a meditation on the meaning of Good Friday 
(167-71).  The section nonetheless maintains a dark and admonishing tone throughout, as 
the moment of resurrection, whether of the soul waiting in Purgatory for the Judgment, or 
of Christ crucified, is left implicit. 
 Section five announces itself as a conclusion, and establishes a more expansively 
reflective feeling, in marked contrast to the didactic severity of its preceding section.  The 
speaker makes a transition from the instructional back to the confessional mode.  The 
lines are longer and unrhymed, though not precisely prosaic.  Instead, they manage a 
balance between the conversational and the exalted.  This is clearly a passage of what 
Eliot himself would call a “greater intensity” (Music 24-25), a fact thrown into relief by 
this punctuated transition.   
 The speaker and the poet are clearly one and the same in section five, a fact made 
clear by the reference to the moment of the poem’s production.  In the closing section, 
central themes are re-engaged and viewed from a perspective enriched by the poetic 
experiences that have accrued during the course of two poems: 
 So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years— 
 Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l’entre deux guerres— 
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 Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt 
 Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
 Because one has only learnt to get the better of words 
 For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which 
 One is no longer disposed to say it…  (172-78) 
The poet returns to the metapoetic reflexivity found in section five of “Burnt Norton” and 
in section two of “East Coker.”  The sense of dissatisfaction returns, and is united with 
the earlier reflection that “…knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies…” (“East Coker” 
84).  Yet, the speaker does not assert a total failure.  Indeed, he acknowledges that he has 
at times “[gotten] the better of words.”  The central problem is change; the assertions the 
speaker would wish to make through poetic language are as fluctuating as his experience 
of a chaotic world.  The acceptance of this fact does not lead to a sense of total despair.  
Instead, the speaker’s dark meditations are enveloped in a qualified and modest 
optimism: “And so each venture/ Is a new beginning…” (178-79).   
 This delicate duality of pessimism and hope runs parallel to another paradoxical 
experience evoked in section five.  The poet, in his struggle to articulate transcendent 
truths, is daunted by “shabby equipment always deteriorating/ … the general mess of 
imprecision of feeling,/ Undisciplined squads of emotion” (180-82).  Even when he 
succeeds, he realizes that what he has found “…has already been discovered/ Once or 
twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope/ To emulate…” (183-85).  Again, 
as in section two of the same poem, the notion of intellectual progress is negated, 
replaced by a model of cyclical losses and recoveries of knowledge.  Yet, the focus of the 
speaker’s argument shifts from goal to process: “But perhaps neither gain nor loss./ For 
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us, there is only the trying…” (188-89).  The speaker avows an ethic that valorizes effort 
and intention over accomplishment, a move that attenuates what might sound to some 
readers like an overall tone of abject despair.   
 The poem closes with a restatement of the idea of stillness and movement 
reconciled.  Here, stillness suggests a firmness of spiritual purpose, an unwavering 
commitment to the project of enlightenment.  Movement is, of course, part of this 
stillness; it is the constant striving for union with the divine that is the substance of this 
commitment:  
 We must be still and still moving 
 Into another intensity 
 For a further union, a deeper communion 
 Through the dark cold and the empty desolation, 
 The wave cry, the wind cry, the vast waters 
 Of the petrel and the porpoise. In my end is my beginning. (204-09) 
The union, though it may occur at privileged moments, is never perfect nor permanent.  
The speaker thus asserts the need to perpetually seek “a further union, a deeper 
communion.”   
 The darkness of despair is central to this passage poetically, elaborated with the 
musical repetitions of “wave cry” and “wind cry” and the concrete images of “the petrel 
and the porpoise.”  This is so because darkness is central to the poem as a whole.  But it 
is important to note that this zone of “desolation” is a space to be moved through.  This 
distinction in the closing of the poem forces a re-evaluation of the gloomier moments in 
“East Coker,” as well as in the Quartets in general.  The essence of the poem’s darkness 
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is redemptive, because it is understood, through a mystic perspective, to be a zone of 
transit toward enlightenment.  The poem’s final declaration underlines this essential 
optimism.  After a pause of thought, manifested in a tab space in the final line, the 
speaker gathers together the poem’s disparate threads of cyclicality and duality, layered 
with intellectual and spiritual confidence: “In my end is my beginning.” 
 
“East Coker” and “Burnt Norton” in the Context of Orígenes 
 Having developed a working understanding of the thematics and the mechanics of 
Eliot’s poems, it is possible now to begin the process of contextualizing them within 
Orígenes by elucidating some of the consonances and dissonances they produce when 
they interact with different aspects of the Cuban journal’s aesthetics and ethos.  At this 
stage, we will leave translation aside as a factor in these interactions, in order to sketch 
the broader outlines of this intertextual interaction.  Subsequently, we can examine the 
specific means by which the translation betrays Rodríguez Feo’s particular take on this 
interaction.  As we will see, he will function as both the medium and the mediator, 
simultaneously transferring the poem from one contextual sphere to another and 
interpreting the implications of that transfer.  Both of these functions leave concrete 
textual traces in the translations. 
 Looking at the two poems from a distant perspective, it is obvious how they are 
incorporable into the philosophical discourses coordinated within Orígenes.  The journal 
explicitly states an interest in tackling the same fundamental issues taken up in the 
Quartets.  Eliot’s poems are ambitious statements of the problematics of human existence 
in relation to the physical and metaphysical spheres.  In this sense, they work in 
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conjunction with the journal’s humanistic and religious agendas.  Orígenes favors 
meditative work that interrogates the breadth of human experience.  The journal asserts 
that art of all kinds should present an image of experiences of great intensity, wherein 
“…man shows his tension, his fever, his most guarded and valuable moments…” (“…el 
hombre muestra su tensión, su fiebre, sus momentos más vigilados y valiosos…”) 
(Lezama and Rodríguez Feo, 1944, 5).  In Eliot’s poems, meditations on the nature of 
time, love and transcendence in relation to feelings of frustrated romance or of 
empowering connectedness to ancestors seem to respond directly to Lezama and 
Rodríguez Feo’s injunction.  This consonance is perceptible, even if Eliot’s poems do not 
reach the degree of intense intimacy Lezama and Rodríguez Feo’s statement demands.   
 It is important to note as well that both Eliot’s poems and the dominant origenista 
aesthetic clear an important space for concrete sense experience in relation to intellectual, 
emotional and spiritual experience.  In their opening statement in the journal, Lezama and 
Rodríguez Feo assert that art should elucidate the dynamic relationship between the 
interiority of the individual and the physical world that surrounds him, underlining “…his 
desires or … his frustration arising from his darkest self, from his reaction or action 
before the solicitations of the exterior world” (“…sus deseos o … su frustación [sic], ya 
partiendo de su yo más oscuro, de su reacción o acción ante las solicitaciones del mundo 
exterior…”) (5).  The bird that leads the speaker of “Burnt Norton” toward a vision of 
transcendence and wisdom, and the “deep lane” that “insists” that the speaker of “East 
Coker” follow a path toward a vision of the fusion of past and present, both represent just 
this kind of external solicitation that directs itself to the “darkest self.”      
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 The poems also work as an extension of the origenistas’ reaction against the 
vanguardia, as they are, within their own context, post-avant-garde texts.  The Quartets 
mark a clear departure from The Waste Land (1922), leaving behind the emphasis on 
fragmentation and formal innovation.  The philosophical discursivity and the formal 
focus on transitions and interrelations in the later poems mark a clear and deliberate 
contrast with their precedent.12  Of course, Orígenes, nearly contemporaneous with the 
Quartets, reacts against a different avant-garde precedent, as we have noted in the first 
chapter of this work.  Yet, the presence of “East Coker” and “Burnt Norton” in the 
journal can be viewed as a gesture of self definition in opposition to a formally 
experimental and less overtly philosophical literary precedent in Cuba. 
 Further, the explicitly religious nature of much of Eliot’s rhetoric, while it would 
have been distasteful to the producers of the vanguardista magazine revista de avance, 
meets no resistance in its encounter with Orígenes.  As we have established, the journal 
situates itself in the multifarious and dynamic Catholic cultural tradition of its context.  
Lezama, Gaztelu, Vitier, and, to a lesser extent, Rodríguez Feo, all evidence not only an 
allegiance to Catholicism as a means of self-definition, but also as a constellation of 
images and discourses that can be manipulated in the development of a personal ethics, 
aesthetics and politics.  Further, origenistas assert a particularly catholic Catholicism, and 
thus the journal is open to the expression of distinct religious experiences.  Barely 
troubled by the issue of blasphemy, the journal provides an established Catholic 
thematics without a predetermined dogma that would restrict divergent opinions.  These 
qualities are nonetheless hardly tested by Eliot’s texts.  The imagery of Eliot’s 
Anglicanism is quite close to Catholicism.  Yet, as we will see, Eliot’s religiosity is more 
 206
consonant with the Catholicism of Cintio Vitier than with the boldly heterodox religiosity 
of Lezama. 
 As we have seen, “East Coker” and “Burnt Norton” posit a complex vision of the 
basic ontological questions it puts forth.  Thus, we must be careful to assert precisely 
what aspect of the discourses constructed in the poems is consonant or dissonant with its 
new Cuban context.  This kind of care is especially necessary when discussing Eliot’s 
purported mysticism, which, as we have seen, is neither a fanatic rejection of physical 
experience nor an intimation of the possibility of dwelling infinitely in a state of 
metaphysical perfection.  Nor is his mysticism an assertion of total passivity in the face of 
concrete exigencies.  The poems enact cyclical movements of abnegation of, and 
enlightened re-engagement with, sensory experience and living-in-time.  As we have 
asserted above, the intent of the poems is not to espouse one or the other clearly defined 
agenda in opposition to another, but rather to suggest the inevitable liminality, the “in-
betweenness” of human experience.  The poems do not resolve into static conceptual 
formations; in the discourse of each of the Quartets, “the detail of the pattern is 
movement.”  Yet, as perceived by Lezama and Rodríguez Feo, Eliot’s mysticism is 
excessively pessimistic and passive.    
 
The Parallels of Eliot and Vitier   
 When examining Eliot’s poems in relation to the work of Cintio Vitier, a number 
of similarities arise.  The delicate and dynamic balance Eliot strikes in the poems—
between the worldly and the transcendent, between the temporal and the eternal, between 
chaos and order, resonates sympathetically with Vitier’s poetics.  In “Poesía Como 
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Fidelidad,” Vitier uses the image of the burning bush to illustrate what he believes is 
poetry’s greatest ontological contribution: a vision of the “interpenetration” of the 
tangible and the numinous, the temporal and the atemporal:  
…las experiencias de la realidad concreta, sin dejar de ser temporales, son al 
mismo tiempo imágenes de lo eterno.  La zarza ardiendo que ve Moisés no es 
mitológica, sino terrenal e inmediata, pero a la vez, en su misma fibra 
incandescente, revela otra cosa.  La revelación o el símbolo utiliza aquí lo real y 
cotidiano … [e]l tiempo y la eternidad, los sucesos de la familia y de la especie, 
las experiencias personales y el drama de la redención, se interpenetran y 
fecundan, en un incesante nacimiento de símbolos trascendentes. (27) 
 
…experiences of concrete reality, without ceasing to be temporal, are at the same 
time images of the eternal.  The burning bush that Moses sees is not mythological, 
but rather earthly and immediate.  But, at the same time, in its very incandescent 
fiber, it reveals something else.  The revelation or the symbol here utilizes the real 
and quotidian … [t]ime and eternity, family events and the events of the species, 
personal experiences and the drama of redemption, all interpenetrate and 
fecundate, in an incessant birth of transcendental symbols. 
It is important to recognize that Vitier asserts the coexistence of the divine and mundane.  
In this kind of world, a particular kind of vision is necessary; if the poet can see like 
Moses sees, she will be witness to the transcendental symbol.   
 Eliot is interested in advocating a similar kind of vision, though he focuses more 
attention on the preparatory disciplines one must exercise in order to be purified for such 
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a vision.  For Eliot, when one has disciplined the senses and the will, one can achieve a 
“grace of sense,” in which there is elevation of the mundane “without motion,” “without 
elimination,” and in which the mind can achieve a “concentration” of the sensible into a 
vision of transcendence (Burnt Norton 73-75).   
 In his essay “Nemosine: Datos para una poética,” Vitier makes an assertion that is 
strikingly similar: “Todo pensamiento poético tiene que partir de la unidad en lo 
heterogéneo, de la síntesis que no anula sino exalta y paradójicamente ilumina la fruición 
de lo múltiple” (“Every mode of poetic thought must depart from the unity in the 
heterogeneous, from the synthesis that does not annul, but rather exalts and paradoxically 
illuminates the fruition of the multiple”) (36).  Both Vitier and Eliot assert the necessity 
of “exaltation” without alteration, affirming the possibility of a transcendent vision that 
does not modify the physical world nor lift off from it into the non-sensory.  Instead, the 
vision occurs in the “very incandescent fiber” of phenomena.   
 Further, Vitier asserts the interpenetration of time and eternity, which is akin to 
Eliot’s reconciliations.  More specifically, both poets reconcile themselves with linear 
time as a means for discovering the eternity that inhabits each instant, like the “lifetime 
burning in every moment” evoked at the end of “East Coker” (194).  The willingness of 
Eliot’s speakers to see temporality as potentially redemptive is a quality advocated by 
Vitier in his essays.  Eliot’s speaker asserts that one must first accept time, and 
subsequently employ memory as a means of “conquer[ing]” it (Burnt Norton 89).  Vitier 
asserts the importance of “being possessed by time” in order to receive an “infusion of its 
generative energy” (“Estar poseído por el tiempo… la infusión de su energía 
generadora”) (Nemosine 31).   
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 Vitier alludes to the classical association of art with memory in his title’s 
reference to the Muse of Memory, mother of all muses.  For him, memory is the faculty 
that facilitates the transposition of experience into poetry (40).  It is a paradoxical faculty, 
in its embodiment of the same kind of reconciliation of opposites that Eliot describes.  
Memory consists of a simultaneous presence and absence that allows access to an 
understanding of “essences” (40).  Eliot presents time as an initial obstacle that can be 
overcome only when it is embraced.  Vitier’s poetry and essays assert that an experience 
of longing and nostalgia in the face of time—clearly a similarly agonistic relationship—
can be transformed into an experience of regeneration when one gives oneself over to the 
inevitability of time-as-progression. 
 Clearly, Eliot and Vitier’s assertions are cognate in terms of philosophical and 
religious content.   But even further, the poets’ attitudes toward the revelations poetry 
makes possible are similar.  As we have established, Vitier is much more modest than 
Lezama in his description of the spiritual powers of the poet.  Vitier describes the 
fundamental stance of the poet as passive and longing.  Poetic labor establishes an 
openness to revelation, but does not enact that revelation.  This attitude is consonant with 
the comportment of the mystic generally, and specifically with the stances of the speakers 
of “Burnt Norton” and “East Coker.”  The profound humility with which the speaker of 
“East Coker” instructs his soul to “…wait without hope/ For hope would be hope for the 
wrong thing…” (123-24) is exemplary of a crucial aspect of Vitier’s concept of poetic 
“fidelity,” an act of “consent” (“consentimiento”), “obedience” (“obediencia”), and 
“acceptance” (“aceptación) (Fidelidad 28).  For both poets, this passivity does not result 
in a disengagement with reality; on the contrary, for Vitier it allows one to be “…in line 
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with reality” (“…en la línea de la realidad”) (Fidelidad 28).  For Eliot, the waiting that 
obliterates “hope,” “love,” and “thought” delivers the mystic to a scene where the 
transcendent illuminates a concrete landscape of “…running streams, and winter 
lightning./ The wild thyme unseen and the wild strawberry…” (“East Coker” 129-30). 
 Finally, Eliot’s metapoetic reflections complement a similar tendency in Vitier’s 
poetry.  Vitier’s work is characterized by its frequent engagements with problematics of 
all kinds, and the difficulties of verbal communication find a particularly prominent place 
in the texture of his poetic reflections.  In “El desposeído,” the speaker feels dispossessed 
of language, just as he feels alienated from the concrete world that surrounds him: “No 
son mías las palabras ni las cosas./ Ellas tienen sus fiestas, sus asuntos/ que a mí no me 
conciernen” (“Neither words nor things are mine./ They have their celebrations, their 
issues/ that do not concern me”) (1-2).  Because it is seen to be essentially exterior to the 
subjectivity of the speaker, language proves frustrating as a means of expressing interior 
states.  Thus, the speakers of Vitier’s poems often reflect on the meaning of their own 
names, grappling with the tension between the exteriority that language confers and the 
intimate reality that it incompletely signifies.  In “Poema,” there is a “longing/ abyss” (“el 
abismo/ anhelante”) (136-37) in the speaker’s name, in which something of the person is 
present, but is still trapped in an exteriority subject to the emptiness of language.  In this 
sense naming bears witness to the absence in language of real presence or real human 
connection. 
 These are similar to the problematics Eliot tackles in “Burnt Norton” and “East 
Coker,” though Eliot takes a different approach.  For the speakers of these poems, 
language is also an alienated externality to be manipulated for the purpose of interior 
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expression, a purpose that is repeatedly frustrated.  Yet the frustration of the speakers is 
less emotionally and existentially profound; they see the effective manipulation of 
language as an accomplishment to be evaluated against a tradition, rather than as a 
measure of intellectual, emotional and spiritual authenticity.  Thus, the speaker of “East 
Coker” describes his rhetoric as “not very satisfactory” (68), and measures it against the 
standard of his predecessors (179-85).  Polysemy’s betrayals are more of a threat to a 
sense of mastery than to a concept of the self.  Yet, this attitude is a reaction to the same 
failure to express profoundly personal ideas that one finds in Vitier’s work.  The 
significance of what Eliot’s speakers long to communicate is equally great.  The impetus 
in Eliot’s poem is the same, though the reaction to failure takes a distinct attitudinal form. 
 
Eliot and Lezama: Incommensurate Histories  
 In contrast to the many points of concurrence between Eliot and Vitier, the 
interaction between Eliot’s poems and the dominant theoretical structure of Orígenes 
established by Lezama is conflictive.  In his essay “Mitos y cansancio clásico,” Lezama 
uses Eliot as a foil for his own assertions about the role of poetic production in relation to 
history.  Though the essay was first published in 1957, a year after the dissolution of the 
journal, its assertions summarize a general dissonance between Eliot’s poetics and 
Lezama’s agenda for Orígenes.  Lezama associates Eliot with a general “historical” 
outlook against which the Cuban poet defines his entire poetics.  According to Lezama, 
Eliot sees time as rigid, and history as an immutable and intimidating edifice that testifies 
to the inadequacy of human agency in the present.  Lezama asserts that Eliot’s thinking is 
determined by his role as literary critic rather than by his imaginative capacities as poet.  
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Lezama introduces this assertion slyly, in a revision of Eliot’s phrase “the mythic 
method” to read “the mythic-critical method” (“el método … mítico-crítico”) (13).  In 
Lezama’s exaggerated depiction, the critic is simply a “glosser” of the tradition (13); his 
attitude in relation to the tradition is passive and submissive.   
 This attitude in turn creates what Lezama calls Eliot’s “pessimistic” and 
“crepuscular” attitude toward the nature of poetic pursuits in the present.  If the poet is 
essentially a crepuscular critic, “…he believes that creation was realized by the ancients, 
and all that is left to the contemporaries is a game of combinations” (“…él cree que la 
creación fue realizada por los antiguos y que a los contemporáneos sólo nos resta el juego 
de las combinatorias”) (13). Lezama, in contrast, is an auroral critic and poet, who 
emphasizes the moment of an image’s coming-into-being, rather than instances of its 
imperfect repetition.  His poetics insists on the limitless potential for poetic creation.  As 
César Salgado asserts, Lezama’s optimism about the possibilities for creation in the 
present is founded on a vision of a creative continuum between antiquity and innovation 
(229).13  Thus, a reverence for the tradition does not justify a despairing passivity.   
 Not only does Lezama disagree with what he sees as Eliot’s sense of division and 
alienation from the creativity of a classical past.  The Cuban poet also differs profoundly 
with what he believes is Eliot’s conception of the ontology of that past.  Seen through the 
lens of Lezama’s poetic historiography, Eliot’s vision of the past is essentially a 
reification of a complex of dynamics.  History is a space in which images are in constant 
interaction.  Out of this imagistic material, Lezama asserts the importance of creating 
new myths, rather than interminably glossing old ones.  Instead of Eliot’s critical method, 
the poet should employ a “fictional” one (12), in which poetic activity is constantly and 
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limitlessly creative.  As we have asserted before, Lezama portrays poetic language as a 
force that intervenes in history, preventing any kind of stability in its meanings.  This 
action is possible because Lezama portrays history not as a conglomeration of facts, but 
rather as a dynamic constellation of image systems.  Thus the way history should be 
divided is according to discrete “eras of the imagination” (“eras imaginarias”), in which a 
certain usage of imagery predominates (14).  Since these image systems are penetrable by 
the artist at any time in history, they are endlessly manipulable, in direct conflict with 
what Lezama sees as Eliot’s servile reverence for history and tradition.   
 In “Mitos y cansancio clásico,” Lezama uses a passage from “East Coker” (182-
89) as evidence of his assertions about Eliot’s attitude toward history.  In this passage, the 
speaker asserts that “…what there is to conquer/ By strength or submission, has already 
been discovered/ Once or twice, or several times…” (182-84).  Lezama makes selective 
and deceptive use of Eliot’s poem, the complexity of which we have been at pains to 
illustrate in this study.  The speaker’s statement of defeat in the face of an imposing 
tradition must be seen, not as an isolated declaration, but rather as a stage in the 
development of a discourse of liminality between time-as-destruction and time-as-
redemption, between defeated human agency and the assertion that “[i]n my end is my 
beginning” (“East Coker,” 209).   
 Furthermore, in “East Coker,” the attitude toward tradition itself is not nearly as 
simple as Lezama makes it appear.  We need only remember the speaker’s bitter 
questioning of “the knowledge of dead secrets” bequeathed to him by hebetudinous 
predecessors (73-83), to realize that the speaker is engaged in an intellectual movement 
of oscillation between distinct notions of tradition.  This speaker, like Lezama, believes 
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that the present changes “the pattern” of the past that our notions of history try to 
maintain: “The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies,/ For the pattern is new in 
every moment” (84-85).  
 Lezama’s agenda in “Mitos” is the advancement of his own vision of the relations 
between poetics and history, rather than a careful reading of Eliot’s poetry.  His use of the 
North American poet’s work is shaped by this agenda.  Eliot is available to Lezama as a 
poetic foil, for two essential reasons.  First, the general thematics of Eliot’s poetry and 
prose, with its emphasis on the question of tradition, has lead many readers to see only 
the nostalgia for an orderly society rooted in a restrictive reliance on the past that one 
finds in such essays as After Strange Gods and “Notes Toward a Definition of Culture.”  
Second, the pessimistic metapoetic reflections in “East Coker,” which are “at hand” 
because of the poem’s appearance in Orígenes, support the vision of a crepuscular poetics 
Lezama outlines in contrast to his own poetics.   
 César Salgado suggests that Lezama specifically reacts against the later Eliot, 
whereas he greatly respected the younger poet of The Waste Land.  Salgado asserts that 
Lezama saw this older Eliot as an “. . .ultra-orthodox Anglican of quasi-inquisitorial 
aesthetic intolerances” (“. . .el anglicano ultra-ortodoxo de intolerancias estéticas quasi-
inquisitoriales”) (229).  Of course, this study seeks to develop a more complex vision of 
Eliot, based on a reading of the concept of liminality in “Burnt Norton” and “East 
Coker.”  Methodologically, we have resisted Lezama’s use of a generalization about the 
poet’s world-vision in our readings of the complexity of the Quartets.  Nonetheless, 
Salgado’s assertion is important.  It suggests, as we attempt to illustrate here, the 
operativeness of a generalized vision of Eliot the person in Lezama’s approach to the 
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poems.  When Salgado, in paraphrasing Lezama, asserts that “East Coker” represents a 
“quietist” perspective (229), he touches on the question of mysticism, which is precisely 
the discursive node that concerns this study.  Eliot’s use of mystic ideas in the Quartets is 
for Lezama evidence of an agenda of total annihilation of the individual will in the 
exercise of contemplating God.      
 
“East Coker” and “Burnt Norton” in Spanish: Translation as Caricature 
 As we will see, the conceptual foundation for Lezama’s selective use of Eliot is of 
great consequence, because it proves to be operative in the interpretation that Rodríguez 
Feo mobilizes in his translations for Orígenes.  Rodríguez Feo’s translations of Eliot’s 
poems break down the liminality, relationality and “in-betweenness” that structure the 
originals.  The translations undermine many of the poet’s attempts to enact and illustrate 
delicate reconciliations between time-as-progression and time-as-unity, between order 
and chaos, and between the experience of the body and the abnegation of that experience 
for the purposes of spiritual elevation.  As a result, the poems, as presented in Orígenes, 
seem to make more categorical judgments that affirm or negate one or the other pole of 
what is a carefully balanced duality in the originals.  Rather than mapping out a fruitfully 
ambiguous space between opposites, the translations make categorical affirmations or 
negations of one or the other element in the duality.  In doing so, Rodríguez Feo 
generally does not introduce new elements, but rather enacts emphases and obfuscations 
that disturb the conceptual balance of the poems.14
 These multiple shifts of emphasis from the liminal space to the space of clear 
affirmation or rejection occur in four of the poem’s thematic areas: time, death, order, 
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and abnegation.   The redemptive interpenetrations of time-as-progression and 
synchronicity in the poems are obscured, suggesting an attitude in which time is seen as a 
rigid and alienating linearity.  Since this image of Eliot’s work is operative in Rodríguez 
Feo’s mind, it is not surprising to observe that the translations fabricate a fearful attitude 
toward death.  A negative view of temporality and a fear of death are intertwined in this 
conceptual distortion.  Also, the speakers’ assertion of a broader order to be found in the 
chaos and multiplicity of the phenomenal world is suppressed in the translations.  As a 
result, the translations express a negative view of physical existence.  If orderliness is not 
to be found in the physical world, then a more total rejection of that world is thus upheld.  
This implication is supported by moments in which the translations portray the speakers 
as recoiling from the concrete world and seeking to break free into a realm of pure spirit.  
All of these distorted images will become clear as we analyze the recurring translational 
interventions to be found in Rodríguez Feo’s renderings. 
 Many of Rodríguez Feo’s manipulations of Eliot’s poems bear a distinct 
relationship to Lezama’s characterization of Eliot in “Mitos y cansancio clásico.”  
Reading the translations, it appears that Rodríguez Feo has put Lezama’s critique of 
Eliot’s ideas about temporality and the role of the artist into practice in the very act of 
translation.  Yet Lezama’s essay appears after the dissolution of Orígenes, so the 
relationship is not one of cause and effect, where the translator’s reading of Lezama’s 
essay creates a conceptual template for the analysis that goes into the translation.  Instead, 
this consonance of approach to Eliot is illustrative of an underlying perspective on the 
poet’s work that is shared by the two editors.   
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 Both men react to Eliot’s philosophy and religiosity in an exaggerated fashion, 
producing an image of Eliot as a passive person who thoroughly rejects life in the 
concrete world.  In this way, the translations magnify the version of Eliot we are shown at 
the opening of “Burnt Norton,” a man who feels dominated by the passing of time and 
who passively contemplates a love that was never achieved, rather than seeking that love 
and giving action to his desires.  This exaggerated image of Eliot casts a shadow over the 
entirety of Rodríguez Feo’s translations of both poems.  Thus, the operative dynamic in 
Rodríguez translations stems from a coherent system of misinterpretations of Eliot’s 
personality.  These misinterpretations enforce parallel misreadings of the conceptual 
structure of the poems.   
 Within Rodríguez Feo and Lezama’s shared assumptions about Eliot, an operative 
notion of mysticism is at work.  Rodríguez Feo alters the notion of a mystic discipline in 
Eliot’s poems according to an exaggerated sense of the mystic’s withdrawal from the 
world.  A resigned and pessimistic view of concrete phenomena, manifested in passivity, 
repression of the body and its desires, and the surrender of agency, are ascribed to Eliot’s 
speakers.  This occurs because Rodríguez Feo supports Lezama’s essential attitude 
toward the mystic tradition handed down to the Hispanic world through the crucial 
textual node of St. John of the Cross’s writings.   
 As we asserted in the general chapter on Orígenes, Lezama’s celebrations of San 
Juan’s contributions emphasize the mystic’s heterodoxy.  St. John’s use of a discourse of 
the body in religious contemplation and his assertion of individual approaches to the 
divine are attractive to Lezama because they parallel the religiosity undergirding his own 
poetics.  Lezama, in turn, believes that St. John’s heterodoxy must be continued, rather 
 218
than allowed to fossilize.  The moment at which Lezama’s fisherman, surrounded by the 
light of the divine, begins to urinate, is the definitive enunciation of this agenda. 
   As we have seen, Ángel Gaztelu’s elaboration of a sanjuanista poetics of the 
body also engages in this process, though it does so within the context of the priest-poet’s 
more traditional Catholicism.  Lezama, unlike Gaztelu, revises the essential humility and 
passivity prescribed by San Juan’s mystic discipline into a radical affirmation of the 
power of poetry to enact moments of enlightenment and transcendence, rather than 
simply portray the longing and the striving toward those goals.  
 In “Burnt Norton,” two translation acts add extra emphasis to the speaker’s sense 
of entrapment in temporal linearity.  The first is a subtle intervention, the insertion of line 
breaks before and after the speaker’s question: “But to what purpose/ Disturbing the dust 
on a bowl of rose-leaves/ I do not know” (16-18) (“Pero para qué/ Perturbar el polvo 
sobre el bol de pétalos de rosas/ No lo sé”) (16-18).  We must remember that this 
question comes after the speaker feels magnetized toward a return in time to a rose 
garden where a lost romance might be salvaged.  The speaker breaks from this 
wishfulness to express the hopelessness of disturbing the past.  The translation sets this 
statement off, visually emphasizing it, an act consonant with the operative image of Eliot 
and his speakers as passive and regretful in the face of time.  
 At the closing of “East Coker,” the translation eliminates a tab spacing that comes 
before the poem’s last sentence: “In my end is my beginning” (209) (“En mi fin está mi 
principio”) (300).  The translation is semantically faithful to the original, such that the 
concept of redemption through cyclicality is communicated.  Nonetheless, the absence of 
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a space eliminates the visual emphasis on the closing statement.  As a result, the more 
optimistic tone with which the poem ends is muted. 
 A shift in verb tense at the opening of “East Coker” also obscures the implications 
of the vision of the dancers in the field: “The association of man and woman/ In 
daunsinge, signifying matrimonie…” (28-29).  Whereas the original narrates the vision in 
the present tense, making the past vividly present, the translation introduces future and 
conditional tenses.  For “…you can hear the music” (25), the translation gives “…podrás 
escuchar la música” (25) (“…you will be able to hear the music”).  “And see them 
dancing…” (27) becomes “Y los verás danzar…” (27) (“And you will see them dance”).  
In the original, the present tense supports the synchronicity that allows characters 
animated from a sixteenth-century text to physically inhabit a space shared by the speaker 
in the present timeframe of the poem.  In the translation, this synchronicity is deferred 
and made conditional.  The presentness of the past enacted in the poetic discourse of the 
original is thus obscured. 
 This alteration of verb tense is followed by a translation act that further obscures 
the sense of the synchronicity that the vision of the dancers evokes.  Rodríguez Feo 
makes no attempt to replicate the sixteenth-century spellings Eliot uses in his description 
of the dance.  Eliot’s discursive evocation of a notion of the suspension of linear time 
through genealogical memory is thus nearly absent in the translation.  Because of the 
alterations of verb tense and the suppression of the antiquated spellings, readers of the 
Spanish are not given the sense that the dancers are from the past until they reach the line 
that reads: “Mirth of those long since under earth” (38) (“Alegría de aquellos mucho 
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tiempo ha bajo la tierra”) (39), sixteen lines into the description.  This interval marks a 
significant disruption of the sense of an intersection between the past and present.   
 It is clear from a letter to Lezama dated April, 1946, wherein Rodríguez Feo 
instructs Lezama to make corrections to a typed proof of the translation of “East Coker,” 
that the translator is only interested in ascertaining how the English words might be 
brought into contemporary Spanish (35-36).  It is possible that Rodríguez Feo is unaware 
of the passage’s origins in a text penned by one of Eliot’s ancestors.  If he were aware of 
that fact, it seems his attention would be drawn to the constellation of personal and poetic 
significance surrounding Eliot’s recourse to that early text.    
 It is also possible, nonetheless, that Rodríguez Feo is aware of the provenance of 
the “daunsinge” passage, but is simply not interested in conveying its feeling and its 
implications in translation.  Such an attitude seems plausible, as nothing in his own or in 
the general philosophy of Orígenes stresses the idea of ancestry.  Origenismo is a poetic 
ideology of the individual’s creative relationship to national culture on the one hand, and 
to a flexibly defined religious tradition on the other.  To Rodríguez Feo, Eliot’s use of an 
ancestral linkage might seem a snobbish and exclusive attitude, exacerbating the negative 
vision of Eliot’s personality that is already active in the translator’s thinking.  
 As a logical extension of the exaggeration of the sense of linear time’s oppressive 
inevitability, the translations of “Burnt Norton” and “East Coker” introduce a fear of 
death into those poems, where the attitude in the original is more distanced, impartial and 
philosophical.  As we have asserted, the speakers of the original poems do not fear death, 
not only because they operate in an analytical mode that confers a certain degree of 
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distance from the reality, but also because faith in an afterlife informs the poems’ 
conceptual approach.   
 We have established that section four of “East Coker” seeks to impart a wisdom 
that welcomes death as release and deliverance into resurrection.  Employing a discourse 
of paradox, the speaker portrays a hospital as a site wherein disease is a kind of health, 
and death promises restoration.  The speaker expands on this view of death by asserting 
that we are fortunate to “Die of that paternal care/ That will not leave us, but prevents us 
everywhere” (160-61).  The “paternal care” is God’s act of making human beings mortal 
and inflecting life with reminders of mortality.  This care, an ironic inversion of what 
might seem to be neglect, is part of God’s plan.  Eliot carefully chooses the verb 
“prevents” at line 161.  The verb does not just suggest that mortality is a fundamental 
limitation placed on human life.  The etymological meaning of the verb (to come before), 
gives the sense that our mortality precedes us, that it is established in God’s 
determinations before our birth.  Thus the sense of “prevents” is not schematically and 
immediately negative.  Rather than suggest a menace, it upholds a discourse that portrays 
death from a calm philosophical and theological distance.   Rodríguez Feo renders the 
phrase “prevents us” as “nos atormentará” (162) (“will torment us”).  The concept of 
death thus undergoes two alterations.  Most obviously, death becomes a source of 
suffering.  The act of intellection and faith inherent in the positive portrayal of death in 
the original is distorted into an act of fear.  More subtly, the transposition of the verb 
from the present to the future tense (“it will torment us”) is consonant with this assertion 
of a terror of death, as it places the arrival of death in an indeterminate future.  The 
original, in the phrase “prevents us everywhere,” asserts the presence of mortality at 
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every moment of life, a presence that, as we have asserted, gives meaning to life, rather 
than casting a pall over it. 
 This dramatic darkening of the speaker’s attitude toward mortality is predicted in 
a more subtle refraction that occurs in section three of “East Coker.”  In his evocation of 
the ubi sunt motif, Eliot asserts the absolute equality conferred upon all human beings by 
mortality.  Statesmen and laborers alike meet the same fate.  This assertion is bolstered 
by the neutral factuality of the verb “to go”: “They all go into the dark” (101).  This 
movement from life to death is presented in a matter-of-fact tone.  In Rodríguez Feo’s 
translation, “to go” becomes “to fall” (caer): “Todos caen en la oscuridad” (102).  The 
resulting negative shading portrays death as a defeat, rather than something accepted 
calmly.  In the translation, death is suggested to be something one must be careful to 
avoid, for its arrival is a menacing prospect.  Furthermore, as the event of death becomes 
a fall, the afterlife becomes an abyss.  The image of falling into darkness suggests the 
uncertainty of any kind of arrival.  Again, the translation obscures the idea of resurrection 
that supports the notion that time and death can be redemptive. 
 In addition to the effects that the translations have on the concepts of temporality 
and mortality, Rodríguez Feo’s rendering of the original poems suppresses the idea of the 
pattern, a concept that provides an overarching structure for both poems.  As we have 
seen in the original poems, the pattern is a reconciliation of change and stasis.  By means 
of an elevation of perspective, chaotic details resolve into broader orders.  Yet, in the 
translations, the patterns are blurred. 
 The most obvious example of this blurring is the inconsistency with which 
Rodríguez Feo translates the word “pattern.”  At line 142 of “Burnt Norton,” he translates 
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it as “el diseño” (“design”), a decent representation of the concept of order.  Yet, in three 
other instances, “pattern” is translated as “forma” (“form”) (“East Coker” 85, 86 and 192; 
“Burnt Norton” 60).  “Form” is an inadequate replacement for “pattern,” as it does not 
denote the coordination of disparate specifics in the same way.  The interaction of 
opposites in the concept of the pattern—stasis and movement, order and chaos—is not 
carried over in the translation.   
 An example of this problem comes in section two of “Burnt Norton.”  In the 
tightly structured verse that opens this poem, the speaker describes how “…the 
boarhound and the boar/ Pursue their pattern as before…” (59-60).  Though the two 
animals are in movement, their movements reinforce nature’s unchanging pattern of 
predation.  Yet, when “their pattern” becomes “sus formas” (60), the sense of a resolution 
of change into constancy is lost.  The animals are simply pursuing shapes. 
 In this same passage, the breakdown of the notion of the pattern is also obscured 
in the translation of the term “boarhound.”  The phrase “the boarhound and the boar” 
underlines the unchanging relationship between the two animals in the repetition that the 
naming of those animals enacts.  The line break Eliot places after “the boar” creates a 
slight pause that heightens the musical effect of the repetition.  The translation does not 
provide the same sense of symmetry.  The boarhound is rendered simply as “perro,” or 
“dog” (59).  The translation portrays the basic action denoted in the line, but 
communicates little of its resonances with the original’s theme of the pattern.  This 
distortion does not arise from a linguistic incommensurability.  Since “boarhound” could 
be translated as “perro de jabalí,” “jabalí” could be repeated in a fashion similar to the 
original. 
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 Focusing our attention on this same passage, we notice an example of a crucial 
element in the translations’ suppression of the notion of the pattern.  Whereas we have 
noted the carefully gauged rhythm and rhyme of the opening of section two of “Burnt 
Norton,” the translation does not attempt to recreate those qualities.  Because of the 
differing rhythmic tendencies of English and Spanish, Rodríguez Feo would have to 
make some semantic and syntactic alterations in order to give a sense of Eliot’s iambic 
tetrameter.  Further alterations would be necessary to replicate Eliot’s rhyming couplets 
in this section.  Yet, as we have seen, Rodríguez Feo focuses on the transfer of content 
over form.  This is true throughout both translations, and is particularly noticeable in the 
second section of each poem. 
 Rodríguez Feo’s decision is understandable, though it has a discernible effect on 
the original that happens to be consonant with the underlying system of biases that has 
created other distortions.  The absence of a sense of Eliot’s musical devices has an effect 
on the communication of the two fundamental conceptual effects the poet hopes to 
achieve.  First, Eliot’s musical structures give support to the concept of pattern explored 
in the poems themselves.  The diachronic nature of the discourse is balanced by 
synchronic features, and the poems derive coherence from the musical pattern of 
transitions and relationships.  Second, these transitions and relationships mirror the 
concept of relationality or “betweenness” that is also so central to the poems.  Eliot’s 
assertion, in “The Music of Poetry,” of the importance of the moments of transition 
between the prosaic and the lyrical illustrates the importance of this concept of 
relationality.  Emphasizing the transition, Eliot elevates liminality.  Liminality is both a 
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“thing” that can be identified as a structuring element in the poems and a relationship 
between things.  This duality is a crucial element in the poems’ conceptual schema. 
 The final thematic point that Rodríguez Feo’s translations center on is the notion 
of abnegation.  As we have seen, the speakers of both poems rehearse a mystic discipline 
that involves the rejection of sense experience and of limited conceptions of the divine, in 
order to arrive at a zone of darkness that allows for the light of God to become visible.  
There is no doubt that Eliot’s interpretation of this tradition is sympathetic; his speakers 
clearly affirm a belief in their value.  Yet, as we have asserted, the poems are not meant 
as total rejections of the life of the senses.  Instead, spiritual enlightenment is seen as 
breaking away from concrete experience, only to return the practitioner to the physical 
realm with an altered consciousness and a vision of the illumination of the worldly by the 
transcendent.  This return allows for a “grace of sense” surrounding the mystic darkness 
and emptiness.  This “grace” allows the practitioner to be aware of the interpenetration of 
the worldly and the divine, a state of affairs that does not necessitate the “elimination” of 
one reality in order for the other to be visible. 
 Yet, Rodríguez Feo shows evidence of a schematized view of the mysticism 
Eliot’s poems espouse.  The emphasis in this view is on abnegation.  In section two of 
“Burnt Norton,” the speaker offers a description of the duality of the denial of the body 
and the persistence of the “grace of sense.”  This grace is figured as a “light,” in contrast 
to the darkness of renunciation.  Rodríguez Feo’s translation communicates these 
concepts clearly, though one word choice betrays his slant on Eliot’s mysticism.  Where 
the speaker describes “The release from action and suffering” (71), the translation reads: 
“La huída de la acción y el sufrimiento” (72) (“The flight from action and suffering”).  
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The concept of flight undermines the very notion of abnegation that is active in the 
original, where striving and desire are calmly left behind.  By making the speaker 
espouse a fleeing of action and suffering, the translation paradoxically suggests a 
continued enslavement to action and suffering.  One who flees from life in the world of 
desire is ironically still trapped there.   
 The result of this refraction is a subtle negation of the spiritual nature of 
abnegation.  As flight, abnegation is not enlightening.  Instead, the flight from life in the 
world simply serves to underline the caricatured image of Eliot active in Rodríguez Feo 
and Lezama’s thinking.  Rather than a practitioner of a discipline that allows for both an 
elevation above the concrete world and a transformed return to that world, the image that 
emerges is of a constitutional fear of action and suffering, an unthinking withdrawal and 
passivity that do not facilitate any kind of enlightenment. 
 A final example of this distortion of the mysticism of the two poems comes near 
the end of “East Coker.”  As occurs at the end of “Burnt Norton,” the speaker turns to the 
concept of divine love.  In “Burnt Norton,” it is established that this love is an important 
embodiment of many of the dualities both poems describe: desire and transcendence, 
“movement” (164) and stasis, time and eternity.  Love bridges these dualities, in a 
Christian sense, because it is the human feeling that most closely approximates the 
principle of God.  When experienced fully, it is both desire and an elevation above desire.  
From a Christian perspective, it is the worldly embodiment of the divine.   
 Thus, the human experience of love does not imply the total rejection of the 
worldly.  The speaker of “East Coker” does assert that love alters the human perspective, 
such that “…here and now cease to matter” (201).  This implication of an elevation above 
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the plane of space and time is distorted in the translation where love causes the 
obliteration of that plane: “…el aquí y el ahora dejan de ser” (202) (“…here and now 
cease to be”).  Again, Rodríguez Feo’s translation identifies a concept that is 
demonstrably in the text, though he enacts an exaggeration that upsets the delicate 
dialectical balance Eliot seeks to sustain in the poems.  As a result, rather than the sense 
of an elevation that still allows for a return, or “re-conversion” to the worldly, the 
translation offers the caricatured image of total rejection. 
 In summary, Rodríguez Feo epitomizes the activist, rather than the analytical 
mode of translation.  His “independence” is not “…pursued for the sake of the original in 
order to reproduce it as a living work” (Bassnett-McGuire 82).  Instead, it is pursued 
toward a definite cultural agenda.  This agenda is essentially oppositional; Eliot’s texts 
are processed for incorporation into the context of Orígenes in order to highlight a set of 
contrasts between the North American’s poetics and the poetics of the magazine.  As we 
have seen, this agenda flattens out the variegations in Eliot’s poetic response to mystic 
traditions in order to present an image of the poet and of his work that stands opposite to 
the dominant response to the relationship between origenismo and the mysticism of St. 
John of the Cross.  As we have seen, Cintio Vitier’s work is the exception to this general 




 Taking a step back from the series of textual interactions we have described in 
this chapter, we see a number of incompatibilities Rodríguez Feo and Lezama perceive, 
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and subsequently highlight, through translation and critique.  Eliot’s work inevitably 
enters into a conflictive relationship with its new context because both editors of the 
journal deploy a jaundiced view of the poet’s personality, which they believe represents a 
particular set of sociological tendencies associated with Anglo-American culture.  In this 
conflicted terrain, one can see through a surface dissonance to a broader impasse of 
cultural interaction.   
 Thus, at the heart of the reactions against Eliot’s poems are a set of distinctions 
between Eliot’s cultural context and the cultural systems Orígenes implicitly works to 
defend and develop.  This cultural system, in accordance with the agonistic relationship 
between Cuba and the U.S., is defined in a differentiation from the Anglo Other.  This 
Other is implicitly materialist, while Latin American Catholic culture is spiritual.  Anglo 
society is organized around the repression of bodily desires and of sense experience in 
favor of a rigid righteousness and an abstract cast of mind that rejects the tangible.  The 
realities of the senses and of desire are thus fearful to the Anglo.  As we have seen, the 
translations of Eliot’s poems illustrate the fact that he stands as a representative of this 
repressive culture in the translator’s thinking.    
 Paradoxically, the nexus for the assertion of Eliot’s grounding in these 
“Protestant” meaning systems is the poet’s use of Spanish Catholic mysticism.  Lezama 
and Rodríguez Feo evidence a distorted sense of the meaning of their own mystic 
Catholic tradition, believing that it involves a complete rejection of the physical world.  
As we have seen, this revisionist project is active at the very earliest stages of the 
Orígenes group’s development.  Eliot’s connection to Spanish mystic doctrines 
paradoxically throws his Anglo-Protestant cultural association into relief, provoking the 
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subtle and multifarious cultural counterpoints embedded in Rodríguez Feo’s translations 
and Lezama’s essay. 
 Rodríguez Feo’s translation responds to and exaggerates the operation of a 
concept of the mystic discipline in “East Coker” and “Burnt Norton.”  Abnegation is, in 
all forms of mysticism, a means for enlightenment, but after that moment of 
enlightenment, the mystic must continue to live in the body.  The return to a worldly 
existence after the moment of enlightenment in Eliot’s poems is based on an 
understanding of the theistic, rather than the monistic basis for St. John’s mysticism.  In 
this understanding, the identity of the mystic is not completely dissolved in the moment 
of union with God.  Remaining distinct from his object of devotion, the mystic must 
continue to live a human life, albeit one illuminated by his encounter with the divine.  
Eliot’s poems explore this challenge. 
Because of the assumptions about mysticism that are present in the earliest 
expressions of origenismo, there is little room in the conceptual context of Orígenes for 
Eliot’s exploration to unfold.   As we have seen, there is no notion of the return or “re-
conversion” in the origenista vision of St. John.  The result is a pressure exerted by the 
incommensurability of Eliot’s and the journal’s religious thinking.  This pressure distorts 
the originals in the ways we have analyzed above. 
 The fact that the response to the idea of abnegation is mobilized by Lezama and 
Rodríguez Feo by the means we have analyzed here shows the importance of asserting a 
certain element of what they see as their Catholic cultural identity—the refusal to 
denigrate the spiritual value of the body and its drives.  This stance toward corporality 
clearly informs Lezama’s poetics, which is infused with the language of sexuality and 
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reproduction.  What we have glimpsed in our analysis of Eliot’s incorporation into 
Orígenes is how active Lezama’s poetics is in Rodríguez Feo’s operations as translator.  
At other moments in this study, it becomes clear where the two editors diverge, 
philosophically and methodologically.  Yet here, the incorporation of Eliot’s poems into 
the journal illustrates a profound and tacit concurrence in the two editors’ thinking.  We 
are brought back to Rodríguez Feo’s comment to Wallace Stevens about St. John of the 
Cross with an increased awareness of its importance.  When the Cuban editor and 
translator asserts that “…St. John of the Cross was not a mystic poet, but was a mystic 
who wrote the most perfect poetry of the Spanish language” (Secretaries 95), he betrays 
his belief that mysticism and poetry are incompatible.  This belief is built on the 
assumption that mysticism is wholly non-sensory, while poetry must be a sensuous, and 
sensual, medium.  
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Notes to Chapter Three   
 
1  Gordon’s two volume biography of Eliot is the most useful, as the author was 
allowed greater access to manuscripts than other biographers.  The excellent collection of 
essays edited by Edward Lobb is the first work to consult on Eliot’s Four Quartets. 
2  The original essay, “The Quartets,” was published in 1947 in a revised and 
expanded edition of the 1935 study The Achievement of T. S. Eliot: An Essay on the 
Nature of Poetry.  It is most likely that Matthiessen, who had been a tutor to Rodríguez 
Feo when the latter was an undergraduate at Harvard, gave him permission to translate 
the essay in 1943, the year Rodríguez Feo graduated.   
 3  “…uno de los críticos de más rigor con que cuenta su país…”  “…constituye 
una verdadera complacencia para los editores de ORÍGENES.” 
4  “Los hombres huecos.  Una monedita para el viejo,” translated by Gastón 
Baquero. 
5  Rodríguez Feo most likely found the essay in Partisan Review, which he read 
quite carefully (see Secretaries of the Moon 45, 84, 152).  The essay was expanded into 
the book-length Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, published in 1948. 
6  In its summer, 1944 issue, Partisan Review publishes responses to Eliot’s essay 
by R. P. Blackmur, Clement Greenberg, William Phillips, and I. A. Richards.  Phillips 
asserts that Eliot’s ideas on religion pave the way for “…some form of clerical fascism” 
(307).  Greenberg takes Eliot’s essay as an opportunity to illustrate the capacity for 
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socialism to solve the ethical and political problems religion and the arts never could 
(305-07).  
7  Lezama also betrays an implicit disdain for cultural “puritanism,” though he is 
not as explicit as Rodríguez Feo on the subject.  Ironically, Lezama chides his younger 
colleague for his interest in the culture of the U.S., encouraging him to return from the 
U.S. to Havana. 
8 Irving Babbitt and Charles Lanman introduced Eliot to Indian religions at 
Harvard (Foster 2).  Stephen Medcalf notes that Eliot, in the period of the composition of 
the Four Quartets, saw Eastern and Western sacred traditions as compatible and equally 
relevant to his poetic projects: “…although in The Waste Land Christianity and 
Hinduism/Buddhism are presented as opposites, which seem to cancel out the possibility 
of belief in either, in his later verse he pursues the light of one without excluding 
illumination from the other” (xi).  Foster notes that Eliot “…went so far as to declare that 
he felt the Buddhist Fire Sermon to be as important as the Sermon on the Mount” (3). 
9 Eliot asserts the “…possibilities for verse which bear some analogy to the 
development of a theme by different groups of instruments; there are possibilities of 
transitions in a poem comparable to the different movements of a symphony or a quartet; 
there are possibilities of contrapuntal arrangement of subject-matter.  It is in a concert-
room, rather than in the opera house, that the germ of a poem may be quickened” (Music 
32). 
10 The lotus is a crucial symbol in Hindu and Buddhist traditions.  It is associated 
with the sun, as it typically emerges from a state of submersion to open in warmth and 
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sunlight, and is used to symbolize the emergence of life and of wisdom.  The lotus is 
found throughout Hindu creation stories, and the Buddha’s birth is symbolized by the 
flower’s emergence.  
11 In the introduction to his instructions on the way to a mystic union with God, 
St. John of the Cross writes:  “Para venir a lo que no sabes,/ has de ir por donde no 
sabes./ Para venir a lo que no gustas,/ has de ir por donde no gustas./ Para venir a lo que 
no posees,/ has de ir por donde no posees./ Para venir a lo que no eres,/ has de ir por 
donde no eres.”  (p. 11)   (To arrive at what you are not,/ you must go through where you 
do not know./ To arrive a what you do not like,/ you must go through where you do not 
like./ To arrive at what you do not possess,/ you must go through where you do not 
possess./ To arrive at what you are not,/ you must go through where you are not.) 
12 For a helpful analysis of the differences between The Waste Land and Four 
Quartets, see Jewel Spears Brooker’s “From The Waste Land to Four Quartets: 
Evolution of a Method.”  
13 In his essay “Ulysses en Paradiso: Joyce, Lezama, Eliot, y el método mítico,” 
Salgado places Lezama’s literary theory and practice (the latter manifested in his novel 
Paradiso) in dialogue with two distinct “mythic methods.”  The first is Joyce’s; as 
Salgado illustrates, Lezama sought to correct the notion that Joyce’s major contribution 
was merely technical.  The Cuban poet drew inspiration from Joyce’s use of mythic 
materials for the construction of an innovative new fiction, and went on to employ his 
own version of Joyce’s methodology in Paradiso, without engaging in facile imitation.  
The second of these methods is Eliot’s “mythic-critical” method, which Lezama uses as a 
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foil for his own and Joyce’s concept of innovation.  Salgado asserts that this notion of 
innovation consists of “…a search, at the same time reminiscent and creative, for 
analogies, correspondences and counterpoints through the literary tradition, history and 
humanity’s mythologies” (“…una búsqueda, reminiscente y creadora a la vez, de 
analogías, correspondencias y contrapuntos a través de la tradición literaria, la historia y 
las mitologías de la humanidad”) (229).   
14 An examination of the published versions of the poems that would have been 
available to Rodríguez Feo rules out the possibility that any of the translator’s incursions 
into the texts simply reflect earlier versions.  For the purposes of this study, the 1943 
edition of Four Quartets has been used. 
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Chapter Four 
Region, Nation, “Internation”: Allen Tate’s “The New Provincialism” in 
Orígenes 
 The translation and publication of Allen Tate’s essay “The New Provincialism” in 
Orígenes creates both conflicts and unexpected consonances between Tate’s and the 
origenistas’ notions of the proper relationship of literary expression to national and 
regional identity.1  As we will see, Tate’s essay is a surprising addition to the Cuban 
journal, as its explicitly political stance and its focus on regional cultural differences find 
odd company in the work of Lezama, Vitier and others.  Orígenes, as a cultural project, is 
broadly defined in resistance to both explicit political critique and subnational divisions 
of cultural identity.  As we have established, the journal approaches political issues from 
a standpoint that values creative work over historical or sociological analysis.  Further, 
we will see that Tate’s use of history as a stable system of meaning in his essay is in 
profound conflict with Lezama’s poetic historiography.   
 Nonetheless, Tate’s essay highlights a lesser strain of thinking in Orígenes that 
considers these issues more concretely.  In our effort to find a sympathetic context for 
Tate’s essay in Orígenes, we will be lead to a consideration of the essays of José 
Rodríguez Feo.  The Cuban author’s critiques of the cultural and ideological effects of 
North American capitalism provide a surprising conceptual support to the incorporation 
of Tate’s essay into Orígenes.  Rodríguez Feo’s methodology itself, with its concrete 
historical analysis and its coordination of economic, political and cultural issues, is 
surprisingly consonant with Tate’s work as well.  In sketching some of these parallels, 
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this aspect of Rodríguez Feo’s work and of Orígenes as a whole, which is not recognized 
in most scholarship on the journal, is brought to the fore.  As a result, our understanding 
of the journal’s general evasions of explicit political engagement becomes more 
complicated. 
 Further, Tate’s use of religion as a category for defining the difference between 
Southern and Northern cultures clashes with the religiosity of the Cuban magazine.  
Religion possesses a strict utility in the conceptual scheme of Tate’s essay, while 
Orígenes builds the breadth of its literary, cultural and ethical agenda on foundational 
Christian ideas.  Tate’s packaging of Christian religiosity as a sociological phenomenon 
with a particular usefulness to the advancement of a political program finds no 
sympathetic resonance in its new textual space. 
 As we will see at the conclusion of this chapter, Rodolfo Tro’s translation 
illustrates the tensions we will discover in our comparative analysis of Tate’s text and its 
new context.  The inoperability of a notion of regionalism in Orígenes causes the 
translation to exert significant pressure on Tate’s discourse.  Tate’s distinction between 
regional and national ideologies is blurred in the Spanish text, illustrating the difficulty of 
making such a distinction work in the context of Orígenes.  Further, the cultural 
specificity of Tate’s references is damaged in the translation, a fact that underscores the 
impossibility of preserving the meaning of those references in a foreign context. 
 Nonetheless, the anti-imperialist thrust of Tate’s critique survives the translation 
process, illustrating the space that Orígenes opens for concrete cultural and political 
critique within its discursive boundaries.  Tro’s translation operates in tandem with 
Rodríguez Feo’s methodologies, establishing this secondary, though crucial mode of 
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operations in the magazine.  Understanding this alternate mode of cultural analysis in 
Orígenes significantly complicates our general understanding of the nature of the 
magazine. 
  
The Origins and Development of a Cultural Agenda 
 Throughout his work, Allen Tate constructs a well-developed set of oppositions: 
science versus poetry, the will versus the imagination, simultaneity versus history, the 
industrial versus the agrarian way of life.  In the essay he contributes to Orígenes, “The 
New Provincialism,” he ties together a number of these oppositions under the unifying 
duality of provincialism versus regionalism.  In each of these oppositions, Tate associates 
the first element with the North, while the second is connected to his personal vision of 
the South.  Some of these dualities describe not only the differences between two 
cultures, but are also relevant to two divergent modes of literary expression.  Tate thus 
coordinates two planes of analysis, one more generally cultural, and the other literary.    
 Early in his career, Tate was critical of Southern culture and its literary tradition.  
The South was for the young Tate a region devoid of a viable intellectual and artistic 
tradition.  Thomas Underwood describes Tate’s attitude in this way: “[t]he few people 
who read books in the Old South, [Tate] explained, were, like his own mother, devoted 
fans of a mawkish literary tradition that began with Walter Scott and ended in the 
“shallow” books of Thomas Nelson Page…” (113).   
 At the same time, when he was associated with the Fugitives group in Nashville, 
Tate began the project of formulating a discourse to elevate the cultural status of the 
South and defend it from what he saw as the meddling and condescension of the North.  
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Tate ultimately decided that these exterior forces were more harmful than any of the 
South’s inherent inferiorities.  Two crucial sets of events in the mid 1920s—one public, 
one biographical—spurred Tate to take up this defensive project in earnest.  The first was 
the Scopes “Monkey” Trial, and the second, Tate’s visits to New York City.  Based on 
his outrage at the denigrating image of the South that Northern journalists like H. L. 
Mencken constructed in their coverage of the Scopes trial and the disillusionment Tate 
felt as he tried to live the literary life in New York, the author cemented in his mind a 
rigid view of the North as spiritless, egotistical, and obsessed to the point of fanaticism 
with science.2   
 In March 1927, he proclaimed to Donald Davidson, “I’ve attacked the South for 
the last time” (Fain and Young 191), marking a moment of decisive transition from 
analyzing the deficiencies of Southern culture to defending the region against all attacks.  
Though he was critical of the naive fantasies of the Old South, he became so disgusted 
with the North’s industrialism and its effect on culture that he was compelled to revisit 
those fantasies and find a way to make them viable as a model for the present.  As John 
L. Stewart asserts, 
Before long he had performed the ritual act of repudiating his region and its 
heritage in his essay “Last Days of the Charming Lady” [published in The Nation 
in October, 1925] … Yet at the very moment of its publication he was discovering 
how indispensable they were to him … Raised in a restricting environment among 
much talk of past and vanished glories he craved liberty and modernity, but once 
he had them, they ravaged his sensibility. (319) 
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The “liberty and modernity” of the Northern city were not liberating for Tate, but rather 
presented him with a number of distressing realities.  He felt that city-dwellers, 
surrounded by the distractions and constant demands of technological life, eked out an 
existence balanced on the precarious precipice of the moment.  Modes of communication 
and transportation compressed time, and a proper human sense of temporality suffered.  
As a result, people lost all sense of history, which for Tate was particularly tragic, 
because historical discourse was for him an essential epistemological tool.  The loss of 
history became for Tate the loss of a meaningful perspective on the dilemmas of the 
present.   
 Just as it decries the absence of historical discourse in the construction of an 
American modernity, Tate’s critical and creative work mourns the decline of the Sacred 
as a viable concept in modern discourse.  Technology threatens not only to compress time 
into the illusion of a self-contained present, but also to displace the Sacred as source of 
intellectual structure, emotional fulfillment and social organization.  The poem “The 
Subway” (1927) illustrates not only Tate’s concern with the effect of technology on the 
time-sense, but also with the way in which it threatens to become the new religion.   
 Tate portrays the subway as a terrifying hell of human making.  The vitriolic tone 
of the poem arises from a calibrated rhetorical violence: the technological world has 
usurped the imagery of the church as the structure of the tunnel metaphorically takes on 
the architecture of a cathedral (1-2).  This imposition perverts the connotations of the 
sacred imagery, creating unsettling paradoxes like “angry worship” (6).  The speaker 
makes it clear that technology’s promise to uplift humanity has proved fraudulent, and 
instead has sent it hurtling toward “the iron forestries of hell” (8) an image that also 
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registers technology’s displacement of nature.  This opposition between a sacred tradition 
and a profane, ahistorical modernity re-emerges in Tate’s prose as a central duality, as we 
will see. 
 In the second stanza, the speaker registers the violence of technology personally, 
implicating it in the fracturing of an integral human vision of the universe: 
 I am become geometries, and glut 
 Expansions like a blind astronomer 
 Dazed, while the worldless heavens bulge and reel 
 In the cold revery of an idiot. (11-14)  
Again, technology imposes itself on another reality, altering it profoundly.  In this case, 
the human identity itself is restructured according to mathematical principles, and human 
perception of the universe is made diffuse by the imposition of the science of astronomy 
on the human perception of the universe.  What is absent in this imposition of the 
scientific upon human perception is a sense of proportion, balance and centeredness.  
“Worlds,” or spheres of existence imaginable on a human scale, are lost in the 
“expansions” that technological innovations, in concert with the disciplines of science, 
impose on an organic view of the human place in the cosmos.3   
 The result is “the cold revery of an idiot.”  In this phrase, Tate not only attacks the 
value of scientific knowledge, but also equates it with idle dreaming (“revery”).  The 
human subject, when thrust into an alien technological space, is left “[d]azed,” implying a 
precipitous suspension of awareness.  These assertions of the psychological effects of the 
experience of technology undercut the solidity of science’s claims to dominance over the 
contested territory of “common sense,” implying instead that scientific thinking is an 
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abstraction from daily experience.  This imagery resists the hegemony enjoyed by the 
scientific viewpoint in a technological culture, and contributes to an overarching 
contestatory strategy that Tate employs in his prose polemics, as the case of the “New 
Provincialism” will illustrate. 
 
The Inscrutable Demons of History: “Ode to the Confederate Dead” 
  History is a central concept in Tate’s work, a force that promises centeredness and 
connectedness to the past and subsequently provides a means of making the present 
moment meaningful.  Though his prose asserts these values forcefully, it is important to 
understand that the same values are questioned in Tate’s poetry.  In “Ode to the 
Confederate Dead” (1927), Tate’s most famous poem, the speaker stands as a positive 
example of Tate’s own ideology in his deep concern with the past, though his experiences 
in facing that past are terrifying and disheartening.4  The speaker of the poem can be read 
as a historian engaging the difficulties of historiography.   This speaker reaches toward 
some kind of connection with the past, but finds little to hold on to, beyond an image of 
his own mortality.  History and death are closely linked in the poem; the speaker 
highlights the simple fact that probing the past means pondering the lives of the dead.  In 
his imaginative gaze upon the past, he is ultimately unable to find a sense of meaning to 
validate his existence in the present.  
Tate’s own explanation for this failure, as asserted in “Narcissus as Narcissus,” 
his own reading of the poem, is the solipsism of a “modern man” who illustrates “…the 
failure of the human personality to function objectively in nature and society” (Essays 
595-96).  Tate locates the origins of this solipsism in part in a technologized culture.  As 
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we have seen, Tate is profoundly preoccupied with the effects of technology on human 
perception and cognition.  Further illustrating the epistemological importance of history 
for Tate, the objective reality from which the thinking subject of the poem is isolated is 
not just spatial, but also temporal.  Solipsism is dramatized in its intensest form in Tate’s 
poetry and prose as an ignorance of history. 
 Driven by conflicting impulses, the “Ode” simultaneously evokes the 
problematics of loss in linear time and opens a subjective space for the construction of 
new, epistemologically solid historical discourses built on assertions of temporal 
continuities.  The natural images of the poem signify mindless deterioration.  The wind 
blowing the leaves into “riven troughs” (4) and the rain “Staining the uncomfortable 
angels that rot/ On the slabs, a wing chipped here, an arm there…” (17-18) enact the slow 
and irreversible processes of decay and erosion.   
Despite this deterioration, the past is accessible through the imagination; the 
cemetery is not the site of a temporal barrier.  Nonetheless, the calling forth of the 
historical image simultaneously calls forth problematics, as historical figures become 
fearful specters: 
 Turn your eyes to the immoderate past,  
 Turn to the inscrutable infantry rising 
 Demons out of the earth—they will not last. 
 Stonewall, Stonewall, and the sunken fields of hemp, 
 Shiloh, Antietam, Malvern Hill, Bull Run. 
 Lost in that orient of the thick-and-fast 
 You will curse the setting sun. (21) 
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The past is “immoderate”; it overflows with the lives and deeds of the dead, 
overwhelming the individual surveying it from the present.  The immense body of raw 
data available to the speaker overwhelms the intellectual structures he might use to make 
sense of it.  Further, the imagery that history offers up to the imagination is not only 
marked by excess, but also by inscrutability. 
The speaker’s diction betrays his doubts about the historiographical precepts of 
stability and conceptual clarity.  The human imagination in a sense “surrenders” to the 
“element” (the wind, an image of passing time and its disruptions), like the gravestones 
and monuments of the poem’s setting.  Still, in contrast to the slow, steady and mindless 
erosion suggested by the natural imagery, the imagination express a willful rebellion 
against the inevitability of decay, reanimating, if only for a fearful moment, the figures of 
the past.  After the images fade, the willful imagination “curse[s] the setting sun” that 
blurs them from sight. 
 Not only does the speaker betray an awareness of the past’s weight bearing down 
on the present, but he extends his meditation to the issue of the individual’s proper 
response to that awareness.  In an implied question about the role of creative expression 
in relation to history and its stark reminders of human mortality, the speaker asks: 
 What shall we say who have knowledge  
 Carried to the heart?  Shall we take the act 
 To the grave?  Shall we, more hopeful, set up the grave 
 In the house?  The ravenous grave? (22) 
Just as the poem problematizes the epistemological foundations of history, it raises 
unanswered questions about the effect that the contemplation of the past has upon the 
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individual, and how he or she should respond.  The questions that draw the poem to a 
close ask what kind of message one should formulate from knowledge of the past (“What 
shall we say...”)—whether we should keep the experience to ourselves, internalizing it 
and allowing it to transform us from within (“...take the act/ To the grave”) or place it “in 
the house” for the sake of the instruction of others.  The phrase, “The ravenous grave?,” a 
fragment and a distilled questioning of this notion of the display of knowledge, suggests 
that the kind of wisdom about mortality that the contemplation of history necessitates and 
fosters ultimately threatens to destroy life, or more literally, to “ravenous[ly]” consume it.  
This thorough questioning, not only of the epistemological foundations of historiography, 
but further, of the relevance of historical discourse to other modes of meaning-making, 
run in a forceful countercurrent to the certainty with which Tate’s essays deploy 
historical narrative. 
 The poem as a whole stages what Michel de Certeau would call “the return of the 
repressed” within a historical discourse.  In this “return,” what the discourse  “…holds to 
be irrelevant –shards created by the selection of materials, remainders left aside by an 
explication—comes back, despite everything, on the edges of discourse or in its rifts and 
crannies: ‘resistances,’ ‘survivals,’ or delays discreetly perturb the pretty order of a line 
of ‘progress’ or a system of interpretation” (Writing 4).  What de Certeau calls “the real” 
(le réel) lies outside of discourse, constituting its radical Other, on which the discourse 
nonetheless bases its existence.  This “real” is not totally accessible; a fraction of it is 
available to the historiographer as an enormous data stream flowing through textual, 
visual and verbal archives.  This totality, together with what is absent from it—materials 
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inevitably “washed away” by time—constitute “…the unknown immensity that seduces 
and menaces our knowledge” (3).   
 What cannot be made intelligible in this immensity, the historiographer must 
repress.  What de Certeau describes (and Tate’s poem dramatizes) is the disruptive 
resurgence of what the discourse has rendered irrelevant.  In both de Certeau’s thinking 
and in Tate’s poem, it is death itself, along with the physicality of the human body that 
disrupts a historical discourse with which it has always sustained a problematic 
relationship.  On the one hand, Western historical discourse posits death as a necessary 
boundary between the formulator of discourse and the object thereof.  This discourse 
rejects non-Western assertions of the cohabitation of the living and the dead: “[o]n its 
own account, historiography takes for granted the fact that it has become impossible to 
believe in this presence of the dead that has organized (or organizes) the experience of 
entire civilizations… (5)  Yet on the other, the dead are not abandoned.  Though radically 
Other, they return in discourse, transmuted by an epistemology: 
Historiography tends to prove that the site of its production can encompass the 
past: it is an odd procedure that posits death, a breakage everywhere reiterated in 
its discourse, and that yet denies loss by appropriating to the present the privilege 
of recapitulating the past as a form of knowledge.  A labor of death and against 
death. (5) 
 Tate stages the return of the repressed in a cemetery, a symbolic nexus of tension 
between these two relationships to death in historical discourse.  The cemetery is in one 
sense the site of the discourse’s “encompassing” of the dead—inscribing into stone 
names, dates, rhetorical crystallizations of the complexity of long lives, or pious 
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declarations of life’s ultimate continuity.  It is also haunted by an absence, by the 
invisible persistence of what is unintelligible to that discourse: the reality of death and 
irreversible time.  The image of the inscriptions on the gravestones gradually wearing 
away provides an initial encapsulation of this tension between discourse and death: “Row 
after row with strict impunity/ The headstones yield their names to the element” (lines 1-
2). 
 
Calming the Dead: History in Tate’s Essays 
 Tate’s most important poem questions the possibility of implementing history’s 
meaning-making power in the context of the present, and provides no clear outline or 
guide for expressing and communicating those meanings to others.  In his essays, Tate 
employs much more forceful and didactic rhetorical strategies to prescribe the proper role 
of the writer in relation to the narratives of history and to the concrete experiences of the 
present.  In “Ode to the Confederate Dead,” the speaker makes explicit his uncertainty.  
Nonetheless, the dilemmas and contradictions that inevitably arise from the process of 
formulating a set of interrelating philosophical and aesthetic credos get pulled under the 
forceful polemical current of his essays.  On the one hand, the “Ode” dramatizes the 
threatening emergence of raw, inassimilable historical data into a meditative historical 
discourse.  On the other, Tate’s prose tends to construct historical supports for itself that 
exemplify de Certeau’s description of the heterology—a discourse on a spatial and 
temporal Other that “…aims at hiding the alterity of this foreigner; or, in what amounts to 
the same thing, it aims at calming the dead who still haunt the present, and at offering 
them scriptural tombs” (History 2).   
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 Tate struggles with the “demons” of Southern history throughout his career, and 
at times is successful in pacifying them and deploying them as emblematic figures in his 
attempts to defend a personal vision of history.  His biography of Stonewall Jackson 
(1928) represents a successful deployment of a complex historical figure as paragon of 
the virtues of Southern culture.  He thus turns Stonewall into a discursive figure that 
helps sustain his cultural agenda.  Tate himself acknowledges that the biography 
originated in the “Ode,” the first version of which he had completed in late 1926, just 
before beginning his research on Jackson (Underwood 123, 133).  Tate salvages the 
Confederate general from the “sunken fields of hemp” and inscribes him more 
confidently into history and into the text of the author’s own personal cultural politics.  In 
a review of the Jackson biography, Steve Davis notes how the Jackson of the biography is 
a revision of the ghostly figure in the poem (248-49).   
In Tate’s literary and cultural critiques, as in his biography of the Confederate 
general, it seems at times that the author’s prose voice is driven to compensate for the 
fearful uncertainty of his “Ode.”  Reading his essays with an awareness of the 
philosophical problems raised in his poetry helps us to understand the sources of Tate’s 
typically strident, forceful, and often arrogant prose voice.  We can also understand more 
thoroughly what undergirds the often inflexible structures of his arguments.  As Certeau 
reminds us, what we call historical discourses “…are historical because they are bound to 
operations and are defined by functions.  Thus we cannot understand what they say 
independently of the practice from which they result” (Writing 20).  The assertions about 
history that provide such an important support for Tate’s prose polemics are the result of 
a basic repertoire of practices, organized around the central function of contesting the 
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economic, political and cultural hegemony of the North’s industrial capitalism.  What 
Tate “says” about Southern history is visibly marred by the traces of numerous 
“repressions” (the most obvious and widely commented of these are his equivocations on 
the question of chattel slavery).  These traces map out Tate’s cultural agendas at the 
moment of inscription.  As Certeau succinctly asserts, “…any reading of the past—
however much it is controlled by the analysis of documents—is driven by a reading of 
current events” (23).  As we will see, these “current events” consist of the gathering force 
of a hegemony deployed to reinforce industrial capitalism, events to which Tate is a keen 
and profoundly partial observer, as we will see in “The New Provincialism.” 
 There is a shift in method, in addition to the obvious difference of philosophical 
assertion, between Tate’s poetry and his prose.  While the former engages the problem of 
modernity through a particular use of archetypical religious, poetic and historical images, 
a materialist method undergirds the cultural critiques of his essays.  Further, the poems 
tend to locate the ravages of industrial culture in individual subjectivity—the time-sense, 
the emotional necessity of a meaningful past—while the essays introduce the question of 
industrial capitalism’s systemic effects on the means and distribution of cultural 
production.  Subjective and structural issues are of course linked for Tate as they both 
have a deleterious effect on the production and reception of literature.  Literature is 
always the central example in overarching critiques of economic systems’ effect on 
culture, and the threatened position of the writer in his society is an issue that is both 
close to Tate’s personal experience and emblematic of broader cultural deterioration in 
his imaginary. 
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 In “The Profession of Letters in the South” (1935), Tate warns that writing as a 
profession has been profoundly degraded by its dependence upon market capitalism.  As 
Mark Jancovich points out, the essay engages a concern at the forefront of Tate’s writing 
throughout his career, namely that “the modern writer lacked a social basis for aesthetic 
independence” (45).  Tate laments that 
[t]he American public sees the writer as a business man because it cannot see any 
other kind of man, and respects him according to his income.  And, alas, most 
writers themselves respect chiefly and fear only their competitors’ sales.  A big 
sale is a “success.”  How could it be otherwise? … This racket, our society being 
what it is, is a purely economic process, and literary opinion is necessarily 
manufactured for its needs.  Its prime need is shoddy goods, because it must have 
a big, quick turnover. (Essays 517-18) 
Tate addresses the central concern of the relative health of cultural production in the 
South by describing an issue of economic relations in rather concrete terms.   
 This concreteness is a salient feature of nearly all of Tate’s prose polemics, and 
reading them as a whole, it is impossible to ignore Tate’s condemnation of market 
capitalism.  Tate concurs with his Marxist counterparts on the basic problem, though his 
proposed solutions to the problem are infamously conservative.  In “Profession,” Tate 
criticizes Marxists for confusing monarchy with aristocracy, asserting that the latter is a 
historical social category of significant value not only to the flourishing of the arts, but 
also to the stability of society at large (527).  Ultimately, Tate replaces the concept of 
aristocracy with feudalism, to encapsulate a broader notion of the socioeconomic 
structures he believes are most supportive of valuable cultural production: “Under 
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feudalism the artist was a member of an organic society … The total loss of 
professionalism in letters may be seen in our age—an age that remembers the extinction 
of aristocracy and witnesses the triumph of a more inimical plutocratic society” (519).  
The crisis Tate describes is essentially a crisis of patronage, and a hopeful gaze is 
subsequently cast toward an idealized image of historical European societies where 
patronage supposedly did its job without contaminating the substance of art.   
  
“The New Provincialism”: A Critique of Globalism and a Defense of Regionalism 
 An understanding of the dynamics of nostalgia and repression that characterize 
most of Tate’s prose production is helpful for our analysis of “The New Provincialism.”  
The essay was written for the twentieth anniversary of Virginia Quarterly Review in the 
spring of 1945.  “The Profession of Letters in the South” had appeared in the tenth 
anniversary number of the same journal, and the author makes explicit reference to this 
antecedent and proposes to re-examine its central issues in light of the contemporary 
literary, cultural and political scene.  Tate asserts that the earlier essay “…was possibly a 
little stuffy and more certain of itself than these notes can be” (262).  Tate’s admission is 
deceptive.  The 1945 essay sustains the same tone total self-confidence in the unfolding 
of its cultural polemics that one finds in all of Tate’s previous essays.  The moment of 
slight concession to ambiguity at the outset of the essay is clearly a rhetorical technique 
gauged to draw down the reader’s defenses.  It is not a truthful statement of method.    
 In “Provincialism,” Tate synthesizes a number of his concerns into a succinct 
formulation of what he believes are the two core values of literature: regional 
consciousness and an awareness of tradition.  These values occupy different conceptual 
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planes—the first spatial, and the second, temporal.  At the intersection of the two, 
literature’s proper location is specified.  This conceptual dyad takes on a neat symmetry 
of opposite functions that work together to promote the author’s vision of the proper 
place of literature in society. 
 On the spatial plane, Tate asserts that literary art should work within highly 
restrictive coordinates, in contrast to the cultural globalism emerging in the U.S. in the 
mid-1940s.  As opposed to this globalism’s expanding frame of cultural reference, driven 
by technological innovations in the media of communication, Tate prescribes a 
constriction of the cultural space relevant to literary production.  He defines this 
constricted space as “regional,” but is careful to warn early in his essay that he is not 
espousing what he sees as the typical incarnation of literary regionalism in the U.S., one 
that is subservient to the expression of a national identity and value system: “…mere 
regionalism, as we have heard it talked about in recent years, is not enough.  For this 
picturesque regionalism of local color is a by-product of nationalism.  And it is not 
informed enough to support a mature literature” (263).  Tate rejects picturesque realism 
because in it one finds the local reality seen at a distance, from a point of view that stands 
above and away from that reality.  It is not a literature that grounds imagination in 
experience, as is prescribed in the earlier essay.  As a result of its distance and difference 
from what it describes, nationalistic realism can never be sufficiently “informed”; it can 
never have access to the kind of detailed knowledge of a culture that is necessary to the 
production of a literature of the highest quality.  
 In contrast to “picturesque regionalism,” Tate prescribes a more spatially (and 
culturally) restricted vision, one that ignores the possible national relevance of an 
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expression of local experiences, and instead strives toward a more self-contained form of 
cultural expression.  What is implied in Tate’s argument is that regionalism derives its 
effectiveness, as a literary model, from a process of exclusion.  It is able to communicate 
messages of substance and importance because it avoids the dilution of the pool of 
relevant cultural information that is characteristic of what he calls the provincial attitude.  
This provincial attitude derives a false sense of its own value from the breadth of its 
interests. Regionalism deals with a more limited repertoire of cultural experiences, and 
thus can delve more profoundly into them, whereas the provincial view is so fascinated 
with communication among disparate cultures that it is distracted from the demanding 
task of formulating a substantive message to communicate.  As Tate emphatically asserts, 
“…the real end is not physical communication, or parochial neighborliness on a world 
scale.  The real end, as I see it, is what you are communicating after you get the physical 
means of communication” (264).  The connection between technology and the provincial 
attitude in Tate’s argument is a manifestation of his constant suspicion of science and its 
effects on human perception and communication. 
 According to Tate, the provincial approach to placing literary expression in a 
relevant cultural grid is flawed, not only because it loses cultural or regional perspective 
in its constant outward expansion, but also because it is necessarily ahistorical.  It limits 
itself as its outward expansion pushes history out of the frame of reference.  Because the 
provincial view cannot draw restrictive boundaries around cultural space, it is unable to 
bring to bear a set of temporal narratives that might locate that space in a line of 
chronological development.  Dazzled by the near-infinite variety of images available in 
the present, it exists in a blissful ignorance of the past: “…no literature can be mature 
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without the regional consciousness; it can only be senile, with the renewed immaturity of 
senility” (263).   
 While geographical and cultural spaces are restricted in Tate’s configuration of 
the true object of literature, the temporal plane is broadened.   Presupposing the reduction 
of the cultural sphere of relevance to the regional, the temporal frame of reference can be 
safely expanded.  Once the writer has isolated a small subset of cultural realities, he or 
she can examine how those realities have evolved over time.  Though his poetry 
perpetually struggles with the epistemological dilemmas of historical contemplation, the 
argumentative stance of essays like “The New Provincialism” suppresses those kinds of 
problematics, elevating and reifying history as a source of value and meaning.   
 In his essays, this process of idealization of history is encapsulated in his 
arguments on behalf of tradition.  For Tate, tradition grounds an entire repertoire of 
approved cultural practices, and the socio-political structures that regulate them, in a 
teleological structure.  The practices and institutions that Tate believes the regional writer 
must describe are inherently imbued with the positive quality of wisdom, which is the 
development of forms of knowledge that help the individual tackle the problems of the 
present.  The repertoire of behaviors, attitudes and strategies Tate seeks to uphold, 
grounded in a particular fantasy about an agrarian way of life, does not just display itself 
for scrutiny in the present, but rather reveals itself to be the product of a deliberate and 
progressive evolution over time.  When the line of development is not visible from the 
present moment, Tate himself, his poetic speakers or his fictional characters express or 
unintentionally betray an acute sense of longing for the lost wisdom of the past.  Further, 
 254
they seek through various discursive means to repair the breach in time that leaves them 
without that wisdom’s benefit.   
 Though we have presented the planes on which Tate’s definition of the proper 
functions of literature operate as spatial and temporal, these planes clearly are not pure 
scientific concepts.  In his writing, physical space and temporal progression are both 
cultural concepts, rather than technical ones, and Tate’s advocacy of these particular 
cultural concepts is rife with problematic political implications.   The culture that Tate 
asserts as essential to the South, which is for Tate the emblematic literary region, is 
founded on a particular and highly personal fantasy of gentility, harmony, stability and 
connection to the land.  It is up to the reader, though, to question the ideological 
assumptions lurking behind the writer’s active process of selecting both local and 
historical detail.   
 Southern literature, for Tate, should be regionalist, according to the definition 
provided in “The New Provincialism.”  As he presents this project to the reader, the 
spatial boundaries of the South are easily drawn, and, more importantly, the history of 
that South is presented as an absolute reality beyond debate.  As many critics have 
pointed out, the historical South that Allen Tate presents is shaped by numerous fictions 
and fantasies.  Because he sees the regional reality that is so important to his thinking as 
under attack from economic and cultural incursions from the North, he reifies, then 
subsequently defends, what he sees as the numerous virtues of the Southern heritage.  It 
takes little historical expertise to perceive the way in which Tate simplifies the real 
conflicts and tragedies of the South’s history in his work.  The desperate attempts Tate 
makes in his writing to defend the social structures of the South are tightly bound to the 
 255
development of ideas on the proper function of literature in society.  The dialectic of 
industrial North and agrarian South that Tate constructs to defend the originality and 
validity of the South as cultural space can be seen ultimately as an anti-imperialist 
discursive strategy.  This strategy is marked by notions of what lies inside and outside the 
cultural boundaries and the pressure to define in absolute terms the essence of a complex 
grouping of cultural realities in order to more easily protect it from the perceived threat of 
the North.   
 In this discourse, the concept of positivism functions as a coded distillation of the 
threat the industrialized North poses to the integrity of the agrarian South.  The notion 
that Truth can be discovered through empirical observation is anathema to Tate in the 
most immediate sense because he associates such a perspective with the North’s fixation 
on science and technology.  But Tate’s critique is not so much directed at the 
epistemological bases of scientific methods as it is a response to a set of perceived ills 
brought on by the technologization of culture, a process being forced upon the South 
through an imperialist scheme.  Positivism, in this sense, stands less as a precise 
designation of an intellectual system and more as a cipher for the negative social 
consequences of industrialism.   
 For Tate, technological refinements promise to furnish the means toward positive 
ends, but fail to deliver.  As we have seen, Tate shows a particular interest in modes of 
communication.  Prefiguring our current-day questions about the deeper effects of 
“instant” communication, he faults those obsessed with the means of communication for 
not concerning themselves adequately with the question of what those means might help 
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us say: “The ease of modern communication compelled these gentlemen to communicate 
with the world, when there was nothing to communicate” (268). 
 Looking beyond his critique of industrialism’s damage to the North, it is 
fascinating to see how Tate locates a great deal of science and technology’s threat in how 
it is exported.  It is crucial to recognize that Tate’s vituperative discourses on the evils of 
industrialism are driven by the perception of an imperialistic threat.  What he finds so 
disturbing about industrialism is not what it does within its own established sphere, but 
rather how its negative effects are extended through imperial projects to territories that 
were previously governed by the noble wisdom of local tradition.  Both regional 
autochthony and temporal continuity are broken down when industrialization is exported, 
as ways of life that have proven successful over the course of generations are altered to 
conform to the new rhythms of the machine.   
 It is important to observe not only Tate’s distaste for the industrial model in its 
concrete form, but also his deep suspicion of the kinds of discourses he sees emerging 
from the mechanization of culture.  Internationalism, or what Tate calls provincialism, is 
one set of discourses that he sees as masking an industrial culture’s ulterior motives of 
conquest.  Their deployment in global politics constitutes what Tate succinctly 
characterizes as “rules of plunder which look like cooperation” (267).  This phrase 
strikingly illustrates the antihegemonic mode of Tate’s discourse, as it undercuts the 
concept of “cooperation” with what he asserts as its true nature.   
 As an example of industrial culture’s hegemonic posturing, Tate cites Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech, a text that was intended both as a statement of the 
United States’ responsibility to preserve international justice and as a refutation of 
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strategies of appeasement proposed by isolationists opposed to U.S. involvement in 
World War II. 5  Tate deconstructs Roosevelt’s text in the essay, pouring derision upon 
what he sees as the deception built into the text’s rhetoric and parodying the good-hearted 
intentions it attempts to illustrate: 
We guarantee to the world freedom from want.  We had better—or somebody had 
better guarantee it, even if the guarantee is no good; for nineteenth-century 
industrial capitalism and our own more advanced technology have made it very 
difficult for “backward peoples” (to say nothing of ourselves in small units and 
groups) to make their living independently of somebody else nine thousand miles 
away.  In other words we have destroyed the regional economies, and we offer a 
provincial remedy which ignores our past experience. (268) 
Industrialization is not just a blight on the populations who work in its factories; Tate is 
quite clear in asserting that the misery and subjugation it facilitates spreads itself around 
the world through networks of economic and political influence.  His placement of the 
phrase “backwards peoples” in quotation marks illustrates the deconstructive tenor of his 
argument.  He launches an attack not just on the economic subjugation of foreign peoples 
but also on the conceptual and real violence done to other cultures through the 
Eurocentric political and academic rhetoric that characterizes the Other as an inferior 
element in a comparison with the Western self.  His argument sounds surprisingly 
contemporary, in its anticipation of the kind of deconstructive techniques of present-day 
cultural criticism. 
 Of course, the moral foundation of Tate’s critique is shaky, especially as the 
author indiscriminately dismisses Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms proposal.  The wholesale 
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rejection of industrialization carries with it a disdain for the humanitarian goals toward 
which industrialized countries like the U.S. at times try to employ their technologies:  
Nobody wants to see the Oriental peoples dominated by the Japanese and to go 
hungry and ill clad; yet so far in the history of civilization it has been virtually 
impossible to feed and clothe people with food and clothing.  It is my own 
impression that they get fed and clothed incidentally to some other impulse, a 
creative power which we sometimes identify with religion and the arts. (540) 
The purity of the U.S. government’s intents to protect human rights “everywhere in the 
world,” as Roosevelt states in his speech, can be questioned.  But Tate’s critique does not 
distinguish between false motives and any possible benefits.  Instead, it rejects the 
importance of  “feeding and clothing” people in distant parts of the world, asserting 
instead the notion that religious beliefs and artistic impulses somehow are responsible for 
the accidental, or “incidental” carrying out of these purposes.  Tate fails to clarify exactly 
how this process might work, and provides no sustained development of an alternative 
model of international justice, for the obvious reason that his discourse against 
industrialism has reached a feverish extreme, past which no articulate case can be made. 
 At this point in Tate’s argument, the reader is reminded of the revered core of 
values that helps the author oppose what he sees as the crass utilitarianism of the North.  
Those values take the shape of religion and art, realms of human activity that he 
advocates more articulately and more credibly in other contexts.  In the rhetorical tangle 
of “The New Provincialism,” though, they are clumsily drawn into service in the 
debunking of Northern industrialism.   
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 Though Tate is interested in asserting that a particular kind of religiosity is 
essential to the Southern character, the concept of religion in the essay is limited to an 
oppositional role in relation to the Northern positivism and pragmatism that Tate seeks to 
deconstruct.  The essay’s defense of Southern culture does not emerge from a 
thoroughgoing description of the role of the Sacred in Southern culture, but rather draws 
religion into service in the fight against an opposing ideology.  According to Tate, 
religion is important to Southern regionalism largely because it helps the individual avoid 
falling prey to a superficial and short-sighted practicality.  Because of his religion, the 
Southerner can “evade total efficiency” (266) as well as the “barbarism” (265) that results 
from the unchecked indulgence of pragmatism. The content of the Southerner’s 
religiosity is not the crucial question.  The way religious feeling makes people behave is 
what Tate finds most important.  Religion, hand in hand with Tradition, underwrites a 
repertoire of behaviors that Tate does not defend for their inherent value, but rather for 
the way in which they resist the encroaching influence of Northern culture.  This 
distinction becomes quite important when we place Tate’s essay in the context of the 
religious foundations of Orígenes, as we will see later.  
 Tate’s approach to religion contrasts with the orientation of his wife, the novelist 
Caroline Gordon, whose essay “Some Readings and Misreadings,” was translated by 
Rodríguez Feo and published in Orígenes in 1954.6  Gordon’s essay seeks to prove the 
hypothesis that all novels written in the West are inevitably informed by Christianity, 
whatever the explicit creed of the author:  
A novelist’s conscious mind may be influenced by what is going on around him, 
he may announce himself a pragmatist, a skeptic, an atheist while his creative 
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faculties seem to move in and subscribe to a totally different order …  I believe 
that it could be shown that in the nineteenth century and in our own century as 
well the fiction writer’s imagination often operates within the pattern of Christian 
symbolism rather than in the patterns of contemporary thought. (385) 
Gordon describes Christian thought as the source, not only of the Southern regional 
novel, but of all novelistic production in what she vaguely imagines to be the Christian 
West.  In her essay, she outlines the central Christian themes structuring nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century European and American novels: redemption, charity, sin, damnation, 
and love.  Late in the essay, she arrives at a bold affirmation.  The labor of the novelist is 
akin to the redemptive work of Christ in the world: “It is the fiction writer’s arduous task 
to imitate, on however lowly a scale, the patience that stooped low enough to lift up a 
fallen universe” (400).  Ann Waldron writes that Gordon believed that “…the writer of 
serious fiction had the same goal as the contemplative and the mystic.  He needed the 
patience of Christ” (259).     
 If for Gordon, writing in the early fifties, religiosity precedes and produces 
literary expression, Tate’s 1945 essay makes sociology and history the muses of fiction.  
For him, the primary goal of fiction is to reflect the workings of a society.  In the case of 
the South, it just so happens that Christianity is a crucial element in those workings.  
Though, in an even deeper contrast with Gordon’s position, he allows the humanism 
inherited from ancient Greece a place of equal importance in relation to Christianity in 
his description of Southern culture.  He considers “Christian otherworldliness” (265) a 
force that takes on importance through its counterbalancing relation to humanism and 
individualism.   
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Key Features of Tate’s Rhetoric 
 “The New Provincialism,” in spite of its excesses, proves Tate to be a master 
polemicist.  As we have seen, the essay is sustained by a basic opposition between a 
clearly established set of dualities.  Tate draws on a deep reserve of rhetorical resources 
to fend off any incursion of ambiguity into his argument. The result is an unequivocal 
denigration of one pole of a duality (the North, technology, cultural “provincialism”) and 
advocacy of the other (the South, agrarianism, regionalism).  The perlocutionary effect of 
conceptual clarity is not an end in itself, though, as Tate’s essay is clearly not meant 
simply to be informative.  It is essential to recognize that the purpose of the conceptual 
consistency Tate achieves is to produce the illocutionary effects of confrontation, 
provocation, and persuasion.  His rhetorical techniques work toward this goal, as well, 
not simply toward clarity.  We can observe these techniques at work at various linguistic 
and textual levels—semantic, syntactic, and orthographical.   
 A categorization of his rhetorical techniques and an understanding of their 
illocutionary force are necessary in order to see if Rodolfo Tro’s translation of the essay 
for Orígenes replicates those techniques and thus seeks illocutionary equivalence.  Many 
of the techniques mentioned will seem obvious.  We nonetheless must be attentive to 
them, as we will no longer take them for granted when we observe the alterations they 
undergo as they are translated into Spanish. 
 On a metatextual level, Tate employs a number of literary, political and cultural 
allusions or references that serve crucial functions.  For example, his mention of Bourbon 
County, Kentucky (263) economically evokes for any American reader a general sense of 
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cultural marginality, as part of an effort to displace the dominant ideology to a similarly 
humble position.  Tate asserts that the cosmopolitan, internationalist literature of the 
North “…may be a provincial literature with world horizons, the horizons of the 
geographical world, which need not be spiritually larger than Bourbon County, 
Kentucky…” (263).  The geographical reference is much more concise than a rhetorical 
formulation like “an out of the way county” or a hackneyed expression like “one-horse 
town”; this compression of signification is carefully gauged to explode the comfortable 
conceptual hierarchies of cosmopolitan culture.  
 Perhaps the most obvious strength of Tate’s rhetoric is semantic.  It is easy to 
compile a list of carefully chosen terms whose meanings are manipulated not simply to 
express a concept but also to contribute to the illocutionary force of the essay.  The 
clearest example of this is “provincialism.”  This term not only expresses the sense of a 
cultural perspective limited to the local and familiar, but further, enacts an antihegemonic 
deconstruction of the urban North’s claims to cultural centrality and superiority.  Tate 
uses the term “provincialism” to describe a Northern culture that sees itself as central and 
prides itself on its cosmopolitanism, thus inverting the value-laden semantics of center 
and periphery to contest the imperialist projects of the North.   
 Further, Tate’s syntax (or what we might call, in a less technical sense, his 
“style”) is masterful.  One feature that is especially striking is the alternation of longer 
sentences with carefully arranged multiple clauses and short, forceful single-clause 
sentences.  This alternation balances two effects that might, in other contexts, be in 
conflict with one another: intellectual sophistication and plainspoken directness.  This 
dual effect arises from a delicate equilibrium of scholarly and demotic speech.  This 
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equilibrium contributes to, and provides a concrete manifestation of, the overall goal of 
elevating what Tate calls “the regional consciousness” to a position of cultural 
importance without diminishing the strengths derived from its supposed humility and 
simplicity.  
 Finally, we must notice the rhetorical value of the essay’s orthographical features, 
as mundane as they may seem.  To emphasize the semantic value of certain terms and 
phrases, Tate frequently uses italics.  To question the usage of other terms and phrases 
that the producers of the competing discourse employ, he places them in quotation marks, 
as in the examples of “national” (263); “universal” (263); “international cooperation” 
(264) and “backward peoples” (268).  At other times, Tate places entire sentences in 
quotation marks to show that they are being uttered by an imaginary interlocutor that 
represents the opposing view.   The quotation marks inflect the utterances instantly with a 
deconstructive irony that contributes to Tate’s general polemical strategies.  These 
techniques may seem far from subtle or innovative, though we will appreciate their 
importance when we examine what happens in their transfer from English to Spanish.  
   
  
Contextualization of “The New Provincialism” in Orígenes 
 
 Having established the salient features of Tate’s arguments in “The New 
Provincialism,” it is useful as a next step to examine what happens when those arguments 
are placed in the context of the political and cultural projects of Orígenes.  In this 
examination, we will work from our analysis of the essay in English toward a 
recontextualization of the essay.  This is not the final step of our analysis, though.  We 
must subsequently proceed from an understanding of the conceptual consonances and 
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dissonances between Tate’s text in English and its new Cuban context to an examination 
of the way in which the translator of the essay negotiates those relationships in order to 
process the text so that it will possess a coherent function in the target language. 
 The most immediate difficulty we face when we recontextualize Tate’s essay is 
the inappropriateness of his concept of regionalism to a Cuban magazine that locates its 
own cultural projects in a national framework.7  The differences of prescribed 
methodology between Tate and the origenistas are the logical manifestation of 
contrasting definitions of culture and the reforms necessary to its preservation.  Because 
of his reaction against a cultural imperialism that increasingly asserts itself as a national 
phenomenon, there is great urgency in Tate’s avocation of a local culture that, if properly 
defined, can mobilize literature as a force of resistance.  Orígenes, in contrast, eschews 
all subnational definitions of literature, placing its faith instead in the revitalization of a 
national literature.8  This fact obviously stems from the lack of a conflicted regional 
division within Cuba like the North-South duality that is still so important to Tate.  For 
the origenistas, a project of cultural reform must engage all factions and transcend 
regional, ethnic and class divisions. 
 Despite the absence of an intra-national divide like the one between North and 
South in the U.S., Cuba’s neo-colonial relationship to the U.S. in the 1940s and 50s is 
broadly parallel to the divide Tate describes.  Tate is clear in asserting that the North’s 
imperialist machinations, once they have dissolved all cultural differences and political 
dissent within the U.S., will inevitably become U.S. imperialism, and the South will 
become a participant.  Thus, it is possible to read “The New Provincialism” in the context 
of Orígenes with an emphasis, not on the subnational regionalism that Tate espouses, but 
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rather on the concept of imperialism and the hegemonic discourses imperialism employs.  
In this reading, Tate’s text becomes more deployable in a Cuban context, as a useful 
warning, from within the belly of the beast, of the gathering imperial force of the U.S. at 
the end of World War II.    
 It is clear that the members of the Orígenes group operate under an awareness of 
the same imperialist threat that Tate identifies.  The magazine defines its project in part as 
a response to Cuba’s political corruption, gangsterism, and resulting public sense of the 
futility of participating in a dysfunctional system of government.  These forces are 
impelled in part by the same neo-imperialism Tate critiques in “The New Provincialism.”   
Nonetheless, the origenista response to the threat is quite different from Tate’s.   
 Generally, the Cuban magazine’s programmatic statements identify cultural and 
political problems without being as explicit as Tate in diagnosing their origins.  In “La 
otra desintegración,” for example, Lezama and Rodríguez Feo sketch a trajectory of 
democracy’s frustration in Cuba from the struggles for independence to the mid-twentieth 
century (60).  This progression is evoked with a rhetorical economy that contrasts with 
the detailed deconstruction of imperialist ideology in Tate’s essay.  Orígenes takes an 
oblique and laconic stance on the genealogy of Cuban cultural problems in the context of 
imperialism, whereas Tate tackles the development of imperialist ideology head-on, 
employing a mode of analysis that highlights the specificity of its own cultural 
conditions. 
 While Tate links the cultural ills of the North to material forces like technology 
and the media of communication, the creative and critical methodologies of Orígenes 
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envision the root of political and cultural “disintegration” as a lack of imagination.  The 
description of the problem is couched in a poetic rhetoric that suggests poetic solutions: 
Cerca del índice crítico que señala la falta de imaginación estatal, que no es en 
definitiva sino la ausencia de una proyección o impulsión por zonas más 
espléndidas, es necesario ir ya entregando las formas superadoras de esa 
desintegración.  Si ese señalamiento es esencialmente crítico, su remedio tendrá 
que brotar de creación y de imagen. (Desintegración, 60) 
 
Near the critical index that points out the State’s lack of imagination, which is 
clearly nothing less than the absence of a projection or impulsion through more 
splendid zones, it is necessary to begin to provide the forms that will overcome 
that disintegration.  If that assertion is essentially critical, its remedy will have to 
emerge from creation and from the image. 
Though the editors acknowledge the importance of the “critical index” that quantifies the 
dilemmas facing Cuban culture, their analysis veers from historiographical and political 
modes of analysis in order to reformulate the problem in poetic terms.  This formulation, 
designating a lack of “imagination” and “projection,” determines the nature of the proper 
response: the creation of new images of the nation through art.   
 This way of imagining the national space is a response to the failure of politically 
committed writers to work effectively in the traditional spaces of public discourse.     
Because the origenistas believe that public discourse has been so profoundly 
contaminated by corruption in its various forms, they revise the role of the politically 
engaged writer that is such an important element of their national tradition, opting instead 
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to avoid the failures of political engagement by redefining the nation in terms that allow 
them a more direct role in the process of reform.  Thus, the nation, as imagined in 
Orígenes, is a created and creative phenomenon, a spiritual mode of existence that art is 
especially well-equipped to recuperate and sustain.   
 In her 1948 essay “La Cuba Secreta,” the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano 
defines the nation in poetic and religious terms, positing national identity in a way that 
gives the individual imagination a role in reshaping it.  She thus clears the ground for a 
direct and fundamental intervention in the national process by the kind of literature 
Orígenes promotes. As we have asserted before, this move helps the origenistas define 
their project in such a way that they can avoid a basic dilemma facing politically engaged 
writers: how to reconcile the individual and creative nature of their work with the 
collective and purportedly objective nature of the political discourse they are working to 
transform. 
 Further, there is a fundamental conflict between the function of religiosity in 
Orígenes and in Tate’s essay.  For the majority of the origenistas, religious thinking is at 
the root of their assertions about the nature of literature and its role in society, whereas 
for Tate, a certain kind of religious mindset is described largely in terms of its utility in 
resisting a competing agenda.  Religiosity does not structure Tate’s literary projects from 
the ground up as it does the projects of Lezama and Vitier; the regionalism Tate espouses, 
though it allies itself strategically with religion, relies more on political, historical and 
sociological concepts to sponsor its agendas, and spirituality is most often a manifestation 
of these same concepts. 
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 As we have seen, Tate poses humanism in contradistinction to spirituality, 
asserting that, in Southern culture, one tendency offsets the other.  In the opening 
editorial statement in Orígenes, humanism is a concept that operates in a supportive 
relation to artistic production and to religiosity.  Lezama and Rodríguez Feo do not place 
humanism in tension with Christianity; instead, they see “the humanistic tradition” (6) as 
the source of an artistic and philosophical freedom that facilitates the Genetic acts of 
creation that form their heterodox mode of religiosity.   
 The predominant value system undergirding Orígenes as cultural project defines 
the crisis of the Cuban republic in essentially spiritual terms, and as a result, its proposed 
solutions must not be limited to the historical-sociological method Tate prescribes for 
regionalist literature and evidences in his own essay.  Although Tate affirms the 
importance of literature in renewing Southern culture, its role is for him much more 
restricted.  This aspect of his argument runs up against the methodologies of Orígenes’s 
dominant theoretician.  Bolstered by assertions of the spiritual nature of artistic creation, 
the theoretical foundation for Orígenes that Lezama establishes in his essays assumes the 
power of literature to intervene in history in order to transform it, whereas for Tate, the 
literary text must simply reflect cultural realities and, when necessary, bring to light the 
weaknesses or contradictions that threaten the integrity of a society.  As we have seen in 
his essay, Tate’s literary regionalism emphasizes the importance of cultural information; 
the kinds of questions the writer must ask herself are: “…what is the structure of 
Southern society?  What was it in the eighteen-forties and –fifties?” (271).  The role of 
the writer is to place present realities in the context of a tradition, a line of development 
that will illuminate its complexities.   
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 Lezama approaches history quite differently, rejecting the notions of linearity and 
causality that inform Tate’s basic view of history and determine the way he brings history 
to bear on culture and the role of literature.  For Lezama, cultures consist of 
constellations of images.  The image itself is a dynamic force, moving fluidly through 
time, evolving and undergoing constant permutations.  Throughout history, artists 
participate in these processes, shaping images into forms never seen before, which will be 
taken up and reshaped by future creators.  This notion of culture and its development 
through time facilitates surprisingly fluid connections among creative artifacts from 
different epochs and cultures.  Lezama extols the freedom of the creative genius to 
supercede simplistic causalities in the offering of his or her imaginative vision (Mitos 
15).  The activity of  Lezama’s “sujeto metafórico,” a subjectivity that intervenes in 
history, contrasts sharply with Tate’s effort to establish a stable history upon which to 
found a literary project.  Lezama’s poetic historiography allows a freer play of 
signification and approaches images as entities in a state of constant metamorphosis 
rather than as static markers of a determined set of historical relations.  
 Thus, Lezama transgresses the essential division between the “real” that is the 
object of historical discourse and discourse itself, a division Michel de Certeau asserts is 
central to Western historical discourse.  Lezama’s poetic discourse, rather than staging 
the difficulties of historiography, like Tate’s “Ode,” ignores those difficulties, asserting 
the right of poetic discourse to constitute and reconstitute the “real” through images.  
Further, where Certeau sees history replacing myth in modern Western cultures from the 
sixteenth century on, Lezama deploys mythic materials as a means of rewriting history.  
For de Certeau, history “…combines what can be thought, the ‘thinkable,’ and the origin, 
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in conformity with the way in which a society can understand its own workings” (Writing 
21).  For Lezama, the image, especially in its participation in the epistemological 
operations of metaphor, is invested with the power to constantly challenge what is 
thinkable, and ultimately to return to the question of the origin (of divine Creation and 
human creativity) and enact, in each instance, a fresh encounter.  
 Despite aforementioned differences of poetic methodology, Lezama’s poetic 
historiography is more consonant with the role of the speaker of Tate’s poem “Ode to the 
Confederate Dead” than it is with the epistemological assuredness of Tate’s essays.  
History appears to the speaker of the “Ode” as a series of images he is not sure how to 
order and make sense of.  This, his most famous poem, would have been in this sense a 
more sympathetic interlocutor with the context of Orígenes than “The New 
Provincialism.”  If history is for Lezama an inherently unstable system of signification as 
a result of its constitution by images in constant processes of transformation and 
combination, for Tate the prose polemicist, history is an essentially linear, 
epistemologically stable movement of ascendance or decline, in negation of the more 
questioning poetic subjectivity at work in the “Ode.”  Whereas that poetic voice 
interrogates the nature and utility of the images of the past that emerge in the 
imagination, the prose voice illustrates Tate’s Spenglerian vision, wherein the history of a 
society is seen as moving through clearly definable stages of development or decadence.   
Yoking history to tradition in the essay, Tate allows the regionalist author little creative 
agency; her role is to represent cultural phenomena accurately and to contextualize them 
historically.  Although Tate recognizes the role of the imagination in filling in gaps in 
historical data in order to construct a living image of human experience in history, the 
 271
imaginative freedom of the author is always circumscribed by the investigative and 
critical nature of her project.  This restriction contrasts profoundly with the imaginative 
reconstitution of history in Lezama’s theory of the image. 
 In spite of these incongruities of approach to the questions of history, religiosity 
and the role of literature, the anti-imperialist goals and the discursive strategies that 
uphold them in Tate’s essay find a sympathetic interlocutor outside the dominant 
origenista agendas described above, in the textual space the magazine’s younger editor 
opens within the journal.  The fact that Rodríguez Feo is responsible for contacting U.S. 
authors such as Tate and soliciting submissions from them is the first clue that his agenda 
is to inflect the magazine’s dominant project (as largely defined by Lezama) in a 
particular way.  Not only does he facilitate the concrete process of textual transfer, but his 
critical essays work in tandem with Tate’s methodology, providing a sympathetic textual 
support for the U.S. author’s contribution.  The concrete historical analysis and explicit 
political engagement of his criticism not only harmonize with Tate’s methods, but also 
contribute to the Orígenes project in a unique way generally ignored by scholars of 
Cuban literature. 
  A particularly striking example of these traits is Rodríguez Feo’s 1944 essay on 
George Santayana.  The opening statement of the essay echoes Tate’s critique of the 
pragmatism and greed of the industrialized North (though the Cuban author, significantly, 
attributes these qualities to U.S. culture as a whole).  This statement clears a space within 
Orígenes for the discursive operations of Tate’s essay: 
Para reafirmar los valores espirituales del hombre frente a cualquier momento 
histórico que exige como realidad salvadora valores prácticos y una moral de 
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acción justificada por el éxito material, han surgido en los Estados Unidos críticos 
geniales que han dejado oír su voz en la historia con una claridad terrible. (35) 
 
In order to reaffirm man’s spiritual values in the face of a historical moment that 
demands, as a saving reality, practical values and a morality of action justified by 
material success, there have emerged in the United States brilliant critics who 
have let their voice be heard in history with a terrible clarity. 
Rodríguez Feo celebrates the role of the cultural critic who elucidates and opposes the 
forces of moral and spiritual disintegration in a society, a role he identifies in Santayana 
and simultaneously seeks to exemplify in his own analysis.   
 The kind of critique that Rodríguez Feo advocates and practices contrasts with the 
dominant methodology of Orígenes we have already discussed; it does not describe 
cultural problems in poetic and spiritual terms, even though poetic creation and 
religiosity are still core values.  Instead, he is attentive to the material foundations of 
cultural tendencies.  In contrast to the malleable temporality that is implied in Lezama’s 
vision of history as constituted by images, Rodríguez Feo employs a temporally linear 
conception of cultural evolution.     
 Following his opening proclamation, Rodríguez Feo moves not to Santayana, but 
to Emerson, in an effort to reconstruct some of the stages in the evolution of pragmatism, 
individualism and materialism in U.S. culture.  Rodríguez Feo identifies in Emerson’s 
transcendentalism the origins of an important force in this evolution.  Emerson’s rejection 
of Calvinism engenders an optimism about humanity’s capacity for self-determination 
and a sense of moral infallibility that fuel the doctrine of Manifest Destiny and is 
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exploited by captains of industry.  The savage capitalism of the early twentieth century 
thus has clear roots in Emerson’s thinking in the 1830s: 
Las mismas fuentes de riquezas que parecían inagotables iban siendo controladas 
por un grupo cada vez más limitado de grandes magnates que invocaban la 
filosofía emersoniana como justificación de sus hazañas predatorias.  Aun hoy la 
lectura favorita de Henry Ford son las obras de Emerson.  (36)  
 
The same sources of wealth that seemed inexhaustible became controlled by an 
increasingly limited group of large magnates who invoked Emersonian 
philosophy as justification for their predatory exploits.  Even today, Henry Ford’s 
favorite readings are the works of Emerson. 
In addition to the linearity of Rodríguez Feo’s analysis, we find a more explicitly political 
critique of U.S. imperialism than is allowed within the dominant agenda of the magazine.  
Noting that there is a very similar critique of Emerson in Tate’s 1928 essay on Emily 
Dickinson strengthens our impression of a fundamental philosophical and methodological 
consonance between Tate and Rodríguez Feo. 9  Noting this consonance, it becomes 
clearer why the Cuban editor would solicit a contribution from a writer whose work on 
the surface seems so incompatible with the magazine’s projects. 
 The concrete historical and political foundations of both Rodríguez Feo and 
Tate’s critical work contrast with the dominant notions of nationhood and history in 
Orígenes, though perhaps the specificity and force of their critiques of imperialism are 
not completely at odds with the magazine’s generally metaphorical and only obliquely 
political discourses.  Though recontextualizing Tate’s essay has underlined a dissonance 
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within the Orígenes project, that dissonance can be perceived as part of a broader 
harmony.  We are led to this consideration by noting the striking duality of Rodríguez 
Feo himself, who participates in the espousal of both concrete and metaphorical modes of 
cultural critique in Orígenes.  It is likely that he saw no necessary conflict between the 
two activities.  As we have seen in the passage from “La otra desintegración,” Rodríguez 
Feo and Lezama note the presence of a “critical index” that supports the project of the 
creative revitalization of a culture.  Rodríguez Feo, both as editor and as critic, works to 
establish such an index in the magazine, one that supports the resistance of corruption 
and imperialism from within a clear historiographical and political framework.  Thus, it 
becomes clear that within the magazine’s polyvocality there must be a reconciliation 
between the diametric poles of historical analysis and explicit political engagement on the 
one hand, and the shaping of poetic images on the other.  The transformative agency of 
image and metaphor that Lezama celebrates is strengthened when the reader can refer to a 
clear historical and political “index.”   
 Lezama’s poetic approach to cultural critique and renovation derives force from 
its discursive exclusion of techniques found to be too specific and dependent upon 
immediate context.  If more specific political advocacy and historical narrative were 
deployed within Lezama’s approach to cultural analysis, broadly ranging and flexible 
metaphors for cultural phenomena would be tied down to limiting definitions.  Yet, the 
presence, within the broader intertextual network of the literary journal, of Rodríguez 
Feo’s markers of concrete historical and political realities exerts a stabilizing and 
orienting force on Lezama’s metaphors.  Furthermore, it does so without compromising 
the internal consistency of Lezama’s approach.  This delicate balance exemplifies 
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Rodríguez Feo’s and Lezama’s assertions of the strength that polyvocality confers upon 
the journal through the mechanism of intertextuality.  Each contributor and each text is 
permitted an integrity that allows for the development of forcefully personal propositions, 
while the intertextual relationships within the journal create enriching inflections and 
recontextualizations.     
 Taking an approach that is attentive to both the contrasts and the parallels of 
philosophy and approach in Orígenes and within Rodríguez Feo himself, we can more 
properly assess the complexity of the encounter between Tate’s essay and its new 
context.  “The New Provincialism” must be seen working in tandem with Rodríguez 
Feo’s essay on Santayana, as both texts place concrete markers on the imperialist forces 
threatening Cuban culture within the space of the magazine’s more abstract, 
philosophical and aesthetic projects.  This concrete basis strengthens the force of 
resistance through image-making by providing a firm conceptual support.   
 
  
“El Nuevo Provincialismo”: The Reshaping and Appropriation of Tate’s Text 
through Translation 
 Having established both the conflicts and the confluences of agenda and 
methodology between Tate’s English text and its Cuban context, it is essential to proceed 
to the final step of analyzing how the translation of the English text into Spanish 
negotiates this varied intertextual terrain.  The translation of the text must deal with these 
issues and find a way of making the original speak in a new language and bear relevance 
to the magazine into which it is incorporated.  As André Lefevere asserts, the translator’s 
“ideology” (how she envisions the ideal society) in conjunction with her “poetics” (or 
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how she views the ideal literary work) inform the process of translation (14).  Further, we 
must see how ideology and poetics work in relation to one another, such that an ideal role 
for a literary work within a society is envisioned.  Rodolfo Tro’s association with aspects 
of the Orígenes ideology and poetics informs disruptions that occur in the transfer 
process and in the less noticeable consonances.  Attention to these textual features 
renders a better understanding of how “The New Provincialism” is redeployed within a 
new cultural space. 
 Taken as a whole, the textual refractions that Tro’s translations enact do not 
represent a radical intervention.  The basic structure of Tate’s argument is fairly well 
represented in the translation.  Nonetheless, Tro’s translation attenuates the urgency of 
Tate’s argument, even if it does not radically alter it.  As we have established, many of 
the essay’s rhetorical techniques are gauged to produce two basic effects—the clear 
development of a conceptual opposition and the evocation of a sense of the urgency that 
one side of that opposition ultimately win out.  At a number of moments in the translated 
text, we see that these effects are not fully reproduced.  This process of attenuation occurs 
on both semantic and mechanical levels.  The translation refracts the original to produce 
an image of the text that is more easily incorporated into the varied cultural projects of 
Orígenes. 
 There is one significant moment in Tro’s translation where the transfer of sense 
breaks down.  It is an important moment in which Tate contests the “provincial” assertion 
that regionalism is solipsistic and must be opened up to a global commerce of ideas.  Tate 
asserts: “… the logical opposite, or the historic complement, of the isolated community 
or region is not the world community or world region” (264).  The complementary 
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principle that should be present in order to balance the small-mindedness and 
combativeness that is latent in regionalism is what Tate calls “a nonpolitical or supra-
political culture … a sufficient unity somewhere at the top, to check the drive of mere 
interest…” (265).  As Tate goes on to explain, the cultural formation that provides this 
“unity” is not a global mindset such as the competing ideology espouses, but rather “a 
peculiar balance of Greek culture and Christian other-worldliness” (265).  Thus, we 
observe an illustrative moment in Tate’s overarching project of resisting the imposition of 
a global mindset on Southern regionalism, a project that a certain concept of religious 
“other-worldliness” helps achieve.   
 In Tro’s translation, the sentence that begins “For the logical opposite…” is 
broken into two sentences that dismantle the sense of the original: “Porque la historia 
opone o complementa.  La comunidad o región aislada, no es comunidad mundial o 
región mundial” (34) (“Because history opposes or complements.  The isolated 
community is not a world community or a world region”).  The effect of this breakdown 
on the translated text is to check the progress of Tate’s argument at a moment when he is 
refuting crucial tenets of an opposing ideology.  As a result, the translation does not 
contest the globalizing ideology of “provincialism” with the same thoroughness and 
systematic progress of the original.  Looking at the translation as a whole, we must assert 
that Tate’s argument does indeed come through, but the moment at which its careful 
development momentarily breaks down attenuates the argument’s force.     
 Investigating this same passage in the translation further, we see that the 
introduction of the concept of “Christian other-worldliness,” to which the sentence about 
regionalism’s “historic complement” opens the way, is not tied so closely in logical 
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opposition to the Northern ideology nor employed as effectively in combating that 
ideology.  With the sense of the aforementioned sentence erased, the concept of “other-
worldliness” emerges somewhat more abruptly, and stands out own its own as a result.  
This effect is highly significant, as it represents a moment in which the translation has 
recast Tate’s argument in terms that pose religiosity in a less utilitarian way.  Instead of 
serving a somewhat strictly delimited function in the opposition of a globalist ideology, 
that religiosity stands out more prominently from the terrain of the argument as a value in 
itself, an aspect of Western culture to be celebrated on its own merits.   
 The fact that Tro translates the term “other-worldliness” as “Piedad” (“Piety”) 
heightens this effect.  Whereas Tate opposes religiosity to “worldliness” or pragmatism, 
Tro employs a term (“Piety”) that effaces that oppositional relationship.  The 
capitalization of the word further elevates it, moving it above the functional level of its 
English equivalent.  This translational move is similar to Rodríguez Feliú treatment of the 
image of the dove in Stevens’s poem.  The translation bears the distinct trace of a 
religious project that is fundamental to the translator’s politics and poetics.  Thus, we 
observe a significant moment in which an aspect of the original text that conflicts with 
the ideology of its new context is suppressed and replaced by rhetorical techniques that 
are more consonant with that ideology. 
 The development of Tate’s argument is also held in check and its illocutionary 
force reduced on a grammatical level.  Another early passage in which Tate establishes a 
conceptual support for his defense of regionalism serves as a good example.  After 
mentioning a few authors who represent examples of literary nationalism—Van Wyck 
Brooks, Alfred Kazin, and Bernard De Voto—Tate asserts quite forcefully that the 
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influence of these authors “…is no longer very much felt by anybody who seriously 
writes…”  The explanation for this criticism is the assertion that a national literature has 
not yet existed in the United States: “...it is sufficient here merely to state the paradox that 
not even literary nationalism could abort a genuine national literature when it is ready to 
appear; when, in fact, we become a nation.  But it is more likely that we may become an 
internation first” (262-63).  An attack on the aforementioned writers serves as a lead-in 
for Tate to refute not only “literary nationalism,” but more profoundly, the very notion 
that the United States is one nation.  He thus asserts the priority of regional divisions over 
any notion of a unified national culture, a move that helps clear the way for his 
development of regionalism as a literary, cultural and political value system, as we have 
seen.   
 In Tro’s translation, the subjunctive mood that sustains the concept of the 
inexistence of a national culture in the original is discarded in favor of the indicative: 
…nos parece suficiente hacer presente la paradoja, que ni aún el nacionalismo 
literario puede hacer abortar una literatura nacional legítima, cuando está 
preparada a aparecer, cuando, de hecho, hemos llegado a convertirnos en una 
nación.  Pero es mucho más lógico, que nos convirtamos primero en una 
internación. (32) [emphasis mine] 
 
…it seems sufficient to us to make present the paradox that not even literary 
nationalism can abort a legitimate national literature, when it is prepared to 
appear, when, in fact, we have become a nation.  But it is much more logical that 
we would convert ourselves first into an internation. 
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Employing the indicative in the verbs “puede,” “está” and “hemos,” Tro obscures the 
negation that underlies Tate’s argument.  The use of the subjunctive in each of these 
cases would underline the fact that the national literature and culture do not exist at the 
moment of the utterance, projecting the possibility of its existence into an uncertain 
future.  The stance of the translation is more neutral with respect to the existence or 
inexistence of a national literature or culture, and the translated text thus refutes 
nationalism less forcefully.  The result of this effect is to establish a less solid foundation 
for the espousal of regionalism in the passages that follow.  Again, the force of Tate’s 
essay is attenuated, in this case, on a grammatical level. 
 Though Tro’s translation gives the reader a sense of the specific cultural and 
historical allusions by which Tate strengthens his argument, many of the original’s 
references are rendered incorrectly.  The result is a blurring of the concrete nature of 
Tate’s discourse.  This effect on the original is consonant with the dominant method of 
cultural commentary in Orígenes, where excessive specificity is avoided in order to 
develop arguments of much broader cultural and historical relevance.  The misspelling of 
“Bourbon County” as “el Condado de Bourhorn” (33) is one example of this blurring. 
 Though it is clear that a conflict with the Orígenes methodology is a factor in this 
blurring, it also illustrates an essential problem with the “translation” of proper nouns in 
general.   The error calls attention to a fundamental fact of any translation: that the 
meanings of many concrete cultural references are not fully transferable to another 
cultural context.  As Susan Bassnett-McGuire reminds us, in a paraphrase of Georges 
Mounin, translation is “…a series of operations of which the starting point and the end 
product are significations and function within a given culture” (15).  Even if the 
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geographical term is spelled correctly, its significance cannot be replicated in a foreign 
cultural context.10  Thus, the error underscores an inevitable effect any translation would 
have on Tate’s discourse: the cultural specificity with which he advances his argument 
must necessarily recede toward the background in a translation.  Conceptual supports for 
his argument that are less dependent on shared cultural understandings will be more 
likely to survive the transfer process. 
 Finally, the processes we have touched on so far are at work even at a 
typographical level.  Though Tate’s use of italics for emphasis at various points in the 
text hardly stands out to the reader as a particularly salient feature of his rhetoric, the 
absence of those italics in the translation calls attention to their effect in the original.  The 
italics mark concepts or logical connections that are of special importance to Tate’s 
argument.  Often, they highlight a contrast between regionalism and provincialism in a 
way that crystallizes the sense of an unequal opposition between the two ideologies.  In 
the case of Tate’s discussion of provincialism’s reliance on the technological means of 
communication and the acceleration in the processes of human communication, he offers 
the regionalist counterpoint, wherein the content of messages is considered above the 
speed with which they can be delivered: “The real end, as I see it, is what you are 
communicating after you get the physical means of communication” (264).  This 
emphasized “what” establishes an opposition to an unstated “how,” resulting in a succinct 
polarity that presents the reader with a forceful contrast between provincialism and 
regionalism.   In the translation, the emphasis on “what” is absent, and subsequently, the 
way in which that word stands out as a particularly effective rhetorical concentration of 
an opposition is not reproduced in the translation.  The concept of the opposition between 
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speed and content of communication is still carried over into the translation, but the 
emphasis on the latter, as well as its use as a cipher or signpost of a whole constellation 
of oppositions between provincialism and regionalism, is lost. 
 The ways in which Tro’s translation refracts the original text determine how the 
translation is designed to work in the context of Orígenes.  The moments where the 
progression of Tate’s argument is interrupted and his emphatic tone is subdued, we see 
the function of the original being altered to work more harmoniously with the dominant 
cultural projects pursued in the magazine.  Though both basic arguments are at times 
softened, there are more moments where the specific idea of regionalism is undermined 
in the translation than there are instances where the basic anti-imperialist implications of 
that argument are threatened.   
 The result is a text that has been processed to function less conflictively within a 
Cuban cultural project that describes itself as national.  The specific features of Tate’s 
argument that pose regionalism against the incursions of notions of cultural nationalism 
do not work as well in the context of Orígenes.  Tate’s assertions of the importance of an 
attentiveness to cultural specificities and to the value of tradition are more easily 
transmuted into expressions of value for the origenistas—they too respond to notions of 
what their culture and tradition are and should be.  But the mechanics through which Tate 
makes these assertions in the service of a subnational cultural basis for literature are not 
fully replicated in the translated text because their full presence in the context of the 
magazine would be anomalous. 
 Tate’s deconstruction of the hegemony that the ideology of provincialism seeks to 
sustain is also at times attenuated in Tro’s translation, but Tro’s translation generally 
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preserves the original’s deconstructive project.  In this way, the translation allies itself 
with the critiques of U.S. culture in Rodríguez Feo’s critical and editorial work.  If Tro’s 
translation attenuates the force of Tate’s avocation of regionalism, it generally maintains 
the force of his anti-imperialism.   
 At the moments where the anti-imperialist force of the original is reduced in the 
translation, the text shifts back toward the majority position of Orígenes, which asserts 
that the concrete description of the political threats to Cuban culture is less important than 
the positing and resisting of those threats in spiritual and creative terms.  Thus, we can 
observe oscillations in the function of Tro’s translation in the context of Orígenes 
between the concrete and the imagistic poles of the journal’s project. 
 
Conclusion 
 Allen Tate’s essay “The New Provincialism” takes a forceful stand on the 
question of the role of literature in society.  His assertions spring from cultural and 
political agendas that have undergone a complex evolution over the course of his career.  
Particularly, the conflict between certainty and ambivalence about the stability and utility 
of history as a system of meaning is a dynamic that helps us to understand the dogmatic 
nature of Tate’s take on the question of history in “Provincialism.”  As we have noted, 
the poem “Ode to the Confederate Dead,” with its depiction of historical figures as 
images, and its questioning of human access to the past, would have been a more likely 
text for incorporation into the conceptual context of Orígenes. 
 Yet, Rodríguez Feo solicits from Tate a text that is generally at odds with the 
journal’s overarching methodologies.  This fact illustrates Rodríguez Feo’s contrapuntal 
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function.  He often sees his role as editor as one of introducing challenging differences 
into the textual space of Orígenes.  If Lezama and Vitier are the most prolific and 
articulate definers of a coherent cultural agenda for the magazine, Rodríguez Feo 
introduces texts that challenge that coherence in a productive way. 
 By publishing Tate’s text, Rodríguez Feo introduces a concrete mode of discourse 
that relies on a stable sense of cultural history into a project that generally organizes itself 
around the dynamic nature of the metaphor and the malleability of history.  This gesture 
is part of a broader pattern in Rodríguez Feo’s work for Orígenes.  As we have asserted, 
Rodríguez Feo’s critical work evidences an orientation toward sociological and historical 
analysis that is similar to Tate’s.  This critical work addresses the issue of U.S. capitalism 
and imperialism with a directness that is also consonant with Tate’s approach.  Thus, our 
analysis of the interaction of Tate’s text with its new Cuban context has had the valuable 
effect of emphasizing a mode of anti-imperialist discourse in Orígenes that generally 
goes unnoticed.   
 Finally, we have seen how Rodolfo Tro mediates the encounter between Tate’s 
essay and the various conceptual structures of Orígenes.  Tro’s translation manipulates 
the original such that Tate’s assertion of the importance of regionalism is attenuated, 
while the warning about the growing threat of U.S. cultural imperialism is preserved.  
The first of these translation effects is part of an agenda to incorporate the text into a 
Cuban national, rather than regional context.  The second represents an implicit 
allegiance to Rodríguez Feo’s agenda of maintaining a strain of thought that is eccentric 
to, yet supportive of, the dominant poetics of Orígenes.  
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Notes to Chapter Four 
 
 
1 Underwood’s biography of Tate is quite detailed and useful, though its narrative 
ends in 1938; a second volume is projected.  Squires’s biography is less detailed, though 
it includes more illustrative readings of Tate’s literary work.  Stewart offers an excellent 
history of Tate’s thinking, in the context of the author’s participation in the Fugitive and 
Agrarian movements.  The reader can also use Stewart’s work to place Tate’s work in 
relation to the work of John Crowe Ransom and Robert Penn Warren. 
2 Louise Cowan asserts in her 1955 essay on the Fugitives that the Scopes trial 
was the most proximate cause of Tate’s emerging Southern patriotism (191). 
3 In “The Profession of Letters in the South” (1935), Tate laments the attempts of 
social sciences to impose orderly patterns on human social existence through “…the 
statistical survey and the conviction that society lives by formula…” (Essays 518).    
4 The original manuscript of the poem, completed in December of 1926, bears the 
title “Elegy for the Confederate Dead,” and includes annotations by John Crowe Ransom.  
The manuscript is in the possession of the American Academy of Arts and Letters. The 
first published version of the poem appeared with the title “Ode to the Confederate Dead 
(1861-65)” in American Caravan: A Yearbook of American Literature, pp.  792-94.   
There were many substantive revisions until 1937, when the poem assumed the form in 
which it is anthologized today.  All citations are from this “final” version, as found in 
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Collected Poems 1919-1976.  For an analysis of the revision process, see Lawrence 
Kingsley, “The Text of Allen Tate’s ‘Ode to the Confederate Dead.’”   
5 The speech was delivered on January 6, 1941.  The four freedoms outlined in the 
speech were: “freedom of speech and expression,”  “freedom to worship God in [one’s] 
own way,”  “freedom from want,” and “freedom from fear.”   
6 Rodríguez Feo’s intent in publishing Gordon’s essay was clearly different from 
his purposes in selecting Tate’s essay.  In a letter dated April 2, 1954, Rodríguez Feo tells 
Gordon: “I think your essay has a special interest to our Latin American readers, because 
of the point of view from which you examine the art of writing novels and also because 
you discuss several Catholic writers who are very popular down here among us novel-
readers.”  Whereas Tate’s essay interests Rodríguez Feo for its anti-imperialism and its 
historical-sociological methodology, Gordon’s assertions are meant to enter into dialogue 
with the question of the relevance of religious doctrine to literature in Orígenes.  Clearly, 
Gordon’s dogmatism bears a problematic relationship to origenista religiosity, though it 
forms an interesting point of reference for the journal’s ideologies.   
7 The handful of letters from Rodríguez Feo to Tate that can be found in Princeton 
University’s archives do not give us much information about Tate’s intentions in using 
“The New Provincialism.”  In a letter dated February 15 [1945], the Cuban editor simply 
expresses his appreciation: “In the Winter issue of ORIGENES you will see your essay 
on Provincialism.  I am sorry I could not publish it before but you can see our magazine 
only counts 48 pages.  Thank again [sic] for the privilege of printing it and allowing our 
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Spanish readers to see the work of one distinguished American critic who is not known 
south of the border.” 
8 For example, Orígenes distances itself from Afro-Cuban literature and art, 
which it considers a folkloric phenomenon adverse to the creation of a viable national 
literature.  The only exceptions to this stance are the essays and stories of Lydia Cabrera. 
9 In his essay on Emily Dickinson, Tate asserts that “…for Emerson man is 
greater than any idea and, being himself the Over-Soul, is innately perfect; there is no 
struggle because … there is no possibility for error” (Essays 284-5).  This statement is 
remarkably similar to Rodríguez Feo’s assertion of the dangerous optimism that 
Emerson’s thought encouraged.  This parallel marks a basic similarity of analytical 
orientation between the two writers. 
10 Jacques Derrida explores the problematics of translating proper nouns in his 
essay “Des Tours de Babel.”  He illustrates the duality of the proper noun with the 
example of “Babel”: a pure, untranslatable reference to a tower and a city, and a dynamic 
grouping of religious, historical and cultural associations, which could be translated, 





 The sophistication and polyvocality of the Orígenes project has encouraged the 
development of a sizeable body of scholarly work.  The consistently high quality of the 
literary work it presents, along with its unique orientation toward issues of aesthetics, 
epistemology, religious and cultural traditions, politics and national identity, have marked 
out a fertile ground for study of these qualities within the implicit frame of Cuban 
national culture.  What this study has attempted to develop is the projection of the 
origenista aesthetics and ideology toward a zone of transnational contact with the United 
States.  For an influence study, such a choice would render unsatisfactory results.  Clearly 
the origenistas, if asked to trace the genealogies of their modes of expression, would 
point to Spanish literature of the early twentieth century and of the Golden Age, and 
mention the inevitable influence of French Symbolist poets.   
 The central operation under study here has not been influence, but rather the 
journal’s negotiation, on the established terms of its own cultural agendas, with a group 
of foreign authors.  The analysis of particularly illustrative moments in this negotiation 
has enlarged and inflected our understanding of the nature of those origenista agendas.  
The ways in which the journal engages in dialogue with foreign texts offer useful insights 
into the most fundamental and operative aspects of origenismo.   
 Thus, we observe how Rodríguez Feo and Rodríguez Feliú express and defend 
their journal’s opposition to an empiricist or realist aesthetics in their interactions with 
Wallace Stevens.  Rodríguez Feo’s assertions of the centrality of Platonism to his 
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thinking about art and his interest in Spanish mysticism resist Stevens’s empiricist agenda 
by advocating the primacy of the abstract concept and of spiritual feeling in poetic 
expression.  His insistence on a readerly sensibility highlights the valuation of 
intertextuality in Orígenes and conflicts with Stevens’s suspicion of textual influence.  
Rodríguez Feliú’s translations of Stevens’s poems continue Rodríguez Feo’s negotiations 
with Stevens by attenuating the force of the U.S. poet’s arguments for a realist and anti-
intertextual aesthetics.  In a more dramatic act of manipulation, Rodríguez Feliú 
introduces imagery with strong religious resonances into a poem that originally advocates 
a pure empiricism.   
 This act is repeated in Rodríguez Feo’s translation of “Attempt to Discover Life”; 
the Cuban translator takes a scene that suggests illness and exploitation and animates it 
with intimations of redemption and regeneration.  The difference in Rodríguez Feo’s 
translational intervention is that is clearly invited by the schematic structure of the 
original, which Stevens uses to provoke just the kind of poetic rewriting the translator 
enacts.  This dynamic, wherein writing already imagines itself in relation to a later 
translation, and the translation responds to this gesture, forms part of a remarkably rich 
pattern of textual dialogue between Stevens and Rodríguez Feo. 
 Rodríguez Feo’s incorporation of Stevens’s essay “The Relations between Poetry 
and Painting” continues this dialogue, as its thematics shifts to issues of art and 
abstraction.  Further, it continues the interaction between the religiosity of Orígenes and 
the skepticism of Stevens, through the introduction of the U.S. poet’s Nietzschean 
concept of the Supreme Fiction.  Again, Rodríguez Feo allows a profound conceptual 
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conflict to occur in this interaction, though this conflict continues a thread of exchange on 
issues of spirituality that can be found throughout the exchange. 
 Responding to the poetry of T. S. Eliot, both Rodríguez Feo and Lezama’s 
negotiations are more hostile.  Both Rodríguez Feo’s translation and Lezama’s critique 
produce a caricature of the U. S. poet’s philosophy, religiosity and personal 
characteristics that implicitly elevates opposite qualities with which the journal identifies 
itself: an optimistic and open attitude toward the complexities of worldly existence, a 
celebration of the body, and an assertion of the supreme creative agency of the poet.  As 
we have seen, an essential misreading of Eliot’s religious thinking, especially his use of 
the mysticism of St. John of the Cross, motivates the textual caricature that emerges.  The 
mechanics of this misreading illustrate the revision of the Spanish mystic tradition that is 
operative in the Orígenes project. 
 In our intertextual reading of Tate’s “The New Provincialism,” we see how 
Rodríguez Feo and Rodolfo Tro negotiate with Tate’s historiography, his aesthetics and 
his politics in a fashion determined by the complexity of their individual visions of the 
meaning of origenismo.  Rodríguez Feo solicits Tate’s essay in order to both inflect and 
support the journal’s insistence on an abstract and relatively non-political mode of 
cultural discourse.  The Cuban editor suggests a revision of his journal’s fundamental 
philosophy through his inclusion of Tate’s text, introducing a more linear, historical, 
political and sociological approach to the question of literature’s relevance to the 
development of a culture.  This act is deployed in concert with the concrete and historical 
modes of analysis in Rodríguez Feo’s critical essays.  Rodolfo Tro enacts his own 
negotiation through his translation.  By blurring the concept of regionalism, Tro 
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suppresses a conflict with the focus on national culture in Orígenes.  By allowing the 
essential force of Tate’s anti-imperialist polemic to make itself felt in the translation, Tro 
works with Rodríguez Feo’s implicit agenda of sustaining a more directly confrontational 
political discourse in Orígenes, to support the more abstract, poetic anti-imperialism 
espoused by Lezama and others. 
 
Reflecting Back on the Original 
 The analysis of any translation necessitates a careful reading of the original.  This 
study has attempted to produce a close reading of the original that makes possible a more 
informed analysis of the translation.  The relationship between close reading and 
translation analysis focuses the perspective of the former in accordance with the salient 
features of the latter.  This focusing is constructive; it requires a discipline that can 
enhance the value of the close reading. 
 In the case of our analysis of the Rodríguez Feo-Stevens nexus, our reading of 
translation within the context of a broader, multivalent textual exchange has underlined 
Stevens’s empiricism, a characteristic that does not receive much attention in most 
readings.  Stevens is generally understood as an “abstract” poet, influenced by French 
Symbolism, and possessed of a remarkable ability to sustain poetic meditations on 
philosophical questions.  This understanding generally ignores the intensity with which 
the poet attempted to coordinate abstraction with empirical observation in the 1940s and 
1950s.  Helen Vendler’s On Extended Wings: Wallace Stevens’ Longer Poems offers a 
brilliant analysis of the operations of Stevens’s poetics, though, when it comes to the 
question of origins, asserts: “Stevens’s imagery … is a system of self-reference, and is its 
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own explanation” (9).  By placing emphasis on Stevens’s interactions with Rodríguez 
Feo, we are lead to a different mode of analysis, one that would understand the processes 
of abstraction and metaphor as emerging from a particular discipline of observation.   
 The caricature of Eliot’s poems in Rodríguez Feo’s translations focuses our 
reading on the complexity and duality of the originals.  Jewel Spears Brooker’s notion of 
liminality, or “betweenness” proves to be a particularly valuable concept for approaching 
Eliot’s Quartets, and can be better appreciated after observing how Rodríguez Feo seeks 
to transform that liminality into a simplistic polarity.  The schematized characterizations 
of Eliot’s work by Rodríguez Feo and Lezama impel the reader toward a better 
understanding of an opposite reality: the movements between abnegation and sense 
experience, atemporality and temporality.  Appreciating Eliot’s attempts to reconcile the 
darkness of abnegation with the light and “grace of sense,” we come to an agreement 
with Denis Donoghue’s assertion: “It would be absurd to repeat the canard that Eliot 
hated life and longed only to be rid of it.  The poet … felt the ravishments of sense just as 
keenly as those poets who advertise their possession of such opulence” (7). 
 Finally, our contextualization of Allen Tate’s “The New Provincialism” in 
Orígenes has contributed to a fuller understanding of the peculiarities of his methods.  In 
particular, the conflict between his use of history and Lezama’s poetic historiography 
leads to a closer examination of the construction of a particularly useful version of history 
in relation to a dominant political agenda in the present.  Questioning Tate’s use of a 
particular historical nostalgia, we have observed how that nostalgia compensates for a 
profound questioning of the epistemology of history found in his most famous poem.  
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The relation of Tate’s essayistic historiography to its foreign context highlights the 
fissures and repressions that mark his discourse. 
 
The Diverse Functions of Translation  
 The methodological emphases of this study have not only allowed us useful 
insights into the Orígenes project and various characteristics of Stevens’s, Eliot’s and 
Tate’s work, but also have illustrated some of the subtle implications of translation acts in 
general.  It is hoped that these discoveries might encourage studies of translation in other 
areas of literary history that allow for a broader vision of translation’s role in 
transnational negotiations of discourse. 
 First, I have attempted to illustrate the importance of evaluating the processes of a 
translation in relation to a set of articulated literary agendas.  Further, through the 
operations of my interpretation, I espouse a method that looks to a more specific and 
proximate literary context for the operations of translations than a broadly defined 
linguistic, or even national, “tradition.”  I assert in this study that the translational 
interventions under consideration emerge from specific aspects of an agenda shared by a 
particular group of Cuban writers.  The case of translations published in literary journal is 
particularly illustrative of the necessity of this kind of focus.  The unity that a journal 
seeks to achieve across the breadth of its contents, in conjunction with the polemical acts 
of self-definition it deploys, produce the most relevant and coherent context for 
considering the implications of a translation. 
 I assert two basic modes in which translation acts relate to this sharply defined 
context: incorporation and counterpoint.  As incorporation, translation acts on those 
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aspects of a text that produce irreconcilable and unproductive dissonances with the 
conceptual context of the journal.  We have seen how Rodríguez Feliú has reshaped 
Stevens’s poems in order to attenuate their empirical and antitextual assertions.  Also, we 
have seen how Rodolfo Tro obfuscates the communication of the notion of regionalism in 
Tate’s essay, as he sees no productive way of relating such an idea to the national 
perspective of Orígenes. 
 The second of these modes preserves or even exaggerates crucial differences of 
idea or methodology between the translated text and its new context.  As we have seen, 
this type of gesture can have varying effects.  In the case of Rodríguez Feo’s caricature of 
Eliot’s mysticism, this underlining of difference serves to highlight a feature of the target 
context and advocate for its defense, through parodic attacks on the source text’s 
conceptual structures.  Where the same editor, working together with translator Rodolfo 
Tro, allows Tate’s argumentative methodology to conflict with its origenista context, he 
seeks to revise and inflect a dominant tenet of the journal’s ideology.  As a result, he 
underscores an alternative methodology his own work implicitly advocates.  Thus, the 
contrapuntal mode of translation can be deployed to defend or reshape a domestic 
context.  In both cases, and in contrast to the incorporative mode, the difference that the 
original text presents is seen as potentially productive. 
 Finally, as we have seen in our analysis of the dialogue between Rodríguez Feo 
and Stevens, translation can form part of a broader intercourse that takes place through 
other textual channels.  In collating the various materials relevant to the connection 
between the two men, we observe a coherent conversation threading the disparate 
activities of correspondence, the writing of poems, and translation.  Seeing this 
 295
coherence, we are able to achieve a more detailed, subtle and satisfying reading of the 
significance of translation acts, because we have at our disposal a greater wealth of 
intertextual connections to examine.  The case of Rodríguez Feo and Stevens suggests the 
value of a more historical and archival approach to the study of translations, where 
relevant materials are available.  This approach makes possible interpretations that 
marshal more tangible textual evidence for their assumptions.   
 
Contact Zones / Reversals of Flow: A Program for Comparative Studies 
 Finally, this study, like any extended study of a literary topic that attempts to 
contribute something new to its field, presents an implicit argument for its particular 
approach.  There are two methodological convictions about literary study that are implicit 
in my approach to the encounter between Orígenes and authors from the United States.  
 The first consists of an assertion of the importance of studying Latin American 
and U.S. literatures as interlinked systems of signification.  Underlying this agenda is the 
notion that the cultural referentiality and relevance of literary production always reaches 
beyond the confines of the nation and of language.  The comparatist perspective is not a 
means for intervention, an agenda of internationalizing national cultural expressions from 
the outside.  Instead, it is a mode of literary analysis that does justice to the underlying 
international cultural relevance of all literature.   
 Our understanding of this relevance must be informed by an appreciation of the 
historical and geopolitical position of the cultures in question.  From an understanding of 
historical reality, the scholar can work toward an explication of authors’ critical and 
imaginative responses to that reality.  Thus, I have attempted to give a sense of the 
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origenistas’ reaction to the crises in national history to which they are witnesses, as well 
their responses to the knowledge that those crises are in part caused by a particular 
relationship with the United States. 
 In delineating these responses, I try to demonstrate the importance of beginning 
our analysis from a recognition of the distinctness of approach of each individual author 
within a cultural space shared by other authors.  From such a recognition, I argue for a 
view that is attentive to the complex interaction between individuality on the one hand, 
and the impulse toward a group identity that can mobilize a collective response to a 
cultural and political crisis, on the other.   
 Thus, the most immediate cultural collectivity considered in any literary study 
should be the chosen affiliation of a group of authors who imagine a common goal for 
themselves.  The literary, spiritual, and political ties that bind the Orígenes group should 
shape the most immediate context in which we analyze Lezama’s, Vitier’s, or Rodríguez 
Feo’s work.  Only after acknowledging this interactive dynamic should the scholar begin 
to suggest what an author’s claims for national or transnational relevance are.  In this 
way, we can avoid interpretive leaps from individual literary production to the question 
of that production’s relevance to national cultural circumstances without considering the 
relationality of literary production within a chosen notion of cultural belonging.  There is, 
in the case of any literary project, an intranational intertextuality that precedes and 
determines the dynamics of any kind of international intertextuality.  It is crucial to make 
the former explicit before venturing into an exploration of the latter. 
 In describing the transnational textual encounters between Orígenes and Stevens, 
Eliot and Tate, I argue for a method that engages in two different, but coordinated, modes 
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of comparison.  First, the scholar must examine the concrete points of contact between 
literary producers on each side of a cultural, national, and/or linguistic divide.  There are 
usually numerous artifacts of concrete textual encounters between literary traditions—in 
the form of correspondence, editing decisions, and translations—available to the 
researcher who wishes to realize a comparative project.  Beginning by collating these 
documents, one can reconstruct a history of contact, and subsequently analyze the 
broader cultural issues raised in that history. 
 The second mode of comparison, which tackles broader consonances and 
dissonances of literary agenda and methodology—the “compare and contrast” mode of 
analysis—should be built from the concrete materials of textual exchange gathered in the 
first mode of comparative analysis.  Thus, one can establish not only what different 
authors have in common or disagree upon, but also make the important step of explaining 
how these authors imagine their own work, the work of others, and the proper means for 
managing similarities and differences in direct contact with those others.  Upon making 
this step, we have contributed something more useful to the discussion than a broad 
analysis of common or distinct repertoires of tropes, organizing conceptual structures, or 
socio-historical experiences.  We have contributed a knowledge of how authors negotiate 
the intercultural relationality of their literary work.  This knowledge, most immediately, 
inserts a new chapter into literary history by narrating events previously ignored by 
studies with other methodological orientations.  Secondly, this knowledge helps the 
scholar reflect upon his previous understanding of an author’s work as self-sufficient 
whole, clarifying, inflecting, or disturbing previous critical encapsulations of that work. 
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 Not only do I argue for the importance of a historical and archival approach to 
projects of literary comparison, but also for the importance, within the field of translation 
studies, of studies that examine the translation of First World texts by Third World 
translators.  Currently, theoretical models for cross-cultural translation tend toward the 
examination of First World appropriations of Third World cultural expressions through 
translation.  Volumes like Bassnett and Trivedi’s Post-colonial translation: Theory and 
Practice and Maier and Dingwaney’s Between Languages and Cultures: Translation and 
Cross-Cultural Texts are outstanding contributions to what has become a highly 
developed system for analyzing the political implications of translation.  Yet, they focus 
heavily on how U.S. and Western European translators shape visions of exoticized Others 
through translation techniques that mobilize postcolonial agendas.  What is 
underemphasized in this approach is how the Latin American translator might enact a 
resistance through her construction of a First World Other. 
 Rather than negate the importance of these contributions, I wish to suggest that 
they are an excellent means of developing half of the total picture of cross-cultural 
translation.  What must be better developed is an understanding of how literary producers 
in culturally and economically colonized nations actively negotiate their relationship to a 
more dominant cultural tradition and affirm their own values through the subtle, 
multivalent, and empowering act of translation.  More studies that examine the flow of 
representation from the Third World to the First are necessary within the field of 
translation studies.  
 This reversal should not ignore the geopolitical and global economic relationship 
between two nations like the one between the U.S. and Cuba in the 1940s and 1950s.  
 299
Instead, studies should avoid drawing a false connection between such a relationship and 
the power balance inherent in a cross-cultural literary exchange.  The definition of a 
literary project and the negotiation of the interaction between that project and foreign 
texts are acts that occur in a space where power is exerted through the manipulation of 
images and discursive modes.  In this abstract scene of interaction, those who frame the 
context into which a foreign text is to be received are in a position of power.    
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